A Second Hand Conjecture

And Egypt too:

The United States on Monday announced military aid packages worth more than $43 billion for Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states in an effort to bolster Mideast allies against Iran and others.

The United States plans to offer a $13 billion package for Egypt over 10 years and a $30 billion package for Israel over the same period, increases over previous military funding, as well as unspecified defense aid to Saudi Arabia and Gulf states, said U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

The Saudi package is expected to upgrade the country’s missile defenses and air force and increase its naval capabilities, a defense official told Reuters on Saturday. The package for Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries could reach $20 billion over 10 years, the official said.

This deal still has to be approved by Congress, and predictably there are questions being raised:

Two local congressmen are trying to block a deal to sell weapons to Saudi Arabia.

Congressmen Anthony Weiner and Jerry Nadler are introducing legislation aimed at stopping the Bush administration from going ahead with selling a $20 billion state-of-the-art weapons package to Saudi Arabia.

The package would include satellite guided bombs and new naval vessels and would also help boost the Saudi Air force. They fear the sale would put high-tech weapons in the hands of terrorists.

“A nation that sends New York 15 of 19 bombers on September 11th, provides 50 percent of all of the funding for terrorism around the world, and as much as $4 billion to Hamas shouldn’t get any U.S. taxpayer support and certainly no weapons to continue their deeds,” said Brooklyn-Queens Representative Anthony Weiner.

These are not illegitimate fears in my estimation. Saudi Arabia may not be openly hostile to us, but they are not kind in truth. Salafism is the heart and soul of our sworn terrorist enemies, and the Saudis do more than their part to promote this backwards-looking approach to Islam. However, there are real politik justifications for concluding the contemplated sale.

Israel is looking into reports that Russia plans to sell 250 advanced long-range Sukhoi-30 fighter jets to Iran in an unprecedented billion-dollar deal.

According to reports, in addition to the fighter jets, Teheran also plans to purchase a number of aerial fuel tankers that are compatible with the Sukhoi and capable of extending its range by thousands of kilometers. Defense officials said the Sukhoi sale would grant Iran long-range offensive capabilities.

Some are speculating that Iran is reacting to the deal proposed by the US, but Russia is no stranger to making arms transactions with Iran:

Despite Israeli and US opposition, Russia recently supplied Iran with advanced antiaircraft systems used to protect Teheran’s nuclear installations. At the time, Moscow said it reserved the right to sell Iran weapons, such as the antiaircraft system, that were of a defensive nature.

The Sukhoi-30 is a two-seat multi-role fighter jet and bomber capable of operating at significant distances from home base and in poor weather conditions. The aircraft enjoys a wide range of combat capabilities and is used for air patrol, air defense, ground attacks, enemy air defense suppression and air-to-air combat.

Moreover, Israel is not at all daunted by the proposition of modernizing Saudi weapons:

In a break from traditional Israeli opposition to U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said Sunday that his country understood Washington’s plan to supply state-of-the-art weapons to Riyadh as a counterweight to Iranian influence.

[…]

“We understand the need of the United States to support the Arab moderate states, and there is a need for a united front between the U.S. and us regarding Iran,” Olmert said at a weekly Cabinet meeting.

The rare agreement reflects shared U.S. and Israeli concern over the potential threat from Iran if it acquires nuclear weapons.

The cynic in me notes that Israel’s acquiescence to the deal may just as well reflect the US holding $30 Billion in aid over their heads, as it does the “Israeli concern over the potential threat from Iran” which is presented as fact by the AP report, but that’s another post for another day. Suffice it to say that buying off Saudi Arabia (and Egypt) may have salutary effects vis-à-vis Iran in the near term, much like Metternich’s Europe. However, Greg Djerejian is not so sure:

Don’t get me wrong. I wasn’t born yesterday, and I know we’ve been supplying arms to the Saudis and other Gulf States for a good while now, often for legitimate strategic reasons I’ve been supportive of. But I think this deal arguably makes us look weak to the Iranians, because in its size and the precipitous (almost Pavlovian) manner we’re pursuing it it signals irrational panic vis-a-vis the Iranians. And yes, the prospective deal, viewed through the prism of Bush’s breathtakingly naive neo-Wilsonianism (married to evangelical zealotry), does have us looking strategically incoherent and hypocritical here.

Greg goes to question whether we are really in any position to bargain with the Saudis, since from their perspective we have to counter Iran in some way or another, thus demanding Saudi help with Iraqi Sunnis is a bit of a weak gambit. He also wonders if we aren’t just pour gasoline on smoldering embers:

Regardless of all the above, let’s just pause for a second and wonder, is it wise to pump in USD 50B of arms sales in this manner at this time (at very least, as Egypt will want its cut, and others too), and in a region where a growing civil war in Iraq could still potentially cross borders? With varied cross-border activity looking to pick up around Iraq, whether reports of U.S. special forces planning to assist the Turks to hunt down PKK, the Saudis likely not materially reducing their support to varied Sunni actors in Iraq, the Iranians continuing to stealthfully consolidate control in portions of Iraq (in a manner that will only get the Saudis more concerned as time goes on, leading them to butress (sic) Sunni interests there even more)–are we not perhaps risking not only bungling the war but also now even the containment of it?

Time will tell, but my gut tells me the Iraq crisis gets even worse before it gets better. Look, to a fashion, this is just the same old arms bazaar, and we’ve been here many times before. But this is the first time a civil war was gaining steam smack in the middle of the Sunni-Shi’a divide, with us trying to bolster a Shi’a government in Iraq that will ultimately align itself with Iran likely, while arming Sunni nations abutting Iraq (not to mention the ‘right’ Sunni tribes in Iraq) arrayed against Iranian interests, and with a Turkish-Kurdish conflagration (and now, as Novak’s piece linked above claims, with potential direct U.S. involvement) always looming as a real possibility. In short, I don’t see a coherent strategy here, in fact quite the opposite, and I therefore suspect this could end in a very ugly way.

Greg raises some really good questions regarding how we may be simply fueling a potential conflagration along the “Sunni-Shi’a divide.” Arming the Saudis (and thus Sunni insurgents) while backing what many may see as their enemy’s government, could be like handing out Uzi’s to the Bloods while declaring the Crips in charge. Widen that to the whole Middle East theater and sooner or later the tension will be too much. But that all assumes that a legitimate Iraqi government representing all Iraqis, whether Sunni, Shi’ite or Kurdish, can’t be established in sort of stable manner. I’m sure that Greg believes that such an event is just a pipe dream, but the assumption should be noted.

The crux of Greg’s argument militating against arming the Saudis is that Iraq is merely involved in a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Tehran no more wants to see a Sunni resurgence than Riyadh wants to see an Iranian border state. When we funnel loads of money and military technology to the Saudis, and then back the Maliki government (which is dominated by SCIRI), we are not encouraging either the Saudis or the Iranians to quit meddling in Iraq. Greg explains it this way:

The Iranians are providing occasional support to Sadr’s JAM (and splinter factions) to keep pressure on U.S. forces, but Sadr is an Iraqi nationalist who could turn on Iran, and it is quite clear that the Iranians are only using him for short term tactical reasons …. The same logic applies to Iran’s purported occasional support to Sunni extremists operating in Iraq, again, they are being used for short-term purposes to make it harder for the U.S. to stabilize Iraq and therefore more credibly consider military strikes on Iran.

Aside from the obvious take-away that higher than Ambassadorial level discussions with the Iranians to allay such concerns … might lead to better security cooperation with Iran in Iraq, there is another element too infrequently commented on. That is, what’s likely most important for the Iranians longer-term, is enhancing SCIRI’s grip in Iraq, as well as Dawa’s too. Those are the real Iranian clients (albeit to different degrees and with varying shadings per specific political actors in each of said parties), not Sadr’s men, and the Saudis (who have a different view of Maliki than our President) understand this backdrop better and realize their Sunni brethren in Iraq could be imperiled once ‘moderates’ like Maliki better consolidate their power.

This makes sense as far as it goes, but again, it assumes that an independent Iraq is not possible. That is to say, that SCIRI really is nothing more than an Iranian puppet playing politics in Iraq. The history of SCIRI suggests that Greg is right (it was founded by Iran after all), but its more recent actions have been to turn :

Iraq’s most powerful Shi’ite party will make key changes to its platform, party officials said on Friday, in a move that will increasingly align it with Iraq’s top Shi’ite cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani…

Under the new platform, the party would get its guidance from the Shi’ite religious establishment as before, but more from Sistani, SCIRI officials said.

That would mark a shift from SCIRI’s current platform, which says the group gets its guidance from the religious establishment of Welayat al Faqih, led by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Iran.

That stance was later clarified somewhat, but the gist was clear — SCIRI (now SIIC) was asserting its independence (emphasis added):

The media bureau of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, formerly SCIRI, issued a statement late Saturday correcting what it described as “dubious remarks attributed to senior SCIRI officials” and “inaccurate analysis” made by media outlets, referring to reports that the party would distance itself from neighboring Iran. The statement said that SIIC wished to stress the independence of its political decision and that its new platform is not directed “against” anyone. SIIC would continue to reject the presence of any foreign terrorist groups in Iraq – a reference to the Iranian Mujahideen e-Khalq opposition group – and to respect the independence and sovereignty of neighboring countries. “The Iraqi people will never forget the noble positions of certain countries around the world on Iraqi issues, especially the Islamic Republic of Iran, which supported and provided refuge for hundreds of thousands of Iraqis during the tyrannical rule of the Saddamist regime,” the statement said.

Obviously, SCIRI has no desire to shun Iran entirely, but this was a not insubstantial signal that it has no plans to be a puppet state of Tehran either (see Allah Pundit’s take here). Compare to these remarks made in 2005 by Dr. Ali al-Adad, a prominent SCIRI member:

On the occasion of a conference on Iraq to be held in Cairo under the auspices of the League of Arab states, IslamOnline — a website related to the pan-Islamic (Sunni) Muslim Brotherhood — invited Dr. Ali al-Adad, to a live exchange with its readers in one of the online discussions that the website organizes regularly on very diverse issues. The exchange took place on November 17, and is posted in Arabic on IslamOnline.net.

[…]

Q: It is said that the [Cairo] conference is backed by the US in order to control the situation in Iraq and overcome the valiant Iraqi resistance in the name of opposing terrorism. How do you assess this view? Is the national entente [between Iraqis] going to allow the resistance to act against the occupiers only, or will it contribute to make the situation in Iraq comfortable for the Americans and exclude the prospect of a timetable for the withdrawal [of occupation troops]?

A [Dr. Ali al-Adad]: It is true that the Americans need the Arab governments to take a positive stand toward the situation in Iraq, but the Iraqis and the Iraqi government and patriotic Iraqi forces need to be integrated in the Arab League and in the Arab nation and Arab people so that they join the Iraqi people and support it in building Iraqi unity.

There is no disagreement on the stance toward American soldiers. All Iraqi forces, Shiite, Sunni and Kurds, want a timetable for the withdrawal of foreign troops. There is no disagreement on this issue, but there are major reservations on the military operations of the so-called armed resistance since they are not only targeting the Americans, but have undertaken operations of mass murder and ugly crimes against women and children under criminal sectarian slogans, while declaring the overwhelming majority of the Iraqi people to be miscreants [takfeer].

This is why we cannot accept this insane criminal resistance to participate in the talks. We want these criminal forces to be definitively isolated by the unity of Arabs, Shiites and Sunnis, and Kurds, and all other minorities, in building a democratic Iraq that refuses sectarianism and rejects the attribution of posts on a sectarian basis instead of attributing them on a positive basis of competence for the building of a unified Iraq for all.

[…]

[Ed.: Answering a different question, and comparing the plight of Shi’ite Iraqis under Saddam Hussein to the situation for all Iraqi under a new coalition government] Nevertheless, the Shiites and Kurds, despite their tragic situation, did not protest against the sectarian practices of the regime. They rebelled against oppression and mass extermination affecting all Iraqis, including Arab Sunnis. On one single day in 1998, the [previous] regime executed 83 [Sunni] scholars in the Western region of Iraq: no one escaped from the previous regime, whether Sunni, Shiite or Kurd.

The present regime in Iraq, when it was constituted, started to build its national institutions representing all Iraqis. Thus we find in the National Assembly Sunnis and Shiites, Arabs and Kurds and minorities, and all are part of the Iraqi government without sectarian discrimination. One of the main ministries in the Iraqi government, the Ministry of Defense, a power ministry of course, is headed by brother Saadun al-Dulaimi, an Arab Sunni.

On the other hand, we must also point to the fact that the Kurds who head other power ministries, like Foreign Affairs, Commerce and Plan, are Sunni Kurds, and not Shiite Kurds.

To be sure, none of that translates into any definitive assurance that SCIRI means to play nice and support an Iraqi government that rules in favor of all Iraqis, and without undue influence from Iran. If Greg is right that the Saudis understand this situation better than anyone in the US, then the real test will be in whether they are convinced.

So is arming Saudi Arabia a good policy decision or not? The pros of fostering a “balance of power” type of détente in the Middle East are centered on keeping the Arab states and Iran at bay long enough to stand up Iraq, which (so the theory goes) would then serve as a positive political force in the region that encourages reforms in the theo/autocratic regimes that currently dominate. A democracy seed, if you will. The cons regard Iraq as the slow-burning fuse set to ignite a region-wide war between Sunni and Shi’a, and thus creating an arms race between the Saudis and Iran (and Syria) is just adding a few powder kegs to the explosion.

From my perspective, none of the above really makes the case that we shouldn’t arm the Saudis. Surely Iran will continue its march to ever greater military capabilities, so having the Saudis well-heeled would appear to be a good thing. Doing nothing, and thus allowing Iran to beef up without consequence, would only encourage Tehran to take bolder action.

With respect to Iraq, we need some sort of bargaining chips to encourage both the Saudis and Iran to stop undermining the political process there. Since neither of them are terribly keen on letting that process move forward unless they have some assurance that it will not negatively impact their own state, pushing the balance of power envelope may be our only real option. Thus we arm the Saudis while backing the SCIRI-dominated government of Maliki. I respect Greg’s worries that adding more explosives to the powder keg could have very bad consequences, but we’re already playing with fire. Either we can control the demolition, or we can’t. Either way, it’s going to blow.

Technorati Tags: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Middle East politics, Iraq, SCIRI, Metternich, arms deal, balance of power, Russia

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