American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam
Keith_Indy on Sep 14 2007 at 12:54 pm | Filed under: Keith's Page, Military Matters
Joshua posted this the earlier…
Queen Sully wants to know why General Petraeus seems to have abandoned every single principle of counterinsurgency he spent two decades defining. I’m interested in the same, but I suppose someone will have a perfectly reasonable explanation, like expediency or career advancement, right?
Here is the selected quote that is getting Andrew Sullivan’s (and I guess Joshua’s) panties in a wad…
“The Vietnam experience left the military leadership feeling that they should advise against involvement in counterinsurgencies unless specific, perhaps unlikely, circumstances obtain — i.e. domestic public support, the promise of a quick campaign, and freedom to employ whatever force is necessary to achieve rapid victory. In light of such criteria, committing U.S. units to counterinsurgencies appears to be a very problematic proposition, difficult to conclude before domestic support erodes and costly enough to threaten the well-being of all America’s military forces (and hence the country’s national security), not just those involved in the actual counterinsurgency,” - David Howell Petraeus, The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam: A study of military influence and the use of force in the post-Vietnam era. PhD Dissertation, Princeton University, 1987. Page 305.
Of course, this is in a 328 page dissertation about the “American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam.” Full text available here. I think a closer reading of these
Hence, particularly in such “small wars,” military leaders should not allow the experience of Vietnam to reinforce the traditional military desire for autonomy in a way that impedes the crucial integration of political and military strategies. The organizational desire to be “left alone” must not lead those who bear the sword to lose their appreciation for the political and economic context in which it is wielded. For while military force may be necessary in a counterinsurgency, it is seldom sufficient.
Another paradox posed by the lessons of Vietnam concerns U.S. preparations for counterinsurgency warfare. The Vietnam experience left … [paragraph above]
A logical extension of this reasoning is that forces designed specifically for counterinsurgencies should not be given high priority, since if there are not sizable forces suitable for COIN it will be easier to avoid involvement in that type of conflict. An American president cannot commit what is not available. Similarly, this line of thinking counsels, plans for such contingencies should not be pursued with too much vigor.
There are two problems with such reasoning, however, and the senior military seems acutely aware of them. First, presidents may commit the US to involvement in a conflict whether optimum forces exist or not.
The second problem posed by such reasoning is that American involvement in COIN is almost universally regarded as more likely then in most other types of combat…
The senior military thus find themselves in a dilemma. The lessons taken from Vietnam would indicate that, in general, involvement in COIN should be avoided. But prudent preparation for a likely contingency (and a general inclination against limiting a president’s options) lead the military to recognize that signigicant emphasis should be given to COIN forces, equipment, and doctrine. Military leaders are thereby in the difficult position of arguing for the creation of more forces suitable for such conflicts, while simultaneously realizing they may advice against the use of those forces unless very specific circumstance hold.
What else does he have to say about the lessons of Vietnam. Well, mostly that they shouldn’t be followed all that closely.
Some selected quotes…
Sphere: Related ContentThe prescriptions America’s senior military have derived from Vietnam do, however, have their limitations. While they represent the distillation of considerable wisdom from America’s experience in Southeast Asia, they nonetheless give rise to certain paradoxes and should not be pushed beyond their limits.
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As will be explained, complete resolution of the paradoxes and dilemmas that reside in the lessons of Vietnam is not possible. Nonetheless, understanding of the limitations of the lessons of Vietnam is necessary if they are to be employed with sound judgment.
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On conclusion may be that in some cases, contrary to prescriptions derived from the lessons of Vietnam, it would be better to use American soldiers in small numbers than “in strength” to assist a foreign government counter insurgents.
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Thus we should beware of literal application of lessons extracted from Vietnam, or any other past event, to present or future problems without due regard for the specific circumstances that surround those problems. Stud of Vietnam — and of other historical occurrences — should endeavor to gain perspective and understanding, rather than hard and fast lessons that might be applied to easily without proper reflection and sufficiently rigorous analysis. “Each historical situation is unique,” George Herring has warned, “and the use of analogy is at best misleading, at worst, dangerous.”
8 Responses to “American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam”
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None of this significantly alters the quote, which still means what it says in plain english: counterinsurgencies are a bad idea.
None of this changes the meaning of the quote, which still means what it says in plain English - counterinsurgencies are a bad idea.
No glasnost, it means what he said, they are problematic. It is also making the point that the inclination of military leaders to not be involved in the political and economic context of wars, “to be left alone,” was driving them away from preparing for the kind of capabilities necessary to fight “small wars.” Thus when one presents itself, as in post invasion Iraq, we are woefully unprepared. He is not saying fighting them is a bad idea, he is saying that their inherent problematic political nature is leading to poor policy by our military in preparing for them.
Of course a corollary, and reading the thesis, his later work, and what he and others, who have long argued for beefing up our capabilities in this area have said in various forums, is that not being willing to fight them does not work. Every potential opponent thus need only turn their tactics in that direction to stymie even the most limited objective. We will give up, no matter how one sided the conflict in fact is. That may be alright in many peoples eyes, they don’t want us intervening militarily under almost any circumstances, anywhere. Petraeus however isn’t arguing that here, but making the point that the military has a responsibility to provide a military capable of fighting and maintaining such wars, it is the civilian leadership who needs to decide whether to do so. The military instead was trying to undermine the possibility of such a decision by making it more difficult to do. Petraeus points out that this is problematic (as well as undemocratic)
Also, notice that his reasons for viewing counterinsurgencies as problematic are because of the political aspects of waging them. He is not saying that we shouldn’t want to fight them as opposed to large scale conventional battles because they are in fact more difficult militarily, but because they require political will to be maintained for long periods. They are not more deadly or expensive necessarily. So it is a bit disengenuous to sit there and say they are not a good idea because people like me will bitch and moan about them. If that is the issue it is in your power to solve it. Stop. Worse is to use the mans noting of people such as yourself’s behavior to argue that he thinks that COIN operations are inherently a bad idea. He doesn’t think so. Any particular campaign might or might not be a good idea, but they can be, and they can be won.
Vietnam actually shows that, as does the French campaign in Algeria. Both were lost despite a successful COIN campaign. In fact, COIN has a pretty good history of success. That is what is driving Petraeus’ essay. By being unprepared for Vietnam and not launching a true COIN campaign until the war had become a divisive political issue, the victories were rendered moot when we cut off funding for South Vietnam and they fell to a massive conventional invasion short of ammunition, supplies and air cover. Instead of learning the proper lesson, developing such capabilities in advance, he is arguing the military compounded the error by trying to avoid having to face the possibility in the future.
You can feel free to disagree with all that, but that is his argument, not what Sullivan is implying or something as cut and dried as they are a bad idea.
So no, Sullivan is misrepresenting what Petraeus is arguing, by acting as if his observations about the military leadership’s response to Vietnam is one he approves of, and Keith is right to point it out.
As for Joshua’s remarks
It is real easy to throw out such stuff about a man with a very difficult job. However, given even Petraeus’ guarded assessment of any really good outcome from his campaign it seems especially petty and small to suggest this is a prime motivator. Honest critics who have actually met and worked with the man all blanch at such suggestions, not least because they know how high the chances of failure are.
In my defense, I wondered if anyone else had a perfectly reasonable explanation. I think this is one.
Since you’ve defended the Instapundit linking to ideas he finds intriguing without necessarily agreeing with (and have called me to task for calling him out on it), I’d appreciate the same courtesy. Don’t confuse being flippant with being a dick, though I’ll grant they’re often really close together.
Heh, well I was a bit cranky. A defense you can certainly understand;^)
I accept your defense. I will note however, when I defend Insty on such things it is usually when he says something somewhat less prejudicial than the little bon mot you threw in. Yet, I also think it is alright when he occasionally buys something that may in fact be less than well founded and includes a snarky comment. He is actually pretty good about posting people who correct or have altered ways of looking at it. A trait you demonstrate here, and so therefore absolution is granted and charges of pettiness dismissed with prejudice.
Lance:
Word.
Joshua:
Up.
I heard what you said here, Lance, but I don’t agree. Sure, he’s saying that even if the military is unprepared to fight in counterinsurgencies, they may get told to do it anyway.
But, how much clearer can he be than this?
The lessons taken from Vietnam would indicate that, in general, involvement in COIN should be avoided.
I don’t think you’ve in anyway established that he disagrees with the military’s conclusions here. If he did, you’d be able to quote him saying something, somewhere, like, “The military was wrong.”
That stuff about “not reading too far into the lessons” is standard academic bet-hedging boilerplate. In papers, you say that about your own primary thesis, which you obviously agree is basically right.
My interpretation is still the correct one. Sorry.