A Second Hand Conjecture

Iraq is buying 140 M1A1 Abrams tanks, along with wide range of other conventional hardware, as it prepares to shift its focus from internal security to defending the borders in a very hostile neighborhood. Iran, in case you’re wondering, can field approximately 1600 tanks, but mostly of the Soviet iron heap variety that the M1 annihilated in the Gulf War.

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How much of the Georgia/South Ossetia/Russian conflict can be laid at the hands of a corrupt cabal of former soviet ministers bent on lining their own pockets? Perhaps a great deal.

Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili has handed his Russian counterpart, Dmitry Medvedev, a victory over the “siloviki” in Russia. And if Medvedev is able to take advantage of the fruits of this victory, the consequences will be significant not so much for Tbilisi as for Moscow.

So, why is this a victory over the siloviki — those in the Russian ruling elite with close ties to the state security organs? Because there is no way the regime in South Ossetia can be in any sense called “separatist.” Who there is a separatist? The head of the local KGB, Anatoly Baranov, used to head the Federal Security Service (FSB) in the Russian Republic of Mordovia. The head of the South Ossetian Interior Ministry, Mikhail Mindzayev, served in the Interior Ministry of Russia’s North Ossetia. The South Ossetian “defense minister,” Vasily Lunev, used to be military commissar in Perm Oblast, and the secretary of South Ossetia’s Security Council, Anatoly Barankevich, is a former deputy military commissar of Stavropol Krai. So who exactly is a separatist in this government? South Ossetian “prime minister” Yury Morozov?

However, alas, I also cannot say this regime is “pro-Russian.” On the contrary, all the recent actions of Eduard Kokoity, the leader of the breakaway South Ossetian government, have run counter to the interests of Russia in the Caucasus — beginning with his embarrassing Russia in the eyes of the international community and ending with his ratcheting up the tensions in the very region where Russia might begin to come undone. South Ossetia is not a territory, not a country, not a regime. It is a joint venture of siloviki generals and Ossetian bandits for making money in a conflict with Georgia. For me, the most surprising thing in this entire story is the complete lack of any strategic goals on the part of the South Ossetians.

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Again — nothing that is going on in South Ossetia makes any sense from the point of view of strategy. It only makes sense as a means of making money. And we aren’t talking about small sums. Running a gas pipeline through the mountains from Russia — a precaution in case Georgia decides to cut off the 70,000 residents — cost $570 million. And then there is the secret budget Russia has allotted for the struggle — estimated at somewhere around $800 million. And don’t forget the pensions and wages for state-sector workers, who officially number some 80,000 but whose actual numbers are not more than 30,000.

Yulia Latynina lays out a convincing case that this war is not about ethnic tensions, nor about Russian power plays, but instead about the soliviki creating the tensions necessary to loosen the Kremlin’s purse strings. Towards that end, Kokoity is using the PLO playbook:

Whenever someone starts telling us about shelling in Tskhinvali, it is important to keep in mind exactly what Tskhinvali is. It is not a city somewhere in the middle of a republic that is being fired upon by saboteurs. On three sides, Tskhinvali is surrounded by Georgian villages. The edge of Tskhinvali is a military outpost. South Ossetian forces fire from there into the Georgian villages, and the Georgians respond with fire of their own. To help keep Georgian fire from hitting civilians in the city, all the South Ossetians would have to do is move their military base forward a couple hundred meters.

But, of course, it is a fundamental principle of terrorists the world over — set up firing points in civilian areas and then when your enemy fires on you, you gleefully parade the bodies of your own children in front of the television cameras. Kokoity’s terrorists are following this same principle. If South Ossetia can in any way be considered a state, it must be considered a terrorist state.

When we are told about “peaceful civilians” in South Ossetia, we must keep in mind that the situation there is similar to that in Palestinian refugee camps. South Ossetia, like the Palestinian Liberation Organization before it, is not a state or an ethos or a territory. It is a peculiar form of mutated government in which residents have been turned into militarized refugees. It is a quasi-armed force that is not allowed by the authorities to occupy itself with anything other than war — a situation that gives the authorities absolute power and absolute control over the money at its disposal. It is a place where the hysteria of this disfigured population is the primary means of filling the authorities’ personal coffers.

Without endorsing Ms. Latynina’s views, I have to admit that they are quite compelling, and that a lot of it makes logical sense.

[HT: Joshua Foust]

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A few weeks back I posted a facile little rebuke aimed at the national security implications of Green Party presidential candidate Alan Augustson’s political platform. Alan responded to this in such a way that I realized I had little idea what the Green Party’s position on security matters was, relative to its environmental policies. Indeed, rarely have I seen anyone even ask Green Party figures questions about this subject.

In continental Europe, Greens are expected to have a broad agenda on all conventional political issues from foreign policy, to funding for the humanities. However in the United States, Greens seem to have been ghettoized into answering questions solely on subjects like global warming or genetically engineered foods. This has the natural effect of marginalizing them into niche political interests within the broader Left. A Left that the media seems quite content to have dominated by the Democratic Party alone.

So, toward a better education in the broader politics of Greens, Alan was kind enough to sit down with us for a short interview on security policy.

From the outset, it should be noted that Alan is a fierce critic of current US security policy and naturally his ideas won’t find much agreement with me, or among postpolitical’s predominantly conservative audience. But I think you’ll agree with me that we managed to ask some fair questions and the interview turned out to be an interesting and instructive exploration of a radically different political perspective.

(more…)

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I seem to have caused some confusion with my previous post, “Putting the Question to the Bishop,” by an inartful use of the term “small-government libertarian.” The more I think about, the clearer it becomes to me that this term is redundant — libertarians are, by definition, in favor of small government. To me, the term has always been a way to distinguish between the minarchist (such as Hayek or Friedman styled libertarians) and anarcho-capitalist (such as fans of Murray Rothbard or Robert Nozick) flavors of libertarianism. Minarchists find value in some minimal level of government, whereas anarcho-capitalists are usually anti-state in nearly every form. However, when the term “small-government libertarian” is used in any other context it just becomes confusing. Frankly, I was simply wrong to employ it the way I did.

The intended point of my previous post was to highlight the choice being forced on the Democratic Party by the netroots crowd — those who support the war vs. those who don’t — and to suggest an alternate choice: the anti-war left vs. the pro-small government electorate. The choice I envision does not involve the war, but instead hinges on how one views the State. Of course, anti-war views are well represented amongst those who prefer small government, and that’s fine. A good argument can (and has been) made that if Congress and the Executive branches were filled with small-government types, there would be no War in Iraq. But, in my view, the Democratic Party needs to focus less on netroots voters who would hold their support of the war against them, and more on voters who are (justifiably) wary of the Democrats’ propensity for big government. The latter have been abandoned by the Republican Party. If the Democrats decided to occupy that small-government ground that the Republicans vacated, such small-government voters could easily be swayed to vote Democratic.

In short, instead of “small-government libertarian” I should have simply said “small-government voters.” My underlying premise is this: as the two major parties continue to cater their policies of governance to increasingly smaller and divisive, albeit increasingly more vocal, special interest groups, they are creating an ever-growing swath of independent voters.

If you think about it, don’t you hear more and more people claiming to be libertarians today, despite their seemingly disparate views? I surely do. I believe this is the natural result of the Democrats and Republicans being more concerned with single-issue voters (e.g., pro-choice vs. pro-life; homosexual rights vs. anti-gay marriage; anti-war vs. pro-strong defense; etc.), than with broad policy measures. Eventually all you have left are moneyed special-interests who promise to get out the vote. Left in the wake of this rush to divvy up the battleground into pro and anti groups are those who feel the government is foisting itself too much on ordinary citizens. Most people just want to be left alone, even though they gladly take free goodies when they are a member of a favored interest group (which is, of course, quite rational). In my opinion, a significant number of voters are out there who will choose small-government policies over single-issue candidates (such as pro-defense/anti-war). I only wish one of the two parties would act on that.

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