Negotiation Is Scary
Joshua Foust on May 27 2008 at 8:21 pm | Filed under: Domestic Politics, Election 2008, Foreign affairs
I’m no fan of Obama—his social programs are enough to make him a no-go in my book—but much of the hoopla over things like his foreign policy are ludicrous. Take the “negotiate without preconditions” bit. Is that really so outrageous? Many people here have argued quite vociferously that it is tantamount to retreat, surrender, appeasement, or capitulation, somehow rewarding the world’s thugs for their bad behavior. Negotiations, of course, are not a panacea, but they are a marked change from the current Administration’s mostly ineffective foreign policy, and, according to History Professor Ralph Shaffer, actually quite a good thing.
While Bush and McCain seem unmoving in their opposition to meetings between an American president and those they consider terrorists who head foreign governments, it is inconceivable that they would rule out lower echelon diplomatic contact. But their uncompromising position on high-level meetings was not held by several of their Republican predecessors. Instead, Dwight Eisenhower, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan and even George H. W. Bush met with foreign leaders whom many Americans considered to be terrorists, radicals or just plain evil dictators
The most glaring instance in which a president refused to meet with the head of a potentially threatening nation occurred not under a Republican conservative but a Democrat. In 1941 Franklin Roosevelt ignored pleas from Japanese Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoye for an urgent meeting to resolve differences between the two nations. Konoye felt that his civilian government could best be strengthened by talks between himself and Roosevelt. Throughout the summer and fall, 1941, American insistence upon detailed agreements prior to a conference aroused Japanese fears about delays that would bring a crisis before diplomats could meet. Roosevelt held firm and, with their oil supplies running low, the Japanese moved into the Dutch East Indies and simultaneously attacked American possessions in the Pacific.
Republican Cold War presidents, on the other hand, blustered publicly about “evil empires,” but went to the conference table, sometimes in secret. Dwight Eisenhower, proponent of massive retaliation and rolling back the Iron Curtain, held a crucial summit meeting with Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin at Geneva in 1955. This effort to relieve the tension that had developed between East and West over the previous decade proved more symbolic than substantive. Still, the Geneva meeting set a precedent for more productive meetings in subsequent years.
Perhaps what Bush and McCain have in mind is the danger inherent in meeting with a powerful and potentially threatening head of state without a proper awareness of your opponent’s ability and toughness in such negotiations. That situation faced an unprepared diplomatic novice, not unlike Obama, when a recently inaugurated Kennedy engaged a summit-hardened Khrushchev at Vienna in 1961. Kennedy later admitted: “He beat the hell out of me.”
Indeed, the larger danger is that Obama is not skilled or experienced at these sorts of meetings, not that he wants to hold them. “Negotiations,” as he says, “are not appeasement.” They might go nowhere. But if they do, then that is itself an important step to go through, not whether we can make them jump through the required number of hoops before we’ll even talk. That has its own set of dangers.
The point Shaffer raises about Taiwan is key as well: many of us gloss over the fact that we sold out a small democratic country in exchange for a broader goal of normalizing relations with the country everyone knew would be the regional power. Only we didn’t—Taiwan is still Taiwan, China is still China, and there is really very little danger of one taking over the other any time soon.
Perhaps there is a lesson there.
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There aren’t a lot of commentators that I’ve read who said we shouldn’t talk and negotiate with Iran, North Korea, or other roguish regimes. It’s the “I’ll have direct talks with no preconditions,” that many object to. Obama just doesn’t sound like he’d be dealing from a position of strength when he says things like that.
The state of foreign policy is not what it once was. While generally one might agree that powerful countries should require something of less powerful countries in order to negotiate with them, I think our status in the world has changed somewhat. We are currently occupying two countries one of which we invaded “pre-emptively.” We have stirred up conflict in the middle east instead of resolving it. We have created problems. I think at this point we need to show our commitment to finding solutions in that part of the world and working with their governments. Strength is good, but one can still have strength and humility.
We have created problems? There has always been conflict and problems in the Middle East. In fact, that’s been one of the arguments against intervention.
So, in what ways should we work with some of the most illiberal governments on the face of the earth? Governments which oppress their women, imprison the opposition, and kills homosexuals outright. What accommodations are you all willing to make?
Just asking, ’cause the thought of actually working with these governments leaves a pretty bad taste in my mouth.
We’ve made attempts at negotiating, offering carrot after carrot. But that’s not enough for them it seems. They are on their quest to join the ranks of countries with nuclear weapons. What they will do with them, or where they will go, is anyones guess.
They, them, these. What are you talking about? President Bush goes hat-in-hand to Saudi Arabia, which is far worse in its oppression of women, opposition persecution, and homosexual murder than Iran, yet this raises little fuss, not even here. We collaborate with Syria routinely, and have ties with Yemen and Egypt — also eggregious offenders in the areas you list.
Being a bad man or a brutal tyrant has never been of itself a barrier to dialogue. What makes Iran any different? And how would you suggest getting anything done in the region without talking to the nasty men who control it?
Also, I wouldn’t call our relationship with Iran to be “offering carrot after carrot.” Solemnly swearing not to nuke them if they give up all their leverage over us is not really a carrot.
Dealing with those regimes also leaves a bad taste in my mouth. We do maintain a non-belligerent relationship with some of them, and have been applying soft pressure on them to change. And some of them have slowly been changing.
The United States has made clear that it is prepared to join the negotiations should Iran resume full and verifiable suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities as required by the IAEA.
Iran has to take the first step, since they’ve “broken the trust” of the system. Iran isn’t willing to do that, so that is that. Iran opens up it’s nuclear program to inspection, and sanctions get dropped, among other things. That is our policy, and has been for a few years. The UNSC keeps trying to sweeten the pot, but nothing is budging the Iranians.
The EU isn’t having any better luck with negotiating with Iran either…
We have stirred up conflict in the middle east instead of resolving it.
We have created problems. I think at this point we need to show our commitment to finding solutions in that part of the world and working with their governments.
What we need to do now is finish the job in Iraq and Afganistan, while dealing with the threat in Iran. Obama ain’t the man to do it.
President Bush goes hat-in-hand to Saudi Arabia, which is far worse in its oppression of women, opposition persecution, and homosexual murder than Iran, yet this raises little fuss, not even here. We collaborate with Syria routinely, and have ties with Yemen and Egypt — also eggregious offenders in the areas you list.
Is SA far worse in its oppression of women et al?
In any case, the government of SA is at least officially working with us. They are not attempting to build nukes and they don’t control Hezbollah or similar terrorist orgs. Their patrol boats don’t play chicken with our navy. Any major change in SA would be for the worse–the SA government is playing a pragmatic role compared to the opinions of its subjects. Granted, I doubt the SA government likes us, but they realize the best path forward is to work with us. Iran is on the other side of the fence.
much of the hoopla over things like his foreign policy are ludicrous. Take the “negotiate without preconditions” bit. Is that really so outrageous?
Doesn’t it require a certain “suspension of disbelief” to make the above statement? Or are you just so into the details that the big picture is blurry?
Consider the Reverend Wright, Obama’s terrorist pal Ayers, his wife finally being proud in this country, etc., and his weak stance on the likes of Iran comes into focus.
Don, I would love to know how we “finish the job” in Iraq and Afghanistan when everyone in charge throws up their hands and say there are no more troops to add to the fight in either theater. In a universe of limited choices, you cannot simply say “both.” General Petraeus wants to keep the majority of our forces committed to Iraq, yet he believes the tribal belt in Afghanistan/Pakistan is where al-Qaeda is most active internationally and is the most likely source for the next attack on American soil. Where do you plan on drawing resources from to do it? How would you institute a top-down effectiveness review of each campaign to ensure success, and success will be measured according to which goal? Petraeus’ standard of “substantial progress,” or something legitimate and concrete?
How would you “deal with the threat in Iran” without diplomacy and negotiations, given the resource constraints we face?
It’s very nice to brag about how awesome you are. Our bragging has been rather empty in this regard, however.
How would you institute a top-down effectiveness review of each campaign to ensure success, and success will be measured according to which goal? Petraeus’ standard of “substantial progress,” or something legitimate and concrete?
Uh, what conflict couldn’t one say that about in all of history? You might find one, but the very difficulty should tell you why that argument, as I have pointed out in the past, is a standard one only applies when one has some other rationale for opposing pursuing a goal.
As for SA and Syria, exactly when has working with them engendered any sympathy here?
Lance,
In WWI and WWII, even Korea, Grenada, Haiti, Bosnia, and so on, there were concrete goals and objectives that more importantly did not change as our fortunes did. In a case like Korea, we decided the expense and trouble of a decisive military win was simply too much to bear, and settled for an imperfect compromise situation; in WWII we dropped nuclear weapons to push through our win. But in each case, the goals were concrete, definable, and the methods needed to do so not opaque.
(I bring this up because of President Bush’s fondness of comparing Iraq to WWII, which I personally find daft.)
In Iraq, we’ve gone from “it’s a cakewalk, should take 60 days, we’ll be greeted with flowers” to “we’re really hoping we keep seeing substantial progress toward a reduction in violence to give the Iraqi government space to foster reconciliation.” I.e., not only have we shifted goalposts (to borrow a term), we’ve lowered the bar.
That isn’t in of itself a bad thing, but we need to be honest that we have shifting goals, those goals change depending on our prospects, and we have an amazing propensity for overestimating our acumen at forcing other societies to follow our lead. To this day, none of those things have been acknowledged by the men in charge. And because of that, when those same men who froth at the mouth at the prospect of more war mock Obama for saying we should try something else to resolve our problems, I find their objections way less than credible.