Assessing the President’s New Plan for Iraq
The Poet Omar on Jan 11 2007 at 7:32 pm | Filed under: Foreign affairs, The Poet Omar's Page
Much discussion of the President’s speech has gone on of late throughout the wonderful world of blogging. Although I have at least skimmed some of the major left/right/center blogs, I have really only dedicated significant time to following this discussion on QandO blog. The relevant links are here, here, and here. In particular, I’d like to examine the White House’s official bulletpoint list.
Let’s start at the beginning, shall we:
The President’s New Iraq Strategy Is Rooted In Six Fundamental Elements:
Let the Iraqis lead;
They appear not to have any particular desire to do so over the past four years. Why should the suddenly decide to step up to the plate now?
Help Iraqis protect the population;
There’s a nice sweeping generalization. Exactly how are we planning to do this?
Isolate extremists;
Yes, we’ve isolated them so well that now we can find just about all of them in a city 200 square kilometers large and with a population of 7 million. Yay us!
Create space for political progress;
What on earth does this mean? Did we get a call from Prime Minister al-Maliki saying that, “Hey George, look things have been great lately, but we just need our space.” Charming.
Diversify political and economic efforts;
As opposed to???
and Situate the strategy in a regional approach.
This sounds a lot like the above mentioned isolation of extremists. So now that we have them all together in one spot (relatively speaking), what exactly do we plan to do with them? Carpet bomb Baghdad? Station a US serviceperson in every house? Smart bomb our way to success? Sick Barbara Walters on them?
Iraq Could Not Be Graver – The War On Terror Cannot Be Won If We Fail In Iraq.
Oh, I agree with the first part of this. The situation in Iraq is about as grave as it gets. The second part is pure alarmist neo-con garbage, though. Iraq is one battlefield in a global war. If we lose in Iraq (something I certainly am not hoping for), the war will continue. This is equivalent to saying that since US troops were defeated at Corregidor and Kasserine Pass, the US should have just given up on that whole World War 2 thing. The President has stated numerous times that the Global War on Terror (or whatever the popular catch-phrase is at present) is a multi-generational, GLOBAL war. That is absolutely contradicted by his official bulletpoint here placing an all or nothing emphasis on Iraq.
Our enemies throughout the Middle East are trying to defeat us in Iraq. If we step back now, the problems in Iraq will become more lethal, and make our troops fight an uglier battle than we are seeing today.
Again, I’m with the President on the first sentence here. Our enemies throughout the Middle East (Syria and Iran) are trying to defeat us in Iraq, however the second sentence is quite wrong. Should the US back out of Iraq as we did in Vietnam in 1975, then Iraq’s problems will no longer directly affect US military personnel. No more American soldiers will die there. More Iraqis will die, certainly. Depending on the outcome of the post-American withdrawl civil war, I daresay the problems of Iraq will rapidly become the problems of its neighbors, as well. Iraq (after American withdrawl) has three possible futures, as I see it. One, it is taken over either militarily or by a combination of economic, diplomatic, and espionage pressure undertaken by Iran. Two, it undertakes a partition and divides into two, possibly three mini-states along ethnic and/or religious lines (Kurdistan, Sunnistan, and Shiastan [using highly uncreative catchall terms to describe the three new states]). This may follow or precede a civil war depending on the method undertaken to create partition. Three, Iraq becomes the battlefield in a proxy war fought between Saudi Arabia and possibly Syria on one side (the Sunni powers) and Iran (the Shiite power) on the other. This last may well occur as a result of the first two possibilities, for example Iran taking over may prompt Saudi Arabia to take action to protect the Sunni minority (which it has sworn to protect against Shiite oppression). While a generalized regional war between Middle Eastern states would certainly create economic ripples throughout the world (oil), other players would certainly step into the oil shortage void (Russia and Venezuela, to name a few). This places the US in a rather poor position given our dependence on foreign oil (yet another reason to push for sane energy policy reforms), but militarily this is actually not a bad thing for us. Politically, it also works for us, as it takes attention away from us backing out of Iraq and certainly diverts attention away from Israel. Given that much of Hamas and Hezbollah’s support comes from Syria and Iran, they would possibly wither without such support. Don’t get me wrong. I would love to see President Bush’s dreams for Iraq as a stable democracy materiallize, but should things not work out the above possibilities are hardly doomsday scenarios for the US.
Key Elements Of The New Approach: Security
Iraqi:
Publicly acknowledge all parties are responsible for quelling sectarian violence.
Then, what call in Doctor Phil for an intervention? This isn’t an AA meeting. We don’t need all of the various leaders to stand up, introduce themselves, then admit that they have a problem contributing to murderous sectarian violence. Security bullet point one = pointless
Work with additional Coalition help to regain control of the capital and protect the Iraqi population.
Whom, for example? The Brits? I think they are just about as tired of this mess as we are and they aren’t able to commit massive new forces for an escala… sorry, I meant surge. The Iraqi Security Forces certainly aren’t up to this task and even if they were, there just aren’t enough of them to go around. Security bullet point two = flight of fantasy, now boarding.
Deliver necessary Iraqi forces for Baghdad and protect those forces from political interference.
See above. The militias seem to be the only force capable of ruling the streets of Iraq, free of political interference. The Iraqi Security Forces do not have the numbers to accomplish the stated mission, nor are they going to be able to operate without some interference from the factions in their own government. Assuming US military forces could change this situation, how much longer would they need to remain in country to accomplish said change? Security bullet point three = hopeless naivety you have found your champion.
Commit to intensify efforts to build balanced security forces throughout the nation that provide security even-handedly for all Iraqis.
Assuming this task is possible, it takes time. That means a fairly long-term commitment of significant US forces, which has become politically unfeasible. For all the talk of acknowledging that he’s made mistakes in Iraq, the President still seems fairly committed to earlier strategy. Security bullet point four = DOA.
Plan and fund eventual demobilization program for militias.
Hey, Chief, this isn’t Northern Ireland. Muqtada al-Sadr and other militia leaders aren’t going to just turn in their arms in return for a place in government. Not to mention the fact that the militias are not operating under a unified command like the IRA was. Each group has its own leader and its own goals. How exactly do you get all of these guys together to “discuss their grievances and disarm?” Short of direct military action against the militias, which Prime Minister al-Maliki is against, I don’t see any other methods of getting them to disarm. Security buller point five = interesting, but not possible without politically unfeasible direct military action.
Coalition:
Agree that helping Iraqis to provide population security is necessary to enable accelerated transition and political progress.
Provide additional military and civilian resources to accomplish this mission.
Increase efforts to support tribes willing to help Iraqis fight Al Qaeda in Anbar.
Accelerate and expand the embed program while minimizing risk to participants.
Essentially recapping the above points, with the exception of adding diplomacy with the tribes (who have already taken sides and are unlikely to be swayed barring a major power upset).
Both Coalition And Iraqi:
Continue counter-terror operations against Al Qaeda and insurgent organizations.
So basically, keep on keepin’ on. Brilliant.
Take more vigorous action against death squad networks.
More of the same.
Accelerate transition to Iraqi responsibility and increase Iraqi ownership.
That’s fine, but I’m not terribly sure how much longer we have to accomplish this goal. US troops simply cannot remain on the ground indefinitely. We are reaching the point that 2008 has become the definite final year that voters will accept a major US military presence in Iraq.
Increase Iraqi security force capacity – both size and effectiveness – from 10 to 13 Army divisions, 36 to 41 Army Brigades, and 112 to 132 Army Battalions.
Same point here. The President has been stressing this strategy for darn near four years. It still hasn’t seemed to produce dividends and the voting public is running out of patience. How much longer does he have to create the effective Iraqi Security Force that he so desires?
Establish a National Operations Center, National Counterterrorism Force, and National Strike Force.
Reform the Ministry of Interior to increase transparency and accountability and transform the National Police.
These two points basically go together. The present wants to create an Iraqi Pentagon, in effect. That’s all well and good, but given the instability of the Iraqi government, how is this to be accomplished?
Key Elements Of The New Approach: Political
Iraqi:
The Government of Iraq commits to:
Reform its cabinet to provide even-handed service delivery.
Act on promised reconciliation initiatives (oil law, de-Baathification law, Provincial elections).
Give Coalition and ISF authority to pursue ALL extremists.
All Iraqi leaders support reconciliation.
Moderate coalition emerges as strong base of support for unity government.
Fine, then let’s just go ahead and abandon the pretense of democracy in Iraq. Following these points, the President might as well just appoint the Iraqi government that he wants and then force them to follow his plans. Part of the problem with democracy (that the neo-cons seem to be just discovering now) is that you cannot predict the results. If you insist on creating and enforcing a democracy, then you have made your bed and you must now lie in it (accept the leaders that the people elect). Assuming that the President is serious about going to President Talabani and Prime Minister al-Maliki with this list of demands, what carrots and sticks (if any) does he intend to use in getting them to comply?
Coalition:
Support political moderates so they can take on the extremists.
See above.
Build and sustain strategic partnerships with moderate Shi’a, Sunnis, and Kurds.
Such as whom?
Support the national compact and key elements of reconciliation with Iraqis in the lead.
Why is there so much emphasis on reconcilliation here? If reconcilliation and coming to terms with differences are the end-all be-all strategies for success, then pull out the military and send in Dr. Phil and Oprah.
Diversify U.S. efforts to foster political accommodation outside Baghdad (more flexibility for local commanders and civilian leaders).
Not a bad idea, but I thought that the surge strategy was supposed to focus on Baghdad, not the rest of the country.
Expand and increase the flexibility of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) footprint.
Again, not a bad idea, but the latest from the White House seems to constantly stress increased US emphasis on Baghdad, not the outer areas of Iraq.
Focus U.S. political, security, and economic resources at local level to open space for moderates, with initial priority to Baghdad and Anbar.
Not a bad strategy, but the local leaders, right now, are almost all part of or at least partnered with militias. Short of demolishing the militias, I’m not sure how all of this emphasis on local leadership is going to help.
Both Coalition And Iraqi:
Partnership between Prime Minister Maliki, Iraqi moderates, and the United States where all parties are clear on expectations and responsibilities.
Strengthen the rule of law and combat corruption.
Build on security gains to foster local and national political accommodations.
Make Iraqi institutions even-handed, serving all of Iraq’s communities on an impartial basis.
This all sounds great, but I haven’t seen any hard, detailed plans to enact all of these strategies. As for the last sentence, we can’t even accomplish that goal here in the US.
Key Elements Of The New Approach: Economic
Iraqi:
Deliver economic resources and provide essential services to all areas and communities.
Important, but how does the Presdient plan to deliver on this?
Enact hydrocarbons law to promote investment, national unity, and reconciliation.
Que?
Capitalize and execute jobs-producing programs.
First you need a stable government and a less than 100 person per day death rate.
Match U.S. efforts to create jobs with longer term sustainable Iraqi programs.
Ok, the Iraqis are just figuring out how democracy works. Sustainable development is like, chapter two. Maybe this can wait a bit.
Focus more economic effort on relatively secure areas as a magnet for employment and growth.
Now this is a solid strategy, however, the long-term stability and security of Iraq are the biggest stumbling blocks to creating an economic infrastructure. Again, this is like chapter two when the Iraqis are just now on the preface.
Coalition:
Refocus efforts to help Iraqis build capacity in areas vital to success of the government (e.g. budget execution, key ministries).
Decentralize efforts to build Iraqi capacities outside the Green Zone.
Double the number of PRTs and civilians serving outside the Green Zone.
Establish PRT-capability within maneuver Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs).
Greater integration of economic strategy with military effort.
Joint civil-military plans devised by PRT and BCT.
Remove legal and bureaucratic barriers to maximize cooperation and flexibility.
All of these would be great ideas if we didn’t have a serious stability and security issue on our hands. First, we have to make sure individual Iraqis feel some degree of personal safety and confidence in the stability of their government, then let’s worry about streamlining the Iraqi governmental infrastructure, etc. I hate to say this, but for once, it’s NOT the economy, stupid.
Key Elements Of The New Approach: Regional
Iraqi:
Vigorously engage Arab states.
Like Syria?
Take the lead in establishing a regional forum to give support and help from the neighborhood.
Cause ya know, It Takes A Village.
Counter negative foreign activity in Iraq.
Agreed, but how? The planned “Surge?”
Increase efforts to counter PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party).
Even Saddam couldn’t effectively deal with these guys, and he wasn’t fighting with one hand tied behind his back.
Coalition:
Intensify efforts to counter Iranian and Syrian influence inside Iraq.
Yes, Mr. President, but how? Your strategies over the past 4 years have utterly failed.
Increase military presence in the region.
Ah, the Surge. We’ll just have to see now, won’t we?
Strengthen defense ties with partner states in the region.
Our only “partners” are Israel (politically impossible for them to intervene in Iraq), Jordan (they have problems of their own right now), Turkey (cannot intervene in Iraq without serious repercussions amongst the Kurds) and Saudi Arabia (do we really want them involved?).
Encourage Arab state support to Government of Iraq.
Pointless. In fact, I thought that we were trying to minimize the involvement of other Arab nations in Iraq.
Continue efforts to help manage relations between Iraq and Turkey.
See above regarding Turko-Kurdish situation.
Continue to seek the region’s full support in the War on Terror.
Syria will do nothing. Iran will do nothing. Saudi Arabia takes what few actions it can, but its people will not allow any open support of the US. Jordan supports us, but that doesn’t really mean much. We just snubbed the UAE in the Dubai Ports deal, so no help there. Oh, I know maybe Qatar or Yemen?
Both Coalition And Iraqi:
Focus on the International Compact.
Retain active U.N. engagement in Iraq – particularly for election support and constitutional review.
Oooh, that’s it : Send in the Blue Helmets. That’ll learn ‘em.
In short, while the bulletpoints are full of hope for the future, they really provide nothing of substance. The President, for all his acceptance of “ownership” for the situation in Iraq and his talk of changing strategy, seems to be staying the course in all but name. The bulletpoints really boil down to nothing more than a change in semantics, other than the planned “Surge,” but I question the effectiveness of said “Surge,” even if Congress does allow it. I don’t see any meaningful change here and that is a real disappointment for the Iraqi people who deserve better. The President has perhaps one more year to take decisive action in Iraq before it becomes a political impossibility and Congress brings the troops home by simply defunding the war. I truly hope that he makes better use of that time than this bulletpoint list appears to indicate.
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The View From the Bluff: Lance’s Economic and Finance Blog
Nattering nabob of negativity you are, you are…
Nattering nabob of negativity you are, you are…;^)
Okay, so I have a question, and it is unfair because I don’t think you (or I) have a good answer. What would that decisive action, let us limit it to what you would find constructive, be?
What he said !!!
What strategy would you follow for wining in Iraq?
There are only so many options…
Lol to the first, Lance.
To the second, I’m not sure that we haven’t already passed the point that any action would be constructive. Also, the President’s plan of action here doesn’t seem to differ hugely from what we have already been doing, other than the planned increase in troop strength (which has been dissected fairly well by McQ and Dale at QandO).
Had we had a large increase in troop strength in 2003 or even 2004, then perhaps it would have made a difference, but at this point I don’t know that a 20 or 30,000 bump will really matter.
Then I remove the grin from my comment, you are just being negative, and place it here instead;^) Not that that is invalid, that may be all that is left to us, absorbing and managing the negative outcomes.
If that is the case can the plan help with that in your opinion?
Keith, the President appears to be following the Nixon Doctrine of Vietnamization (Iraqiazation?) combined with a draw-down of US troops (the surge notwithstanding). I suggest that any further involvement with Iraq, post-US departure will be about as popular as was further US involvement with Vietnam, post-US departure. The results, tragically, may be similar. Had we made a fairly radical course correction after the first year (or even two) in Iraq, then possibly we could have avoided painting ourselves into a box, which we appear to have done now.
Absorbing the lessons of Iraq, then planning for the next battle in the ongoing war on terror is the best that can be hoped for at this point. Iraq is what it is. Nothing that the US does at this point can change that, IMHO. Certainly not a 6 month boost in troop levels. The bad guys won this time for many reasons, not all of which are the President’s fault. The fact does remain, however, that at the end of the day they will remain in possession of the field, so to speak. That doesn’t mean the war ends, just that this is a setback for the good guys. We rebuild the military, restructure if need be, implement the lessons of Iraq, and next time (and there will be a next time) do a little bit better until we eventually win one.
This looks to be a positive move.
The US raided the Iranian consulate in Irbil, northern Iraq, hours after President Bush announced he would crack down on the Islamic Republic’s role in Iraqi violence.
We cannot act unilaterally against Iran. We’ve already played that card in starting the war in Iraq. At this point, if the US should (again) decide to buck the UN, then we are going to face more than just harsh words.
There has to be a joint effort with UN support or we might as well just quit the Middle East entirely. We cannot engage in the sort of devil-may-care actions that, say, the Israelis can, because we have no massive power to back us up (like the Israelis do). If the US wants to take direct action against Iran (as seems increasingly likely), then we are going to need help.
I can’t say you are wrong here at all, though I am not sure. Of course, I have never been sure about any of this so take that as worth little other than the wisdom of acknowledging up front that any venture as difficult as the conflict we are engaged in, or the Middle East in general, should be taken on with a healthy dose of low expectations. Or more properly, with a high expectation of, and tolerance for, varying degrees of failure.
That being said, attempts to improve the outcome, even if tenuous, may still be warranted. Sometimes just staying in the game can allow for things unforeseen to work in your favor (though the opposite may be just as possible.) If you read back through what I have been writing here, and what I wrote so many times in the comments at QandO or elsewhere, is that failure is something we should plan for, and assume as we muddle our way through all of this. Despite the atmosphere of recrimination and I told you so’s that drive our political dialogue, we as a culture will eventually need to recognize our limits. That is not as some advocate, especially libertarians, a prescription for inaction (though sometimes it may be) but a prescription for realistically struggling forward knowing we will have constant setbacks.
We don’t deal with that well at all. We assume that if we do it right it will all be okay. Unfortunately the world will not cooperate. Every success breeds new problems and every setback gives new opportunities. Those we are opposed to will adapt and their effectiveness will wax and wane. We have had a number of successes, including in Iraq, in the last few years. The world may be a better place once it is all said and done, but it will be a halting incremental process punctuated with revolutionary changes at times, usually unexpected (see the collapse of the Soviet Empire.)
For now I guess I feel something along the lines of what Bush is attempting is what we should be attempting at this point, though all your criticisms are reasonably valid. I am a muddle through guy and I still see something worth muddling through. I see some kind of collapse (destroying at least temporarily the good such as Keith pointed out)as highly likely, but until then I would rather hang in there trying. That isn’t satisfying to many, but that is the real world.
Just withdrawing might make sense for our soldiers (which includes my brother) if the outcome is unclear or unlikely except for one thing.
If there will be a next time, and I agree there will be if we withdraw, I would rather we stick this out a bit longer to attempt to make it less likely to be in the exact same place and with a more formidable opponent. The military cost has been surprisingly low and I suspect it will remain so. If that begins to change then regrouping makes more immediate sense to me.
I have put this rather badly, I’ll try and flesh it out over the weekend.
I am a big fan of this line.
I always looked at it this way and always felt we as a nation refuse to accept that progress typically works in just that fashion. I also agree with this:
Both Iraq war opponents and war supporters do themselves no favors with the we fail here we pack it in talk. Things have gone better than I expected overall since the fall of 2001. More on that later, but the real problem with Vietnam, TET, The Korean War (which despite being seen as at best a draw, with time has to be seen as quite a boon) and our other faltering attempts at war has been our reaction to war not solving things. We were spoiled by WWII into thinking it does, when it does not on most occasions. WWII’s legacy was far more mixed than we would like to acknowledge as well. Yet, in the end, war is part of our world and we will have to eventually come to a mature understanding, hawks and doves alike, of its place and necessity. As I pointed out to Pogue a couple of days ago, sometimes the only satisfying answers to life’s paradoxes and tensions are illusions that comfort us but mean little. Often it is just muddle through a lot of bad outcomes that nevertheless move the world haltingly forward.
I saw Kosovo and the first gulf war that way, this may be in the end a step back. That that possibility is so traumatic to us says more about us than the possible failure to establish democracy in Iraq.
I think what you really mean is that we are not willing to do as a society what it would take to do that. We certainly can, we won’t. Not that I want us to mind you, but we could easily take direct action as long as we were willing to pay the price. We are not. That is part of the reason Bush tried the “small footprint” approach in Iraq.
I don’t think that is his plan. His plan is most likely to be more aggressive in interdicting them entering and moving around Iraq.
What is Iran going to do? Send in the tanks?
That would be stupid. Not only would that mobilize the world in our favor for a change it would be suicidal. Their units would vanish within hours.
Try and destabilize Iraq? I guess they could step that up but that is the issue we are fighting now. At worst we make it more expensive for them to do so. I think Iran is far less in the catbird seat than most people seem to think. We can make their Iraq efforts far more expensive at very little cost to ourselves. We don’t need to invade or threaten to invade to raise that price.
Only partially, Lance. I don’t know that we possess the military resources at this point to actually put troops (in sufficient numbers) on the ground in Iran. Air offensives do not work. That is a hard fact proved by Vietnam, Gulf War I, Kosovo, and the current situation. Ground victories are absolutely needed. Where are we going to draw said troops from? We’ve already skeleton crewed Afghanistan. We’re digging for more for Iraq. Ground troops can only come from allied powers which I why I argue against uniltaral action.
Not in so many words, no. What they will do is enact the same strategy that Syria used so successfully in Lebanon. Espionage, economic pressure, and sending troops covertly (and not in uniforms) to “augment” local militias. Similar to what they are doing now, but 10x the effort once the US is gone. My only worry is if Saudi Arabia gets involved if this turns into a Sunni v. Shiite thing.
Economically or politically? Maybe, but I’m not sure that Iran cares about that at this point. Militarily? How?
We could Omar, we just are not wiling to do it. That is not a bad thing, I just like to keep the distinction. We could put several hundred thousand troops in Iran and train up more in a matter of a year or so. How? You treat troops how we did in previous wars. On the go for years at a time, you draft, etc.
Bad policy? Probably, but let us not in any way think we can’t. Also, we don’t have to occupy Iran to destroy their military. Once again, let us separate good policy from capability. We are capable of destroying quite a bit if we want to regardless of the size of our military.
True, but isn’t that what I said? We can do things within Iraq and along the border (hazily defined) to keep them from doing that while we are still there and they can’t really do much about it that they are not doing already. The only downside is that we were hoping we could convince them to stop. If we have given up on that what is the downside? That after we leave they will do what you suggest? Are they not going to do that anyway? How does our taking aggressive actions against Iran’s efforts to aid the insurgency or the militia’s make that more likely? Maybe I am missing something, but what is it that they will do that they are not already doing if we make their lives more difficult in Iraq and along the border?
I was thinking economically, but it applies militarily as well.
See Army of the Potomac, 1861-1865. Also, United States Army, 1941-1945. Many critics of the war (and some supporters, as you point out) seem entirely ignorant of history. Plus, heck lets go all the way back to the beginning : General Washington was almost never successful on the battlefield, but he won the one battle that really mattered (Yorktown and Cornwallis’ surrender). US victory or defeat in Iraq will not determine the overall outcome of the GWOT. This is merely the first pitched battle (Afghanistan is more of a skirmish). We have to adapt and be ready for the next go-round.
I agree, but the current climate amongst the US public, the politicos, and, seemingly, many in the military is one that demands the 0 casualty war. Smart bombs and other precision guided weapons, unmannded aerial drones, etc. have created the illusion that we can conduct a war without anyone getting hurt. If that is so, then why don’t we just work out international differences by playing Chess or maybe American Gladiators. People cannot seem to grasp that war necessarily means breaking things and killing people. If the US population as a whole and the US government, in particular, has no taste for both inflicting and receiving casualties, then we should simply take military action off the table as a viable tactic.
You know I was going to point that one out, but then I figured I would get some smart ass bitching about me comparing this to our founding. You know, the same BS that says no comparisons between this and WWII are valid or whatever. History is different, but it also is the same. Figure out what parts are or are not and be tentative and it can be instructive.
True, but the problem with that is that eventually enemies will press that until it is back on the table again. I am often struck by the argument that ultimately these countries and forces represent no existential threat to the US. Of course that is true because we will not allow them to. Up to the point of resisting they are a threat. A few men with box cutters can cause 9/11 if you don’t resist. Now that is very unlikely to happen again because we will. A few men with machetes can denude a region of an entire people if they are not resisted. These fanatics and totalitarians may not be able to face us in a “fair fight,” but until you engage them they can do whatever they want, including achieving the capability of making the fight a bit more fair than we would like.
The question we have to face is at what point we are willing to face a determined opponent? When they are weak and can be portrayed as little threat, or later when the consequences of failure, or more likely success, are far greater. I claim no special insight or that there is any principle upon which such things can be decided. I don’t believe there are. I only mean that such issues need to be grappled with more honestly than the term hawk or dove or present political discourse allows or even encourages.
Finally, a democratic republic if it is to engage in war needs to be able to assume that once the decision has been made that its various constituencies first object will be to the wars success, even if they were not sure of the wisdom of the venture in the first place. We have lost that, making much of the criticism a self fulfilling prophecy.
This is not to absolve this administration, it is yet another way that the world does not work in a way that suits us. War takes commitment, even from those who oppose it and that is uncomfortable for many people to deal with. Hitler and the Japanese military, as well as the Vietnamese, all believed that democracies were incapable of that commitment. Therefore they acted upon that belief to reach for goals that from a strict calculus of the array of forces was unachievable. Hitler and his allies ended up being wrong. The commitment was established overwhelmingly within the population. They overcame defeats, their own moral failings and atrocities, their tactical and strategic mistakes, their political divisions, etc.
In Vietnam that did not happen. It is not that we were less capable, or the Vietnamese more capable. Luckily, maybe the Vietnamese will finally step out from the consequences of the North’s victory.
Amen to that.
And I feel that a great deal more support would have accompanied this war (at least from the beginning) if the President had been a) a better public speaker b) had a better, more coherent strategy c) not walled himself off from outside advice and criticism. From the very beginning, the President failed to effectively communicate our reason for going to Iraq. He did nothing resembling FDR’s fireside chats. He also allowed his opponents to define his strategy (the mantra of WMD’s). Lastly, his planning for post-regime collapse was seemingly, non-existent. General Powell, among others, seemed to be fairly prescient in warning the administration about the need to be prepared to take over the day-to-day running of Iraq, after Saddam’s fall. None of those warnings were heeded. Thus any long term success that might have been had in Iraq was thrown away before the first bombs even fell. Or at least that is my take on the matter.
Oh, I meant to agree with this, too. History is cyclical. Just because the US hasn’t existed long enough to have completed a full cycle doesn’t give us and our historians the right to ignore the fact that such a phenomenon exists.
I really enjoy reading A Second Hand Conjecture » Assessing the President’s New Plan for Iraq . It’s very interesting. Hope you will post something like this again.