Tag Archive 'mortgage crisis'

Chicago Tea Party

Rick Santelli just went off on Obama’s housing proposal live on CNBC from the commodities trading floor in Chicago.

It’s now the headline on Drudge:

VIDEO: ‘The government is promoting bad behavior… do we really want to subsidize the losers’ mortgages… This is America! How many of you people want to pay for your neighbor’s mortgage? President Obama are you listening? How about we all stop paying our mortgage! It’s a moral hazard’… MORE…

TRADERS REVOLT: CNBC HOST CALLS FOR NEW ‘TEA PARTY’; CHICAGO FLOOR MOCKS OBAMA PLAN

Who is John Galt?

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…and I want a pony!

Larry Summers and Mark Thoma argue that if done right the bailout will mean we can solve this crisis and still have everything we want, tax cuts, health care spending and all kinds of other goodies. Larry argues:

Just as a family that goes on a $500,000 vacation is $500,000 poorer but a family that buys a $500,000 home is only poorer if it overpays, the impact of the $700bn programme on the fiscal position depends on how it is deployed and how the economy performs. The American experience with financial support programmes is somewhat encouraging. The Chrysler bail-out, President Bill Clinton’s emergency loans to Mexico, and the Depression-era support programmes for housing and financial sectors all ultimately made profits for taxpayers…

Maybe, but Alex Tabarrok finds this optimism a bit ironic:

Does this sound familiar? I can hear it now. A vacation sir is consumption but a home, ah a home, that’s investment. Investments pay off. Just look at the American experience. Rising home prices! Never a downturn. Isn’t that encouraging? Hell, at prices like these you can hardly afford not to buy. Yes sir, a home that’s a wise investment. And that makes you sir, a wise investor. And a wise investor, well a wise investor can certainly afford a nice vacation.

How the economy performs isn’t really the issue as much as the housing market. Chrysler was bailed out at a cyclical low, we are not at a cyclical low in housing, we aren’t even at a cyclical average. We aren’t even close.

Nor was Chrysler such a rousing success anyway. The bailout of Detroit only postponed the pain for the American auto industry and kept them from either going out of business or becoming better, if probably somewhat smaller organizations, and the costs to us all will eventually be pretty damn high. That isn’t even factoring in cementing the idea of “too big to fail” in corporate America. That encourages larger organizations rather than more profitable ones to be created.

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Mixed Economies: Efficacy Without Moral Narrative


(photo: Ian Murchison | website)

The nationalization of Fannie & Freddie is often presented as a crisis of faith for the political right, due to its manifest incompatibility with the advertised belief in the “free market.” However, Sunder Katwala at NextLeft cleverly recognizes that it also presents a challenge to orthodoxy on the left, given that the insisted purpose of the nationalization isn’t government ownership, but to rescue businesses for a stable return to the private sector.

(more…)

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Fannie and Freddie Taken Over

Redstate
A good description of what just happened to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and some reasons why. This made me laugh. “If we were in China, they’d probably have “committed suicide” with bullets inexplicably entering the backs of their heads. I’d certainly want to shoot them if I were a shareholder of either GSE. There are some things the Chinese do better than we do.”

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The Nationalization of the Housing Market

Regular readers know that I have been harping on the likely collapse in housing since this blog began. At this point I am hardly an outlier in being concerned, which means now the politicians and experts are ready to ride to the rescue. Proposals to increase regulation, bailout mortgage insurers, banks and even homeowners are being floated. Alan Blinder wants to bring back the 1930’s era state owned mortgage business.

Most of these proposals ignore that the real problem isn’t falling prices, or non credit worthy borrowers, but that housing needs to fall in price in many areas. Thus plans to stabilize the housing market, and cost estimates assuming such a stabilization, are likely doomed to be disasters, not to mention how bad it would be if they were successful longer term. We may be buying an expensive method of merely stretching the pain out. The cure to this crisis is falling prices. Politicians however, don’t like the medicine.

Anyway, to catch up on all these proposals, the state of the market now, and various amusing aspects of this whole mess, I have a large roundup of links, observations, and plenty of visual data for the curious.

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A Chicken in Every Pot

Chicken Have you ever met a politician who didn’t make promises that could not be delivered? I haven’t, either.

Of course, there are promises… and then there are promises.

If you are someone with an adjustable rate mortgage who has run aground, then you might like Hillary Clinton’s promise to freeze interest rates for five years. If you’re all the rest of us, however….

The Clinton proposal is a blunt tool applied too broadly to problems that are, in principle, contained and specific. Only 3.1 percent of prime (good credit) ARM loans are seriously (90 days or more) delinquent. The disconcerting delinquency rate of 16 percent is for the subprime sector–which is alarming, to be sure, but 84 percent are not seriously delinquent. Over the last three years there was an unusually large volume of aggressive lending activity with flaws at several levels. Some borrowers were led into loans they did not understand. These people deserve some concern. Other loans were made to speculators who do not live in the homes and were betting that house prices would continue to go up. The inhabitants of these homes deserve our concern, but the investors do not. It is now clear that there were too few checks and controls to assure reasonable loan underwriting practices (for example, no escrow accounts for taxes and insurance) or even good recordkeeping.

An accurate assessment of the current mortgage problem would probably reveal no more than 700,000 loans with distressed borrowers. Why, then, would the U.S. government rewrite eleven million loans, or even all 3.4 million subprime mortgages? Any intervention should be targeted at the borrowers who are truly in trouble, especially those who were likely duped by unscrupulous mortgage lenders. The numbers suggest these victims are disproportionately poor, young, and African American. Looking forward, the government needs to take steps to make this market more transparent and make it easier for borrowers to make good choices. But it would be irresponsible to do this by ruling millions of legal contracts null and void.

Senator Clinton’s policy amounts to a command-and-control approach to economic policy in which the government announces prices and tells suppliers what to produce. Undertaking such an intervention can only raise interest rates on mortgages (and maybe other interest rates as well) as markets attempt to incorporate risk premiums to cope with possible future interventions. Promising the American people that you can fix things by just lowering their interest rates is dishonest, a fairy tale that won’t come true.

I’m all for examining various remedies to modify the pain from the current mortgage and housing difficulties. Yet, the notion that we should undertake to destroy contracts and the relationships between investors and lenders is a bit frightening.

Of course, I find a lot about Senator Clinton to be on the frightening side….

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