Most governments in the area oppose withdrawal, the Iraqi government opposes withdrawal, and now we learn (as I suspected) that most foreign policy analysts in Europe oppose withdrawal:
While the American public and policy debate revolves largely around exit strategies and “redeployment,” there is apparent consensus among European policy analysts that American troops should remain in Iraq for the foreseeable future. In contrast to both European media opinion and the prevailing views of American liberals, our respondents supported sustained troop levels. Many consider the announcement of a timetable for withdrawal to be counter-productive and even outright dangerous, saying that lack of American involvement would drive Iraq into further chaos.
From Captain Ed.
About Lance
I want to thank everybody who has encouraged me over the past few years to do this. I doubt it will hold but a few people's interest, but that is okay with me. Special thanks go to Peter over at http://www.liberalcapitalist.com.
I value my privacy a great deal, so I will guess you will have to get to know me over time to find out much. I am in the financial services, wealth management, investing or whatever you want to call it business. I have children, my oldest is entering college.
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I have an enduring interest in how people learn about and analyze the world; my posts here will examine this topic in detail over time. I make no claims to be above the very biases and errors I see in others, in fact it is my belief that we are incapable of escaping them, only moderating their control over us.
I am a member of no political party, but I would broadly consider myself a man of the right. I am inclined to free market economics, limited government and a fairly narrow view of the role of the state. A small L libertarian if you will. However, if you are looking for broad based "the left believes..." or "wingers are so...." types of attacks on liberals, conservatives, neo-cons or whatever enemy you want to slam, look elsewhere.
Lance
But of course, most Europeans themselves support withdrawal. Similarly, most experts here seem to support withdrawal. And since when was opposition of the war limited to “liberals?” Unless liberals have suddenly become like 60 or 70% of the country, there is actually a widespread, bipartisan support for withdrawal.
But I mean, I guess that doesn’t matter here. When you look at what the actual scholars were saying, rather than how Captain Ed was spinning it, they all say that the over-focus on U.S. military strategy—a hallmark of the pro-war Right—is what is damaging the debate, as it is essentially a moot point. Rather, they believe military means can only be considered a means toward a viable, sustainable, political solution… which is what the rest of us have been pointing out is not happening. In fact, the opposite is happening, and I think we’re fooling ourselves if we think a few turncoat tribal chiefs in Anbar is a model we can replicate into a quilted Mesopotamia—it would result, at the best, in a soft partition, which those European scholars were fairly evenly split on whether or not it would be at the least not worse or a disaster.
Those scholars were also largely in favor of increased dialog and partnership with both Iran and Syria—drawing those two countries into the reconstruction process, giving them a stake in its success, rather than in its failure, and so on. This also goes flat out against the reigning pro-war argument, which seems to be straining to start lobbing JDAMS at Iran. AC notably didn’t include what those experts thought of the current push to start a war with Iran.
Really, that survey goes both ways—they see success, but only under the conditions the rest of us see success… conditions that are just not shaping up.
Hi there,
I work for the Atlantic Community and was part of the team that conducted the survey and analyzed the responses. Let me take this opportunity add my own 2 cents:
@Joshua: you got it exactly right. There is no contradiction in the fact that Europeans want the US to stay in Iraq, and the continued criticism of the strategies the US pursues in the country.
Most criticized overly heavy emphasis in America on military strategies, with the prevailing wisdom being “Once there is security, everything will be honkey-dorey”. Oft forgotten is the fact that the causal link “reconciliation will produce security” is a much stronger one than “security will produce reconciliation”.
Naturally, once the will for reconciliation is there, security and stability are very important in creating a space for constructive negotiations to take place uninterrupted. But even such stability is not necessarily best achieved through military force alone. Engagement or increased pressure on Iran and Syria may work manifold better than increasing troops by 20,000, 30,000 or even 100,000. Fact remains, military security is short-term security. If you place all your bets on that, you’ll always be playing catch-up. BUT it also means that a military presence remains a necessity for the time being.
We asked three over-arching questions in our interviews. The article discussed here is the result of the responses we got to our first question. The analyses of the responses to the next two questions – “What can Europe do to help stabilize Iraq” and “What will be the repercussions for Europe should America leave Iraq?” – will be published on AC shortly, and will provide for some answers to many of the comments on this blog. -as well as probably throw up many more questions.
One last thing:
I want to respond to comments made on our articles and analyses and will make sure to check back on this blog as often as I can to do so. But if you have any queries or comments which you’d like to direct specifically at me, it would be good if you could go to http://www.atlantic-community.org, join, and post your comments there. That way I see it immediately and can respond to more quickly.
Best,
Niklas Keller
Staff Writer/Researcher
Atlantic Community Editorial Team
http://www.atlantic-community.org
Josh:
Really? Which “experts”?
How is Capt. Ed “spinning it”? He quotes verbatim from the AC report, including this:
Where’s the spin?
One thing is perfectly clear: no reconciliation is going to be possible with a low-level (much less a full on) civil war taking place, nor with al Qaeda and Iranian Revolutionary Guards running around fomenting trouble. The argument is not that bringing security to Iraq will cause reconciliation, but that security will allow reconciliation.
Furthermore, while you make it obvious that you don’t think the process in Anbar and Diyala can be used as a model, your reasoning is pretty weak. That “soft partition” idea is what we call “federalism” and it seems to work pretty well here. That’s not to say that there aren’t or won’t be problems, but being so dismissive of the successful efforts thus far by labeling co-operative sheiks as “turncoats” (to whom, Josh? al Qaeda?) does not actually approach the issue with any reason.
Which was also pointed out by Capt. Ed. Again, wheres the spin?
On point, what makes you (or anyone else) think that “success” in Iraq can be agreed upon between Iran/Syria and the US? What we would consider success there is diametrically opposed to what Iran wants (i.e. another puppet state).
That’s the reigning “pro-war” argument? Who’s making that other than Norman Podhoretz? Sy Hersh seems much more interested in making war against Iran than anyone who supports finishing the mission in Iraq.
Niklas:
First of all, welcome to our humble blog, and thank you for not only visiting, but also for providing commentary.
Who is putting forth that prevailing wisdom? Gen. Petraeus has been quite frank is saying that we can provide the security to create space for a political solution, but the Iraqis themselves have to arrive at that solution. And while there are a few pundits who take any pronouncement of political progress that comes from Maliki’s mouth as the gospel truth, our leaders on the ground in Iraq, at the Petagon and in the White House haven’t been so sanguine. Again, as I pointed out to Josh above, the argument is not that security will cause reconciliation, just that it will remove the greatest current obstacle to such reconciliation.
I don’t think there’s a lot of argument here. We can certainly quibble over the correct amount of military vs. diplomatic engagement, but the fact is that both are happening. Moreover, the part of the COIN that’s been most successful is in relations with the tribal leaders in Iraq, which it seems to me goes a long way towards fostering reconciliation.
In any case, the point of Lance’s post (and that of Capt. Ed) was to point to the fact that the argument against a precipitous withdrawal is not some neocon talking point, but a rational, fact-based policy.
Michael, you’re about the spin, and that’s my error for reading it way late at night. While Captain Ed was providing proper context, Lance was not, making it appear there is unanimous consensus among FP experts in Europe that we just need to sit it out in Iraq (at best, a gross and partially misleading summary of that survey)… which is, coincidentally, an easy position for them to take, since their troops aren’t at risk, and their countries aren’t being blamed for the chaos and misery we’ve unleashed.
As for experts: we can start with Wayne White, Steven Simon (hell, a big majority of the Council on Foreign Relations), James Dobbins (and a majority of scholars at RAND), Daniel Drezner (and most academic IR scholars), William F. Buckley, every foreign policy expert at CATO, a huge chunk at CSIS (didn’t count to see if it’s a majority or not), and most of the DC staff at ISIS. We could also bring in guys like Lt. Gen William Odom if you require a military contingent.
Personally, I find it remarkable the Iraq war is, in a sense, more popular in Europe than here among the talking heads.
You also seem to misunderstand the point on focus. In your defense, you’re saying security must come before reconciliation (“no reconciliation is going to be possible with a low-level (much less a full on) civil war taking place”), when that is exactly the point these scholars, and Niklas, are refuting. Focusing so heavily on security — which in this case has entailed arming competing tribal groups in the hopes of creating a sort of detente — will not lead to reconciliation, but rather worse conflict once we leave. We are, in effect, arming all sides of a barely tampered civil war.
And federalism? Really? Federalism requires a working, weak central government with local provinces who agree to ultimately mediate their disputes among federal courts (like here, and in Switzerland). Iraq doesn’t have one, and it becomes more broken as time drags on. Federalism is the wrong model; Somalia under the Islamic Courts Union might be more appropriate, since that was the result of arming one group of tribal chiefs over all the rest, and having them impose brutal order through mayhem and force. The soft partition idea also willfully ignores the relatively power neighbors who have a vested interest in not allowing entities like Kurdistan to exist — such as Turkey and Iran, who are both poised to invade should things change much more in the North.
And yes, turncoats to al qaeda. It is vitally important we realize why they switched sides. Chuck Schumer said something very interesting on September 5:
In other words, the tribes used al-Qaeda as shock troops, and turned on them when their usefulness was over. We predicted neither the start nor the end of this process, and we will not so long as we pretend local wars fought for local reasons have any significance beyond their locality. It is possible other areas might turn on their foreign beneficiaries if they think they can get more strings-free weapons and training from the Americans, but that is not a sustainable solution for peace — it just sets the conditions for deeper brutality once we leave.
At issue isn’t whether or not staying is some sort of neocon talking point (in the U.S. at least, it certainly appears to be, Michael O’Hanlon notwithstanding), but whether it is rational and fact-based. It can be a sincere and honest policy, but I do not see the facts to back it up. Neither even do those scholars surveyed, who think there can be a role for a continued American presence in Iraq, but that their current roles and missions and strategies are actually making things worse by being so badly misfocused.
It isn’t, nor is it claimed they are.
They do, and Captain Ed didn’t spin it. I am not sure that we have any disagreement over that, though I think the political dimension of our strategy is more complex than what the survey respondents may think.
Who is arguing against that? Except the political solution which you claim isn’t going to happen. It may not, but I will address that complaint later, because your characterization of the political path to success is quite shallow and ahistorical. Sorry for the tough words, but if you are going sling expect me to be at least blunt.
The point of the post is not to argue that the analysts are fans of Bush’s policies, but to point out that withdrawal is probably not in our, Europe or the Iraqi people’s interests. Nor do I see the surge as primarily a military solution, nor does Petraeus. It is political in a number of ways, and your mischaracterization of local political progress does nothing to advance the debate. Far more is going on there than you are acknowledging. Is it sufficient? I don’t know, but it is far more important and widespread than you are claiming.
The idea that most people in favor of continuing to have a presence in Iraq want to go to war with Iran is pretty ridiculous. I have been hearing we were about to invade Iran for quite a while, and it still hasn’t come true, and in any near term time frame is pretty unlikely. The anti-war crowd was convinced the tanks were going to roll right after the last election. So far it seems even less likely now. Nor does all that you say have anything to do with the point of my post. If you want to argue with the pave over the Middle East crowd have at it. What it has to do with my discussion frankly escapes me.
It is the web Josh. Ed was linked. Yet in no way did I imply any such thing. I already addressed the point of my post. That you have all kinds of other points you wish to make in no way implies I was saying anything more than the limited one I made. I only quoted one piece. Captain Ed was there to be read. I only wrote one sentence and then referred to the source. That is the context you are looking for so your entire diatribe was just a knee jerk smear against Capt. Ed and an untrue attack against me when you realized your initial attack on Ed was unfair.
Niklas,
Thanks for your input. I am looking forward to the answers you get. I think Europe has been less than helpful since the invasion. I understand the disagreements over the rationale for the invasion, but once it happened there has been a distinct lack of willingness to help us make the best of it. That is certainly due to some extent to the Bush administrations behavior, but I cannot help but think that the interests of the Iraqi people and the long term interests of Europe have been ill served on both sides of the Atlantic by the inability for more constructive policies to be considered. Watching the administration struggle seems to have had far too large a role in determining many people’s attitudes and policies here and abroad.
That is an area that funny enough tracks with the administration, and especially Petraeus’ policies. What the troops do, and the political process inside Iraq at both the local and national levels is seen as far more important, which is why the surge was relatively small, and focused on particular areas and with radically different tactics. More political engagement with the local population being the primary difference, but hardly the only one. Thus it has been done in the face of criticism that we need even more troops.
I will admit that I think even more troops, and keeping it at higher levels longer makes more sense, in addition to the changes in approach. I however am not sure I am right and can see the logic in the surge being shorter and smaller. I see the administration moving more in the direction urged, and the military commanders even moreso.
Engagement with Iran and Syria is a problematic path. It is being attempted, but of course the other sides have to be willing to do so in a way that is helpful. So far the failures on that front are consistently placed at the feet of the administration. However, failure is a two way street. Neither Iran or Syria has been willing to cooperate on terms that limit them as well as us. Syria may be doing some good at this point by cracking down on foreign insurgents basing themselves in their territory. That though is because those same insurgents are a threat to their own regime. An opening thus may exist, but I am less than sanguine about its prospects no matter how skillful we are. Crocker however is an able diplomat, so possibly he can make some progress despite my skepticism.
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