I’m still not sure that outside of a few cases (Zimbabwe, Sudan, may be Angola) China’s strategy is to put all of their eggs in the same basket (or behind one regime. Their strategy is to suck up to whoever is on the throne but they’ve shown (in Lesotho or Zambia or even Zimbabwe) that they can have enough flexibility and ambiguity to not be tied up to a particular regime. And to an extend, they’re very good at using post-colonial non-alined rhetoric to argue that they have no investment in internal politics of the countries they deal with.

But given my issue with most oil-in-africa discussions, I shouldn’t be talking about China. The interview definetly raises a bunch of other issues that usally get ignored so let me shut up.

Thanks for reading shakara though.

I don’t misunderstand what John is saying. Nor do I dispute that he is correct that China is almost exclusively pursuing economic and resource security policy in Africa today (and is largely politically indifferent). Nor that that this is the motive that will drive their engagement in Africa henceforth.

But I certainly doubt that in the course of getting itself intimately involved in these countries and thus becoming increasingly dependent upon them, that it can remain apolitical. Indeed, I think that the very nature of their lack of scruples in doing things like building Robert Mugabe’s mansion, or allowing the Sudanese air force to bomb villages for them in land clearing operations (John goes into this in his book), tends to suggest that they would have few moral qualms about manipulating the political situations in these countries, to the disadvantage of African populations.

That particularly becomes true when their increasing resource demands are threatened by international competition. Particularly from the United States, which definitely has a political agenda in addition to its economic needs, to encourage market liberalization and representative democracy. To the extent that Western firms and states can challenge or defeat Chinese efforts to secure their needs, the temptation becomes substantial to actualize their goals through political (or even military or paramilitary) means.

If you want to read a depressing book, may I suggest “The Coming Anarchy” by Robert Kaplan (incidentally my favorite journalist–bar none…). What will make your depression worse is that he wrote much of it in 1994. Its an important……

I agree with you too. The moderately low arms sales only means that they do their thing under they own terms and following their own motivations.

Oh, that’s a great link you posted.

I think it’s a little bit naive to think China won’t interfere in politics, etc… of course their will. Right now, their interest is to build goodwill with its partners so they can secure their markets, but in the future they will do whatever they need to do to guarantee their oil supply, like everybody else. And, maybe even worst, if we look back on their behavior through history.

However, I am not sure I agreed with the author’s view on China.

I agree with your skepticism Ms. Feathers. John is a little too generous with the PRC strategic vision I think…and it’s not strictly true that China isn’t selling arms in Africa. Albeit it is notably limited…perhaps intentionally. In 2004 they sold $200 million to Zimbabwe and they’ve sold military aircraft to Sudan. Norinco assault rifles also have a nasty habit of turning up in African conflicts.

Some info on arms sales.

However, in the context of my question, which contrasted Chinese sponsorship of regimes to the Soviet experience, these sales are almost negligible. So John has a point, there is a substantial difference. However, the limitation of volume in military sales might itself betray a dimension of political calculation. The Chinese have few compunctions about dumping arms elsewhere, where they are more firmly established diplomatically and commercially.