Victory Ill-Defined
Joshua Foust on Apr 12 2008 at 3:42 pm | Filed under: Notes on the war
Michael Yon wants more troops, more surging, more progress in Iraq toward inevitable victory. Of course, what that “victory” is, if it is even remotely like what we thought it would be in 2003, if it is in fact achievable against all reason, is left unsaid. As is the impact his desires would have upon an Army its own soldiers fear is strained to the breaking point.
But hey, he’s been living with soldiers in Iraq for five years, so he knows best, right?
Sphere: Related Content
Well, probably better than you. You can’t even seem to read him and understand what he is saying. “inevitable victory?” That is what you think Yon is saying? The man was quite willing to proclaim the situation a near disaster in the past, exactly why you think he has now turned into some blind shill at this point is beyond me. He may be wrong, but the only reasons for your snarky, wrongheaded comments about probably the best reporter of this war that I can come up with reflect poorly on you Josh, so I am just going to confess consternation at this point and avoid connecting the dots.
It is especially annoying given that 9 months ago he obviously had a better grasp of things than you did. It may not matter in your opinion that he did, because what he was correct about is in the end going to be irrelevant in your mind. Fair enough, but it sure should call for a hell of a lot of humility in arguing that case, and a lot more respect for the mans work and judgment.
He was right about the poor choice of strategy and tactics the administration was using, he was right about the disastrous turn Iraq was about to take, he was right about what they should be doing, he was right about what would likely happen if we changed to those methods, and the men who should be given the task. Obviously he knew a hell of a lot more than most. Seems a pretty good record to me.
“achievable against all reason?” Whose reason?
“Breaking point?” If this war is straining the army to the breaking point then we better damn well find it out now so we can know whether to just pack it in ahead of time in the future. This army is right now in better shape than any army we have had at the beginning of a major war in the past. If this is breaking them then we are just too pansy ass to do anything besides guard our own borders.
I’d like to make a prediction, if I may.
I predict that as this conflict winds down (and it is, and it will, even if we (or maybe particularly if we) re-surge) there will be no push to continue to increase the size and readiness of the United States military forces.
The concerns that our forces can not maintain this level of troop rotation without “breaking” will be a concern of the past. The fear that we are not ready to meet some other unexpected challenge or disaster or aggression will be forgotten.
Lance, Yes, that is what I think Yon is saying when he writes off those who think the ‘Sons of Iraq” movement will end in disaster as committing “vile slander,” and that we have victory within our grasp if we just keep surging troops into the country. I have nothing personal against Yon — I think he has offered an incredible, soldier’s eye view of the war. In fact, he and his colleagues like Totten and Roggio have done that even better than the war reporters of yesteryear.
At the same time, I don’t think he’s reading the broader, macro-level picture right. I would lay this at the feet of having such a detailed picture of the platoon view; it doesn’t lend itself well to what Iraqis are willing to say when they’re away from the foreigners with guns, nor does it lend itself to a sober view of what our deployment schedule over the past five years has done to the Army. It is not a personal attack.
I don’t think he’s a blind shill, merely that observer’s bias limits how useful his analysis can be toward the broader war.
I dispute that nine months ago he had a better view than I did. He was right about a bunch of things. Fine, that happens. And as I’ve said before, I’m happy to be wrong about these things. But being right about how something will turn out doesn’t make dissenting opinion any less valid, nor does it mean that he’s right now. And being wrong doesn’t necessarily mean you’re incapable of sound analysis—if people really thought that, then men like William Kristol and Fred Kagan and the like would all be out of work. Just as being right once doesn’t mean you’re still right, or that your opinion is any more valid—think of the number of analysts who correctly predicted how disastrous Iraq would become that are still marginalized. Being embedded in a brigade doesn’t give you any better a view of how an entire country-wide war is faring than reading the news and soldier/local blogs in the States.
“Whose reason?” How about Iraqis? When the tribes we’re arming and funding think of the national government as “Iranian” because of Badr and ISCI’s close ties with the Revolutionary Guards, and then those groups launch a war to eliminate the Shia nationalists from an upcoming election, how reasonable is it to then think that all we need is a few thousand more Americans to make it alright? That strikes me as unreason.
And I am sorry to put it like this, but you are literally the only one outside the Kagans who don’t see the Army as strained to an extreme. Hell, the Army itself sees this too. I can rattle off studies and surveys and interviews going back 18 months that all think the current situation is unsustainable. This does not address those who are in-theater: you’re right that those who stay in the service have developed an incredible institutional memory of how to fight these wars. But the vast majority are leaving. When Colonels are complaining that “anyone can make Major these days” in a very serious way—namely, that clearly unqualified people are rising up from the middle ranks based solely on time-served rather than suitability, that tells me there is a problem.
Synova may be right that we can escape from this without too much damage to the long-term health of the Army (though it is interesting that such a view is rare amongst the uniformed). But that doesn’t make concern over it any less justifiable.
“It is not a personal attack.”
Yes it is. Your comment was, and has when speaking of him in the past, dripping with disdain. Your explanation shows that your underlying reason for that disdain is also ill founded. You give no evidence to back it up that his view is so restricted. Yon’s view is important because he has shown a keen grasp of both the local and larger view of the conflict. Few have managed it. He was far more pessimistic than many in the military in the past precisely because how he saw local issues undermining the strategic situation.
“But being right about how something will turn out doesn’t make dissenting opinion any less valid, nor does it mean that he’s right now.”
True, and you can make the argument as to why he is wrong now, but my point is that his view deserves more respect and less dismissiveness. Maybe even a little humility. Though, I do think he had a better take then and I said as much at the time. You hooted at the possibility that the types of things we have seen happen could happen. Only people blind to the reality on the ground could believe such pipe dreams even possible was your view. I pointed out at the time that whatever happened some of this could happen, and that the certainty which you held those views was misplaced, and would be misplaced even if the change in strategy and tactics failed. I see nothing to change that point, and everything that has happened reinforces that truth. It is a truth by the way, not an opinion.
“Being embedded in a brigade doesn’t give you any better a view of how an entire country-wide war is faring than reading the news and soldier/local blogs in the States.”
Yon’s usefulness transcends his being on the ground. It is how he has integrated it with a deft interpretation of the the larger issues. You seem awfully disdainful of someone who has immersed himself in the larger situation and commentary from the military, in the intelligence community and civilian leaders, American and Iraqi, while being able see how it matches up on the ground, and with Iraqi’s at all levels of society. Somehow you, reading “the news and soldier/local blogs” has a better grasp. Maybe you do, but once again, a little humility given his record might be in order.
“that is what I think Yon is saying when he writes off those who think the ‘Sons of Iraq” movement will end in disaster as committing “vile slander,” and that we have victory within our grasp if we just keep surging troops into the country.”
You said “inevitable victory” not Yon. Nor does he describe an inevitable victory. He says we can win, that we can defeat the insurgency and leave a relatively stable democratic government. “Can” is the operable word.
As for what Iraqi’s say when they are not around us, well that is just a load of crap. Yes, you can hear such things, Yon’s point is how much the attitudes have changed amongst the broader populace, not that everything is all flowers and ponies. He points out several concrete examples of just that. It was those kind of less quantifiable points I tried to impress on you last summer, that attitudes were changing and that that was the most important political aspect of the surge and the Anbar awakening. Changing, not arrived, though increasingly we see more and more Iraqi’s who have in fact arrived.
To your claim about our broken miltary and my “minority” view, then I say they are wrong, and the soldiers I speak with say they are wrong. However, even if they are not, it just reinforces my point. Our Army has become pansy assed if that is true. We might as well find that out. Strained I’ll buy, war has a way of doing that. Many leaving, yeah, war has a way of doing that as well. Broken? Probably irresponsible commentary. If this war is breaking us then we are done fighting wars. If so that is a sad fact. I wonder what the men who fought in WWII think of the idea that a war with so few casualties, with living conditions most of them didn’t see stateside, with the incredible medical care our soldiers now receive while they spent sometimes years overseas, think about this army being “broken.” I think it would make them sick. That is unless it gives them a way to mine anti war votes.
The view is also not rare amongst the uniformed. They worry about keeping their best officers, they worry about their soldiers family lives, all legitimate areas of concern, though all are less of an issue than past wars where somehow our military didn’t end up “broken.” No war is fought without those concerns, and shouldn’t be. Concern about those issues, trying to deal with those issues, is important, and always will be, but they do not translate into “broken.” Armies strained to the breaking point don’t behave in the manner ours is. They are war weary, they want to see their families, they are not broken or close to it. If the army does break we will see signs of it long before the break happens, though of course, those signs will be used to claim see, they are broken, when they are really the signs we are straining the military to the point it is a legitimate risk.
I agree with you Josh. I don’t think you can achieve any victory in Iraq.
<B>And I am sorry to put it like this, but you are literally the only one outside the Kagans who don’t see the Army as strained to an extreme.</b>
If you were really worried about straining the army, you would stop your demoralization and propaganda operations. Since you value dissent that much, straining the army is not a big priority in your scales.
and that we have victory within our grasp if we just keep surging troops into the country.
You have not demonstrated your comprehension of counter-insurgency policies nor have you stated where you disagree with Petraeus’ COIN strategy. Nor have you demonstrated any specific disenchantment with any specific tactic. You may call this void an “analysis”, but it really isn’t.
At the same time, I don’t think he’s reading the broader, macro-level picture right.
When you are unable or unwilling to demonstrate a broader, macro-level comprehension of counter-insurgency, insurgency, internal political, and foreign political factors in Iraq, I don’t see how this makes Yon deficient in the big picture compared to you, Josh.
it doesn’t lend itself well to what Iraqis are willing to say when they’re away from the foreigners with guns
It’s what Iraqis are doing that matters, not what Arabs say or claim. That applies for Americans as well. It doesn’t matter why you think Iraqis are telling you special things they haven’t been telling Yon. It is only speculation to say that Iraqis aren’t willing to say things to foreigners with guns, if you yourself don’t claim to know what those specific things the Iraiqs are unwilling to say are. You either know what Iraqis haven’t been telling Yon, from your current and historical position, or you don’t, Josh. Such a claim that you know more about events in Iraq at such a communications lag in the States, is demonstrably false. And if you don’t claim to know what Iraqis are really saying, and just claim that you “heard” it from some second, third, 7th source, then that is just more unfortunate compared to Yon’s first hand testimony.
And being wrong doesn’t necessarily mean you’re incapable of sound analysis
No, what it means is that if you were capable of sound analysis, heck any analysis, you would have written something a bit more in-depth than could have been covered in one paragraph for your OP.
How about Iraqis?
Your opinions and short riffs about Yon have nothing to do with Iraqis, their actions or words, but has everything to do with your own preconceptions and prejudices concerning Iraq and Iraqis.
the number of analysts who correctly predicted how disastrous Iraq would become that are still marginalized.
The number of fake fortune tellers that could provide ambiguous doomsday predictions are a dime a dozen. The number of people who go to the site of Judgment Day and actually record the events as it occurs, now that is far rarer.
When the tribes we’re arming and funding think of the national government as “Iranian” because of Badr and ISCI’s close ties with the Revolutionary Guards
The difference between Yon+Petraeus and you is that the former knows what should be done to fix problems if such problems exist and will try to do it while you only complain that their solutions won’t work. Yon is not an observer, he is a participant. He has been a participant in Iraq and Afghanistan for many years now. It is not just a show he watches on tv, it is a living breathing problem he has to deal with day in and day out. Thus his thinking and writings revolves around clearly describing problems so that solutions may be created for them, either by Yon himself, his readers, or the High Command. Someone eventually will have a clue.
As an example of why your quoted portion makes no difference in any kind of analysis, good or bad, there is this. The Democrat Tribe here in America thinks Bush and the Administration of the national government are “Saudi Arabian” because of some fictitious cabal links between Saudi Arabia and Bush. This kind of thing has nothing to do with Petraeus and Yon getting behind a solution for Iraq and working towards it. And thus, it has nothing to do with you being “right” about how Petraeus and Yon are “wrong”.
I can rattle off studies and surveys and interviews going back 18 months that all think the current situation is unsustainable.
Are you trying to join the Copperhead Democrats or just Chamberlain who also thought Britain’s army was stretched too thin to challenge German military might via force? You can perhaps indeed rattle off enemy propaganda and misguided opinion pieces, but when compared to human experience in real history, however, it is not something which is all that useful.
Scientists have to create hypothesis based upon random sets of data or correlated data that they just gathered as best as they could without error. Those studies and surveys and interviews are data that the scientist, meaning you, are using to create a theory. A scientist that observes 20 black birds can make a hypothesis based upon the gathered data that all birds are black. This hypothesis goes down the drain the first time a white bird is seen. This doesn’t mean you should shoot and bury the white bird in order to reinforce your hypothesis, however. What it means is that when it comes to war, there is a huge amount of human experience and memory when it comes to figuring out what is true or not. These things are called principles, which are always true regardless of what factual events occur. Compare this to a hypothesis, which is only “true” so long as the data backs it up.
In war, it is far more effective in terms of saving lives to rely upon principles and human experience, rather than the hypothesis of scientists whose data can change at any minute, thus changing the hypothesis. It is not a good idea to rely upon hypothetical relationships and explanations, which could change at any minute, as the foundation from which to fight a war. Preferably, something more solid and unchanging would be more fitting.
But the vast majority are leaving.
Retention rates have not dropped to such a level as you claim. Your “idea” of the vast majority comes from your observer position based upon eye witness accounts, interviews, and the various other propaganda you have encountered. Why you think such amorphous and unreliable sticks of data are better than Yon’s consistent writings, is not very clear. But you obviously do think it is better, otherwise you would not have tried to justify yourself by saying Yon’s only an observer watching things happen at the bottom level.
When Colonels are complaining that “anyone can make Major these days” in a very serious way—namely, that clearly unqualified people are rising up from the middle ranks based solely on time-served rather than suitability, that tells me there is a problem.
Wrong. This tells you that there is a problem, all right, but not what it is. As if combat losses in the officer branches are as bad or worse than the Navy and Air Force’s officer problems in a time of pseudo-peace. You have no idea what the problem is, because you haven’t done any independent research into such claims as you have proposed here. You don’t know why, if it is true that Majors are being created from “any” junior officer, this happens.
But that doesn’t make concern over it any less justifiable.
So it’s Yon consistent and long term analysis sourced from high level command decisions such as Abu Zarq’s intercepted letter as well as experiences from the platoon level, in competition with your ‘concern’? And this makes Yon wrong and you right… No, it is more like the other way around.
Lance, “he is wrong” is not “I hate him.” It is not personal. I think his analysis has flaws, not his person. Stop pretending it is when it isn’t.
And again, I’m still of the view that the drop in violence is not the boon we think it is. Reporters and scholars who go “outside the wire” and talk to Iraqis, including Sons of Iraq and other Shia, away from the military come back with radically different views of the political situation. When they speak to outsiders, or better yet, to non-Americans, the Iraqis have dramatically different opinions than what they tell the American translators. And what they are things like “we will start fighting again once the Americans leave.” “We will never accept an Iranian government.” And similar things. That is what makes me shake my head when we look at something like body count and proclaim it political victory. Violence is only back to where it was in 2005, which many analysts at the time considered unacceptable.
Ymar, actually it is. I think we face many other threats we need to be addressing and preparing for, and a strained Army is bad no matter how you cut it. Lance, soldiers do complain about that kind of stuff—that being gone for a year is terrible hardship, that going to sea for six months is needless strain on marriage, and so on. I’m not pulling that from nowhere. For starters, I suggest Foreign Policy’s survey of officer attitudes. Then look at the growing showdown between the Army and the Air Force about resource and recruitment allocation. Then look at the consequences of officer flight. Simply saying “oh well, that happens” is a bit flippant for the seriousness of this, I feel.
About a proper understanding of COIN, I don’t think you realize what that means. Follow the principles of ASCOPE outlined in Appendix B of FM 3-24. In fact, we could examine the “perception assessment matrix” the authors claim we can unpack, understand, and then coopt the insurgents success criteria. We’re trying to address that through the SoI movement, but it’s hollow (see above).
Or we could look at the methods for local sustainment, which are simply not happening. When Totten goes around and interviews soldiers in Fallujah, and most of them barely trust the police to behave when they’re gone, that doesn’t tell me the campaign is working.
Ymar, I’m afraid the rest of what you wrote, including about my sources and reading skills, are not worthy of comment. Claiming Yon’s first-hand testimony is superior to my analysis of a large range of sources does not play nicely with, “Your ‘idea’ of the vast majority comes from your observer position based upon eye witness accounts, interviews, and the various other propaganda you have encountered.” If everything I read is propaganda, but everything you read is simply eye-witness fact, then there is no basis for further discussion. Lance and I may disagree, but he at least treats what I say honestly.
… then there are the fresh mass graves being unearthed as we bombard the very people we need to be winning over. Air power does not win counterinsurgencies.
No, some do. Others don’t. Behavior has changed. Neither Yon nor anybody else claims the tensions and anger have disappeared. They claim it has changed for the better, and there are lots of concrete actions which show that to be true. We see far more inter factional cooperation without US instigation than we saw earlier. That is progress.
Nor would you be claiming should the violence have continued that it wasn’t a boon, and you know it. Violence will continue to flare as various parties maneuver for power, as they decide cooperation is no longer to their advantage (such as Sadr now) but that is progress. A return to 2006 is not. That may still come, but we do have an opportunity here, that is what Yon is saying. Snark such as inevitable victory and the last sentence above, as well as numerous other comments you have made in relation to Yon are dripping with disdain. It may not be personal, but it is dismissive and wholly unwarranted given the quality of his analysis and reporting so far. I never said you hated him. You ridicule him, and you did above.
Yon hasn’t made that error, so it is irrelevant to his argument. The reduction in violence is a result of the changes he has observed, and a cause. They are interrelated. You don’t go from murderous hatred and conflict to peace overnight. To act as if the fact that anger and hatred remain proves our policies failure is to set up a straw man for you to knock down. It has lessened, as well as allowed those who never wanted to live in such a world of hatred more space to have an impact. That hatred and anger never has to disappear for the policies to work. The parties just have to on balance prefer using other means to express them for the surge to have been worthwhile, as well as our continued presence.
Didn’t I just say they did? I think I said exactly that. Why yes I did, so please refrain from lecturing me about things I just acknowledged are a problem.
More to the point josh, I have deep personal and tragic experience with just those matters, in this very war and at least ostensibly because of this war. Family ripped apart with lawyers letters flying, unfaithfulness, children suffering, the whole enchilada. So don’t ever deign to tell me about it again since I not only have said such things are a problem, but have experienced it up close and personal. The question is not whether the tragedies of war exist, it is whether such tragedies that have been in existence for all of human history have broken this army. This war has had the least impact in those terms, not least due to the military being far more attuned to them and using todays technology to reduce the impact.
Hmmmm…. I didn’t see anything about bombarding the people in that article, nor is a year old mass grave very supportive of your case. As al Qaeda found out, our sins don’t wash away theirs. So the article gives a rather positive spin on your comment. Roadside bombs that don’t drive us away don’t win insurgencies either. They just alienate the populace. Nor does mass killing as in that house or any number of other abusive tactics. Yon has made points on both of those issues over the years.
Air power may not win insurgencies, but it can be a component. The question is how well we are using it, not whether we use it or not. Over the last year we seem to have been pretty damn effective at using it according to those who fight with and against us, but hey, maybe you are right about that. If so, maybe some evidence from Iraq would enlighten me. I do believe we have used it in ways that have set us back in Afghanistan, though it has helped as well. Over the last year in Iraq I see a very different story.
As I said, Iraq may yet fall back into bloody chaos, but to obnoxiously ridicule, and that is exactly what you are doing, someone who has been as accurate in their assessments of what would and would not be likely to work, as well as having so much experience with the people involved, sure seems unwarranted to me.
By the way, Totten’s interviews showed huge progress, it just didn’t show we have arrived where we need to as of yet. We may never, but denying that it is a huge step forward what he is describing is tone deaf. I never denied the disaster Iraq was becoming in 2006, if I had I would frankly suggest it would have been pointless to read me for any insight. Such a person would be a hopeless Pollyanna who was incapable of analyzing what was really going on. I did see some hopeful signs, most specifically in Anbar, and in the fact that I saw a change in strategy and leadership that was better equipped for this war. In fact, I was reading you and quoting you because you realized it as well.
It is no more attractive to see analysts unable or unwilling to admit that we have seen progress, turning victories and progress into defeat and quagmire by claiming that because there is still danger that no progress is achieved. It reminds me of those who claimed during the invasion that our stunning progress was an illusion that would end in disaster as our supply lines were broken. Listening to some it was only really successful if we were moving slowly, though undoubtedly if we had that would have been declared proof of our inability to defeat them as we Montgomery like crept forward. Nothing is progress for some people because they can always devise a way for it to be indicative of disaster.
That is what you are in danger of becoming, the opposite of the Pollyanna. We get people to stop fighting, you say it is all an illusion because many still claim (and often not so convincingly, talk is cheap) about how they would rather be fighting. Damn then, I guess the answer is for them not to stop fighting! Sunni and Shia neighborhoods start inviting back the members of rival sects, it doesn’t matter because a reporter (who we must assume we can trust) says he spoke to some of the local militia who say they hate the government. I guess the answer is don’t allow those who wish to come back do so, because someone doesn’t like the central government.
Or maybe, I could argue they all love each other because I find someone who says sectarian divides have no meaning for him. Thus I can say that all Iraqi’s are saying something different than those reporters say. The question is is their less sectarian fervor, is there less of a desire to solve the problems with violence, are the most violent amongst the factions more marginalized than before, etc? Obviously despite large differences they are more willing, for now, to try. Even if they don’t believe it will last, that eventually they will need to resort to violence, they won’t find out until they try first. We are giving them that opportunity. Things change Josh. We have accomplished with many of these men the first step, and even a few more past the first. There is a way to go. That is what Yon sees and you deny.
Well, you denied that what we have seen was even possible, so while that doesn’t make you wrong now, it certainly means that maybe you should temper your certainty about your own analysis and show a great deal more respect (even as you disagree) for that of men like Yon, or for that matter me. I haven’t exactly pointed it out before, but I have a large vault of I told you so’s I could bring up with a simple search of our archives. I haven’t precisely because I think this may all still go to hell in a hand basket, and I also know (which I acknowledged at the time) that it didn’t have to accomplish what it has so far. There is some luck involved. I did however strenuously object to the idea that such things were impossible, or foolish to even contemplate. That in fact it was quite possible, maybe even likely.
You want to ridicule Kristol, or Rumsfeld or Kagan, fair game. They have been right, they have been wrong, and they have resorted to a bit of grandiose disdain for views they disagree with along with a bit too much hubris and disdain themselves. If you want to ridicule someone like Yon who has been so very right, who has openly admitted the uncertainty around his views, and even on issues where you were not just wrong about what was likely, but claimed was impossible, well that is just a bit much for me to swallow without pointing out the gall it takes. Especially given his generally gracious rhetoric.
I didn’t say that we *shouldn’t* increase the size and capability of the Army. I predict that we *won’t*, which is a different kettle of fish entirely.
Lance, read the mass graves article before commenting on it: “Witnesses said U.S. aircraft bombarded the area for hours, while media reported rockets slamming into houses and many casualties.”
So, yes — bombarded.
And where have I denied we have made progress? I’ve said repeatedly, including in this post, that I’m grateful to have been wrong about the violence. That is progress, no doubt. The challenge, and this is the same one voiced by Generals Petraeus and Odierno, and echoed by Ambassador Crocker, is that without concrete political movement in Baghdad all that reduced violence will come to naught. Yon looks at tiny halting steps and sees victory ahead. I look at the renewed street wars in Sadr City and Basra as the standard violent grind of sectarian conflict—and, like other Iraq Veterans like <a href=”http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=1924″>Gian Gentile</a> (whose argument about legitimacy I see as the lynchpin in my skepticism of the whole Iraq endeavor), don’t see it as a positive step.
Yes, I was snotty in my post. So what? I wasn’t out of line, and that seems to be the primary component of your argument, since the rest is still very much in the air (i.e. still to be determined, temporary fluctuations be damned). If being snotty on the Internet is suddenly a crime, especially given the tone in other posts here, then I am for once in my life at a loss for further words.
Without getting into the thick of the discussion, I too was taken aback at Yon’s advocating more boots on the ground. I would think he knows, as Josh suggests, just how stretched the military is right now, and that increasing troop levels in Iraq right now could cause more harm than good over the long haul. McQ put it this way:
That seems about right to me (and note that McQ went into greater detail about the issue here). As far as “victory” is concerned, it’s always been the achievement of a stable, democratic government that represents the interests of all Iraqis and serves as a model for representative government for the Islamic nations surrounding her in the Middle East. A tall order? Perhaps. But it is achievable IMHO, and I think we are a great deal of the way there.
On that score, concerns about Iran’s influence are not only legitimate, but an important factor to consider. Even so, I think too much power is ascribed to Iran, and too little credit given to people like Maliki, when it comes to the governance of Iraq. SCIRI may have been formed in Iran (in exile), but people forget that many Kurds including Talabani and the PUK found refuge in Iran while Saddam ruled as well. I don’t think anyone is seriously asserting that Iran has control or influence over the Kurds, are they?
Iran’s interests have mostly involved keeping Iraq a mess so as to prevent any uprising amongst her own population. It seems to me that’s why anyone can credibly claim that Iran was both helping Maliki and Sadr during the recent Basra campaign. But that misses the most relevant point that the Shi’ite PM directed an insurrection-quelling campaign against Shi’ite militias and their criminal followers on behalf of the central government. That’s a big deal, and may go far in facilitating a general reconciliation. Of course, that doesn’t mean that it will happen, nor that Iran didn’t play a part. I just think that clearly identifying what Iran’s interests truly are, and what they think they can actually attain, are important when analyzing the situation. Complaining that we are helping Iran set up a puppet-state is both hyperbolic and completely unhelpful.
Ummm, seems to me there are only 2 ways of getting around the “Air power does not win counterinsurgencies.” argument.
Leave or Increase boots on the ground.
“Congress should be figuring ways and means to increase troop levels.”
A very open ended suggestion for putting more boots on the ground. Which would decrease the very method of fighting the insurgency that you are are complaining about Josh.
Let’s not forget that Yon is both a Green Beret, and very very pro-American. Even with all the positivisim, he still maintains the pragmatism that we could still loose this. Not that victory is inevitable. What he, and other journalists, are seeing (if they bother to get out of the Green zone and see for themselves) is progress.
I also think his final point is valid, the Democrats are arguing like Iraq was still pre-Surge, and it’s not.
Ignore the source for this for a moment, and see if it’s true.
It’s what I’ve been hearing to, that Iraq has met a greater number of the benchmarks, and is working on the rest. If true, then their is substantial (even if slow) political progress in Iraq, and Baghdad.
a strained Army is bad no matter how you cut it.
Requiring a Caesarean section is bad. An infant needing a life support system after birth is bad. An Army and Marine Corps doing what it was made to do, is not “bad”. Not the way you imply.
Do you for one reason or another think the military is just there to look good on parades and fly air shows? Or do you believe that the technological superiority of the United States should be preventing the military from feeling fatigue and the other flaws of humanity, if things were really improving as Yon stated?
I’m not pulling that from nowhere.
Whether the data you used is true or not does not matter concerning the overall strategy. It is simply irrelevant just as it is irrelevant to whether you will need to use the firearm or not when a M-16 has a high chance of jamming in a desert climate. The solution, if there is a solution, is not to go around the desert unarmed or carrying bows and swords. The solution is to clean the M-16 or replace it with alternatives so that the jamming problem is reduced if not entirely fixed.
You seem to imply that just because humans are humans and soldiers are soldiers, both needing to complain and have daily human desires and weaknesses, that we should suddenly not do what we are doing in Iraq.
That is no justification at all for your claims, Josh. There is no solution to human weakness, but if there were, it definitely would not be giving up on a task.
I don’t think you realize what that means.
That would make the situation a vice a versa, now wouldn’t it.
In fact, we could examine the “perception assessment matrix” the authors claim we can unpack, understand, and then coopt the insurgents success criteria.
So obviously you wish to have lives depend on your book learning as opposed to the “institutional memory” of the armed forces that you yourself recognized. I’m not sure if I, in your situation, would want the blood of soldiers and the cries of family members on my hands just because I read a few books. That’s a level of responsibility that requires a certain amount of consideration when you are taking it upon yourself to declare yourself better able to grasp the fundamental problems of the enemy more than Michael Yon and General Petraeus.
The difference between running a war based upon some book you read and the realities of war is that reality does not distill down to some prefered debate over “perception assessment matrix”. Reality requires real solutions, not just endless debate which you find of import, Josh.
Solutions cannot be created without argument or discussion or testing, but that’s not the same as you trying to derail the justified criticism of your attacks against Petraeus’ strategy and Yon’s articles by bringing up some abstract “COIN” concept that may or may not be of any relevance in the end.
If everything I read is propaganda, but everything you read is simply eye-witness fact, then there is no basis for further discussion.
That is the point, after all. There is no basis for commonality when you accept all propaganda as truth if it feels right but eye-witness fact of people you don’t agree with as biased in a false manner. You can state your prejudices towards Yon or Totten or even Petraeus, and I can do nothing about it except explain why they are wrong.
Btw, Josh, eye-witness accounts are propaganda. Refer to your CNN article claims for why that should matter to you. The difference here is, I can analyze Yon’s position and claims for what kind of propaganda it is and what the goals of it are. If it is untrue, I will recognize it. If it is true, that’d be important to know as well.
The discussion starts and ends after I figure out what exactly you believe and why you believe. After that, there’s not much to discuss or figure out.. Currently, there is much to your positions you are not shining a light on. Thus there is something to converse and write about, still. For example, take this short and meaningless portion you wrote.
Or we could look at the methods for local sustainment, which are simply not happening. When Totten goes around and interviews soldiers in Fallujah, and most of them barely trust the police to behave when they’re gone, that doesn’t tell me the campaign is working.
You claim that local sustainment is not occuring. The evidence you use to justify your position is “Totten is wrong”. That may fit in your scientific manner of validating your pet theory based upon how “wrong” the theories of others are, but I cannot really accept your criticism of Totten as being a justification for why your claims are correct.
The fact that you choose to use Totten, who is a clear and out civilian who makes no demonstrable attempt at making a military analysis of events he has witnessed on his blog, instead of Michael Yon who tends to make some strong opinions concerning tactics and strategy known to his readers, says much more than your claims and your attempts to justify those claims.
Interviewing people on the street is simply irrelevant when it comes to the big picture. There is no way to extrapolate what else is true from that, except through speculation. The thing is, Josh, that is exactly what you do when you pick and choose interviews of war weary soldiers and polls of officers. You claim there is a difference between eye witness accounts of Yon and your “big picture” observer position. There isn’t though, at least not in a way that favors you given your arguments against Yon and Totten. You, being the observer, are in a position where you have to rely upon eye witness accounts of things. Since you criticism Yon for being at too low a level to make sense of the events, you are in a sense criticizing and destroying the credibility of your own sources; in the end, this only makes you right by elevating you to some “objective pedestal” beyond the flaws that make humans humans. You must be an omniscient being if you can take eye witness accounts, full of flawed and mistaken impressions, and make it into the Truth that you so value.
Lance and I may disagree, but he at least treats what I say honestly.
Whether Lance is getting anywhere or not in his view, is not for me to say. Obviously from some of the comments here, he has had a long history of such arguments with you. I prefer a different game with different rules. I have no interest in cataloging your mistakes through years and years, Josh. Thus I am not really very tolerant of your claims given how weak they truly are. I do not need to be since I do not hope to convince you of anything; I only seek a little bit of light on exactly what else your erroneous beliefs are.
Apparently, since you don’t prefer to explain those beliefs or even discuss them, my hands are tied.
Air power does not win counterinsurgencies.
MichaelW covered this in a similar fashion to how I would have. Instead I would have called you inconsistent, as per your fashion, in addition to being erroneous and incorrect: full of mistakes, in other words.
All you know are how to push problems into people’s face and laugh at them as they try, and fail in your opinion, to solve them. You complain and spout off such things as “air power does not win counter-insurgencies” while at the same time belittling Yon’s personal face to face evidence that led to his conclusion that we need not only a Surge, but even more of a counter-insurgency Surge based upon more boots on the ground in Iraq.
“Witnesses said U.S. aircraft bombarded the area for hours, while media reported rockets slamming into houses and many casualties.”
I remind people here that I did say that Josh’s sources were propaganda. Not all propaganda is black, but this one does seem like it is black propaganda.
Iraqi soldiers found the mass grave in Mahmoudiya on Thursday, and military authorities believe the bodies have been there for more than a year.
Troops — who initially found 33 bodies — have been excavating the site since it was discovered.
So the only reason Josh mentioned this was because CNN also mentioned it? Is there a point in repeating somebody else’s propaganda mix?
The challenge, and this is the same one voiced by Generals Petraeus and Odierno, and echoed by Ambassador Crocker, is that without concrete political movement in Baghdad all that reduced violence will come to naught.
There is no point in having one delusion about the Surge, accepting you were wrong, and than attaching yourself to another delusion about the Surge’s political success.
What’s the point then? The same fundamental philosophies and sources you used to criticize the possibility of a Surge success are still the same things you base your view of the political progress on. I don’t see where you changed in that respect. And if you haven’t, then what’s the point of admitting you were wrong when you still accept your fundamental premises on COIN as being right?
Nothing really has changed.
I too was taken aback at Yon’s advocating more boots on the ground.-MW
More boots on the ground, circa 2005, would have done nothing under Casey’s then current strategy. Yon didn’t mention this because Petraeus’ strategic methods were far more important than any troop surge, it just so happened that any counter-insurgency strategy needed a troop surge given previous generals and their policies in Iraq.
I’m not sure why Yon didn’t make a greater point about this, unless he did in 2005-6 and I just did not notice, which is very possible.
Yon’s calling for more troops now, seems like it was before. It is a call to arms, rather than a specific policy argument full of details, risks, and rewards. In that, it is not a very good policy all in all, since it is so short term tactical.
We need to explore every way, short of more troops, to ensure success in Iraq.
When there is a will, there is a way. I would have said we needed to explore every way, short of more troops, to ensure success in Iraq circa 2005 and 6. That was because I didn’t want to in any way appear to be jumping on the Democrat bandwagon and cooperating with them on increasing troop levels, because I knew they would mess up any plan, whether by agreeing with it and then sabotaging it or just trying to obstruct it. I also didn’t think Bush was spineless enough to cave into Democrat pressure and provide more troops. Things worked differently though, since Bush listened to Petraeus and it was Petraeus that convinced Bush to increase troops, not the Democrats, which really made all the difference.
Currently, there is the problem of logistics if we increase force presence in Iraq. Bad Voodoo’s war gives you the persona take on the cost of escorting convoys from Kuwaitt to all parts of Iraq. Secondly, there is a problem of manpower.
I think the first problem can be reduced by reducing the amenities in this “huge” central bases in the green zone. It is supposed to be a war, not a vacation for desk jockeys and bureaucrats in the green zone. That should reduce, somewhat, the logistics hording and put more of it into front line combat units that need stuff and will use it well. The second problem has a simple solution. Steal manpower from Korea and Germany and the rest of the world that don’t need it or want us there.
Japan agreed to accept the Constitution MacArthur wrote in return for the US military protection. That’s something we shouldn’t weaken because of a threat somewhere else. South Korea already has an army that should be able to kick North Korea’s arse, they don’t need us and they sure as heck aren’t grateful or polite to Americans. A good spot to steal troops from.More on the mass grave in question
Lance, read the mass graves article before commenting on it: Witnesses said U.S. aircraft bombarded the area for hours, while media reported rockets slamming into houses and many casualties.
As far as I can piece together, Josh thinks of a fresh mass grave as something that occured a year ago and are now being unearthed. How this impacts political progress now, is of course unclear given Josh’s lack of comment on that.
When the United States provides air support to our Iraqi allies, Josh calls this trying to win a COIN war using air power, demonstrating an apparent total disregard for the fact that the air power was only in support of Iraqi infantry operations. Who, while lower on the totem pole of standards to which Americans hold themselves to, cannot be honestly called “air power”.
Perhaps Josh’s solution is to have the US refuse to provide air support, like Ted Kennedy did to the South Vietnamese, and everything will be a okay?
“When there is a will, there is a way.”
I’m well aware of what happens when you believe in the triumph of the will. What pathetic arrogance to think you can just remake people if only we read enough propaganda and believe. Maybe you can. But at what cost? Not everything is worth “any burden.”
As for the rest, from the groundless speculation about my experience to an apparent inability to notice a consistent thread in my argumentation (something Lance has picked up on and attacked quite ably), confirms my desire to end this discussion at once.