“America and Iran supported and trained the Mujahedin (including bin Laden and his fellow Arab volunteers)…”

Firstly, that’s untrue as a point of fact. The Afghan Arabs of whom Osama bin Laden was a part, were independently financed by Saudi interests. The CIA’s program was focused on indigenous Mujahidin. As Milt Beardon –who ran the program in Pakistan in the late 80s– related, there was no lack of local volunteers, the Arabs had their own funds and were more than a little problematic as trainable recruits.

But, even if it were true, so what? On the other side, we gave the Soviets thousands of tanks, trucks, radar equipment, you-name-it in World War II. And it was more readily obvious at that time that the USSR was going to be a far more serious threat to the United States than bin Laden ever would be.

You fight the war in front of you. If you’re making security policy based on every conceivable “blowback” scenario, you won’t have a security policy, because everyone is potentially an enemy when power relationships and global dynamics change, as they inevitably will. Complaining about that, is complaining about reality.

America and Iran supported and trained the Mujahedin (including bin Laden and his fellow Arab volunteers) of the 1980′s. The original Chechen separatists were Red Army veterans of Afghanistan, commanded by General Dudayev.  Sadat abruptly expelled all Soviet personnel from Egypt while retaining everything they left behind. US forces completed Cuban-Soviet-initiated construction in Grenada and renovated Soviet bases in Somalia. The Ethiopian air force deployed aging MiG-23′s against OIC forces in Somalia with great success. My point is, mentors cannot remain ultimately responsible for the decisions made by their erstwhile understudies, and neither can the original makers and issuers of equipment once the original recipients trade them away or pass them down.