Promoting partisanship over prosecution of the war effort reaches an a new low today with the placement of an ad by MoveOn.org blatantly libeling Gen. David Petraeus:
… as General David Petraeus provides his Iraq assessment to Congress–the antiwar group MoveOn.org is running a full-page advertisement in the New York Times under the headline: “General Petraeus or General Betray us? Cooking the books for the White House.”
Let’s be clear: MoveOn.org is suggesting that General Petraeus has ‘betrayed’ his country. This is disgusting. To attack as a traitor an American general commanding forces in war because his ‘on the ground’ experience does not align with MoveOn.org’s political objectives is utterly shameful. It shows contempt for America’s military leadership, as well as for the troops who have confidence in him, as our fellow soldiers in Iraq certainly do.
Quite frankly, this is beyond disgusting, and is in fact downright treacherous. How dare these political wannabes question the patriotism of the leader of US troops in Iraq? How dare they label him a traitor while offering zero evidence to support such a charge? Why shouldn’t MoveOn.org, its members, the New York Times, and anyone else who has the temerity to make such a disgraceful accusation (which appears to go back as far as April of this year), being called to the floor of Congress to answer for such claims? Is there anyone up on the Hill with the stones to issue such a subpoena and to force those hurling unsubstantiated and uncalled for allegations to either back up their charges or publicly apologize?
Certainly not Diane Feinstein who, despite her liberal bona fides, is usually one of the saner voices of the Democratic left.
WALLACE: Yes, but I’m asking about General Petraeus.
FEINSTEIN: Well, let me — well, I don’t think General Petraeus has an independent view in that sense. General Petraeus is there to succeed. He may say the progress is uneven. He may say it’s substantial. I don’t know what he will say. You can be sure we’ll listen to it. But I don’t think he’s an independent evaluator.
To be fair to DiFi, this actually is one of the saner comments coming from Democrats today. While slimy in it’s own right, as are the childish antics of the other Democratic Senators predictably seeking to rob the General of any credibility, they don’t rise to the level of clear and actionable defamation (IMHO).
Indeed, this “General Betray Us” campaign being staged by the anti-war left appears, at least to me, to fit the classic definition of libel:
An untruthful statement about a person, published in writing or through broadcast media, that injures the person’s reputation or standing in the community. Because libel is a tort (a civil wrong), the injured person can bring a lawsuit against the person who made the false statement. Libel is a form of defamation , as is slander (an untruthful statement that is spoken, but not published in writing or broadcast through the media).
Moreover, most states define libel that attacks a person’s professional character or standing as libel per se, which means that the onus shifts to the libeler to prove that he/she has a proper defense for making the statement (usually that the statement is the “truth”). Although the libeling of famous persons usually carries a further showing of malicious intent, and it’s likely that Petraeus qualifies as a such a person, making such a showing in this case would appear to be quite easy. There is little doubt that the entire purpose of the campaign is to impugn the General’s integrity and sabotage his intended statements to Congress (which is, by statute, part of his job).
So, I’ll throw down the gaunlet here and challenge you scumbags calling Petraeus a traitor to back up your assertions. I also call upon Congress to issue subpoenas for the testimony of those making such accusations, forcing them to support their allegations in an open session before both Houses. If you truly believe that Gen. Petraeus is a traitor to this country, and you have the evidence to back up that assertion, then it is incumbent upon you to take that evidence public. If the assertions are true, after all, the American people need to know that their troops are being led by a treasonous bastard. And if they are false, then you are nothing but wretched charlatans who should beg the forgiveness of the very country you so take for granted in full view of her citizens and representatives.
Anybody?
MORE: McQ links and has this to say about the MoveOn.org ad:
There are few times in my life that I’ve seen anything this deliberately despicable and vile put out by a political organization. Words simply fail me.
The perpetrators of this execrable ad should be ashamed of themselves. The depth of hate necessary to attempt this sort of character assassination is both irrational and toxic. The organization which put this together deserves only derision and scorn. And they should understand that I do question their patriotism. This is way over the line and is anti-American by any measure or metric.
See also the link to Beldar at QandO.
UPDATE II: Via Insty, Britain and America is liveblogging Petraeus’ testimony to Congress.
EVEN MORE: McQ sends along this transcript of Petraeus’ testimony (after the jump), and the prepared Crocker remarks.
AND YET MORE: The Good Glenn highlights this comment from Michael Yon:
General David Petraeus’s first day of testimony was completely accurate, and consistent with my recent experiences around Iraq. Everything he said during the public hearing on Monday was measured, cogent, and demonstrably accurate. That his reputation was attacked in an entirely inaccurate full-page advertisement in the New York Times is a smear on the reputation of the New York Times.
Funny. I would have said that it was a smear on Petraeus and a confirmation of the NYT’s reputation.
General Petraeus Opening Statement
REP. IKE SKELTON: Let me, before I ask you to proceed, again, state any demonstrations, any signs or demonstrative evidence will cause your removal.
Once again, General, the floor is yours.
GEN. DAVID PETRAEUS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, ranking members, members of the committees, thank you for the opportunity to provide my assessment of the security situation in Iraq and to discuss the recommendations I recently provided to my chain of command for the way forward.
At the outset I would like to note that this is my testimony. Although I have briefed my assessment and recommendations to my chain of command, I wrote this testimony myself. It has not been cleared by nor shared with anyone in the Pentagon, the White House or the Congress until it was just handed out.
As a bottom line up front, the military objectives of the surge are, in large measure, being met. In recent months, in the face of tough enemies in the brutal summer heat of Iraq, coalition and Iraqi security forces have achieved progress in the security arena.
Though the improvements have been uneven across Iraq, the overall number of security incidents in Iraq has declined in eight of the past 12 weeks, with the number of incidents in the last two weeks at the lowest levels seen since June 2006.
One reason for the decline in incidence is that coalition and Iraqi forces have dealt significant blows to Al Qaida Iraq. Though Al Qaida and its affiliates remain dangerous, we have taken away a number of their sanctuaries and gained the initiative in many areas.
We have also disrupted Shiite militia extremists, capturing the head and numerous other leaders of the Iranian-supportive special groups, along with a senior Lebanese Hezbollah operative supporting Iran’s activities in Iraq. Coalition and Iraqi operations have helped reduce ethno-sectarian violence as well, bringing down the number of ethno- sectarian deaths substantially in Baghdad and across Iraq since the height of the sectarian violence last December.
The number of overall civilian deaths has also declined during this period, although the numbers in each area are still at troubling levels.
Iraqi security forces have also continued to grow and to shoulder more of the load, albeit slowly and amid continuing concerns about the sectarian tendencies of some elements in their ranks.
In general, however, Iraqi elements have been standing and fighting and sustaining tough losses, and they have taken the lead in operations in many areas.
Additionally, in what may be the most significant development of the past eight months, the tribal rejection of Al Qaida that started in Anbar province and helped produce such significant change there has now spread to a number of other locations as well.
Based on all this, and on the further progress we believe we can achieve over the next few months, I believe that we will be able to reduce our forces to the pre-surge level of brigade combat teams by next summer without jeopardizing the security gains that we have fought so hard to achieve.
Beyond that, while noting that the situation in Iraq remains complex, difficult and sometimes downright frustrating, I also believe that it is possible to achieve our objectives in Iraq over time, although doing so will be neither quick nor easy. Having provided that summary, I would like to review the nature of the conflict in Iraq, recall the situation before the surge, describe the current situation and explain the recommendations I have provided to my chain of command for the way ahead in Iraq.
The fundamental source of the conflict in Iraq is competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. This competition will take place and its resolution is key to producing long-term stability in the new Iraq. The question is whether the competition takes place more or less violently.
This chart shows the security challenges in Iraq.
REP. SKELTON: General, let me interrupt you.
The members should have the charts in front of them. The chart over near the wall is very difficult to see from here. So I would urge the members to look at the charts that have been handed out and should be immediately in front of them.
Thank you, General.
GEN. PETRAEUS: This chart shows the security challenges in Iraq. Foreign and homegrown terrorists, insurgents, militia extremists and criminals all push the ethno-sectarian competition toward violence. Malign actions by Syria and especially by Iran fuel that violence.
Lack of adequate governmental capacity, lingering sectarian mistrust, and various forms of corruption add to Iraq’s challenges.
In our recent efforts to look to the future, we found it useful to revisit the past.
In December 2006, during the height of the ethno-sectarian violence that escalated in the wake of the bombing of the golden dome mosque in Samarra, the leaders in Iraq at that time, General George Casey and Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, concluded that the coalition was failing to achieve its objectives.
Their review underscored the need to protect the population and reduce sectarian violence, especially in Baghdad. As a result, General Casey requested additional forces to enable the coalition to accomplish these tasks and those forces began to flow in January.
In the ensuing months, our forces and our Iraqi counterparts have focused on improving security, especially in Baghdad and the areas around it. Wresting sanctuaries from Al Qaida control and disrupting the efforts of the Iranian-supported militia extremists.
We have employed counterinsurgency practices and an underscored the importance of units living among the people they are securing. And, accordingly, our forces have established dozens of joint security stations and patrol bases manned by coalition and Iraqi forces in Baghdad and in other areas across Iraq.
In mid-June, with all the surge capabilities in place, we launched a series of offensive operations focused on expanding the gains achieved in the preceding months in Anbar province, clearing Baqouba, several key Baghdad neighborhoods, the remaining sanctuaries in Anbar province and important areas in the so called belts around Baghdad, and pursuing Al Qaida in the Diyala river valley and several other areas.
Throughout this period as well, we engage in dialogue with insurgent groups and tribes. And this led to additional elements standing up to oppose Al Qaida and other extremists.
We also continued to emphasize the development of the Iraqi security forces and we employed non-kinetic means to exploit the opportunities provided by the conduct or our kinetic combat operations, aided in this effort by the arrival of additional provincial reconstruction teams. The progress our forces have achieved with our Iraqi counterparts has, as I noted at the outset, been substantial. While there have been setbacks as well as successes and tough losses along the way, overall our tactical commanders and I see improvements in the security environment.
We do not, however, just rely on gut feel or personal observations. We also conduct considerable data collection and analysis to gauge progress and determine trends. We do this by gathering and refining data from coalition and Iraqi operation centers, using a methodology that has been in place for well over a year, and that has benefited over the past seven months from the increased presence of our forces living among the Iraqi people.
We endeavor to ensure our analysis of that data is conducted with rigor and consistency, as our ability to achieve a nuanced understanding of the security environment is dependent on collecting and analyzing data in a consistent way over time.
Two U.S. intelligence agencies recently reviewed our methodology and they concluded that the data we produced is the most accurate and authoritative in Iraq.
As I mentioned up front and as the chart before you reflects, the level of security incidents has decreased significantly since the start of the surge of offensive operations in mid-June, declining in eight of the past 12 weeks, with the level of incidents in the past two weeks the lowest since June 2006, and with the number of attacks this past week the lowest since April 2006.
Civilian deaths of all categories, less natural causes, have also declined considerably, by over 45 percent Iraq-wide since the height of the sectarian violence in December. This is shown by the top line on this chart. And the decline by some 70 percent in Baghdad is shown by the bottom line.
Periodic mass casualty attacks by Al Qaida have tragically added to the numbers outside Baghdad in particular. Even without the sensational attacks, however, the level of civilian deaths is clearly still too high and continues to be of serious concern.
As the next chart shows, the number of ethno-sectarian deaths, an important subset of the overall civilian casualty figures, has also declined significantly since the height of the sectarian violence in December. Iraq-wide, as shown by the top line on this chart, the number of ethno-sectarian deaths has come down by over 55 percent, and it would have come down much further were it not for the casualties inflicted by barbaric Al Qaida bombings attempting to reignite sectarian violence.
In Baghdad, as the bottom line shows, the number of ethno- sectarian deaths has come down by some 80 percent since December. This chart also displays the density of sectarian incidents in various Baghdad neighborhoods, and it both reflects the progress made in reducing ethno-sectarian violence in the Iraqi capital, and identifies the areas that remain the most challenging.
As we have gone on the offensive in former Al Qaida and insurgent sanctuaries, and as locals have increasingly supported our efforts, we have found a substantially increased the number of arms, ammunition and explosives caches.
As this chart shows, we have, so far this year, already found and cleared over 4,400 caches; nearly 1,700 more than we discovered in all of last year.
This may be a factor in the reduction in the number of overall improvised explosive device attacks in recent months, which, as this chart shows, has declined sharply by about one third since June.
The change in the security situation in Anbar province has, of course, been particularly dramatic.
As this chart shows, monthly attack levels in Anbar have declined from some 1,350 in October 2006, to a bit over 200 in August of this year. This dramatic decrease reflects the significance of the local rejection of Al Qaida and the newfound willingness of local Anbaris to volunteer to serve in the Iraqi army and Iraqi police service.
As I noted earlier, we are seeing similar actions in other locations as well. To be sure, trends have not been uniformly positive across Iraq, as is shown by this chart depicting violence levels in several key Iraqi provinces. The trend in Nineveh province, for example, has been much more up and down until a recent decline, and the same is true in Salahuddin province, Saddam’s former home province, though recent trends there and in Baghdad have been in the right direction recently.
In any event, the overall trajectory in Iraq, a steady decline of incidents in the past three months, is still quite significant.
The number of car bombings and suicide attacks has also declined in each of the past five months from a high of some 175 in March, as this chart shows, to about 90 this past month.
While this trend in recent months has been heartening, the number of high-profile attacks is still too high, and we continue to work hard to destroy the networks that carry out these barbaric attacks.
Our operations have, in fact, produced substantial progress against Al Qaida and its affiliates in Iraq.
As this chart shows, in the past eight months, we have considerably reduced the areas in which Al Qaida enjoyed sanctuary. We have also neutralized five media cells, detained the senior Iraqi leader of Al Qaida Iraq, and killed or captured nearly 100 other key leaders and some 2,500 rank-and-file fighters.
Al Qaida is certainly not defeated. However, it is off balance, and we are pursuing its leaders and operators aggressively.
Of note, as the recent national intelligence estimate on Iraq explained, these gains against Al Qaida are as a result of the synergy of actions by conventional forces to deny the terrorists sanctuary, intelligence of surveillance and reconnaissance assets to find the enemy, and special operations elements to conduct targeted raids.
A combination of these assets is necessary to prevent the creation of a terrorist safe haven in Iraq.
In the past six months, we have also targeted Shia militia extremists, capturing a number of senior leaders and fighters, as well as the deputy commander of Lebanese Hezbollah Department 2800, the organization created to support the training, arming, funding — in some cases — direction of the militia extremists by the Iranian Republican Guard Corps Quds Force. These elements have assassinated and kidnapped Iraqi governmental leaders, killed and wounded our soldiers with advanced explosive devices provided by Iran and indiscriminately rocketed civilians in the international zone and elsewhere.
It is increasingly apparent to both coalition and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through the use of this Quds Force, seeks to turn the Iraqi special groups into Hezbollah-like force to serve its interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq.
(PROTESTOR SHOUTS OFF-MIKE)
GEN. PETRAEUS: The most significant developments…
(PROTESTOR SHOUTS OFF-MIKE)
REP. SKELTON: Would the gentleman suspend — will the entire group that’s back there supporting that person be removed?
GEN. PETRAEUS: The most significant development…
REP. SKELTON: Just a minute, General.
GEN. PETRAEUS: Yes, sir.
REP. SKELTON: Proceed.
GEN. PETRAEUS: The most significant development in the past six months likely has been the increasing emergence of tribes and local citizens rejecting Al Qaida and other extremists. This has, of course, been most visible in Anbar province. A year ago the province was assessed as lost politically. Today it is a model of what happens when local leaders and citizens decide to oppose Al Qaida and reject its Taliban-like ideology.
While Anbar is unique and the model it provides cannot be replicated everywhere in Iraq, it does demonstrate the dramatic change in security that is possible with the support and participation of local citizens.
As this chart shows, other tribes have been inspired by the actions of those in Anbar and have volunteered to fight extremists as well.
We have, in coordination with the Iraqi government’s National Reconciliation Committee, been engaging these tribes and groups of local citizens who want to oppose extremists and to contribute to local security. Some 20,000 such individuals are already being hired for the Iraqi police. Thousands of others are being assimilated into the Iraqi army. And thousands more are vying for a spot in Iraq’s security forces.
As I noted earlier, Iraqi security forces have continued to grow, to develop their capabilities, and to shoulder more of the burdens of providing security for their country.
Despite concerns about sectarian influence, inadequate logistics and supporting institutions, and an insufficient number of qualified commissioned and noncommissioned officers, Iraqi units are engaged around the country.
As this chart shows, there are now nearly 140 Iraqi army, national police and special operations forces battalions in the fight, with about 95 of those capable of taking the lead in operations, albeit with some coalition support.
Beyond that, all of Iraq’s battalions have been heavily involved in combat operations that often result in the loss of leaders, soldiers and equipment. These losses are among the shortcomings identified by operational readiness assessments, but we should not take from these assessments the impression that Iraqi forces are not in the fight and contributing.
Indeed, despite their shortages, many Iraqi units across Iraq now operate with minimal coalition assistance. As counterinsurgency operations require substantial numbers of boots on the ground, we are helping the Iraqis expand the size of their security forces.
Currently there are some 445,000 individuals on the payrolls of Iraq’s Interior and Defense Ministries. Based on recent decisions by Prime Minister Maliki, the number of Iraq security forces will grow further by the end of this year, possibly by as much as 40,000.
Given the security challenges Iraq faces, we support this decision, and we will work with the two security ministries as they continue their efforts to expand their basic training capacity, leader development programs, logistical structures and elements, and various other institutional capabilities to support the substantial growth in Iraqi forces.
Significantly, in 2007, Iraq will, as in 2006, spend more on its security forces than it will receive in security assistance from the United States. In fact, Iraq is becoming one of the United States’ larger foreign military sales customers, committing some $1.6 billion to FMS already, with a possibility of up to $1.8 billion more being committed before the end of the year. And I appreciate the attention that some members of Congress have recently given to speeding up the FMS process for Iraq. To summarize, the security situation in Iraq is improving. And Iraqi elements are slowly taking on more of the responsibility for protecting their citizens.
Innumerable challenges lie ahead. However, coalition and Iraqi security forces have made progress toward achieving security. As a result, the United States will be in a position to reduce its forces in Iraq in the months ahead.
Two weeks ago, I provided recommendations for the way ahead in Iraq to the members of my chain of command and the Joints Chiefs of Staff. The essence of the approach recommended is captured and it’s title: Security While Transitioning: From leading, to partnering, to overwatch.
This approach seeks to build on the security improvements our troopers and our Iraqi counterparts have fought so hard to achieve in recent months. It reflects recognition of the importance of securing the population and the imperative of transitioning responsibilities to Iraqi institutions and Iraqi forces as quickly as possible, but without rushing to failure.
It includes substantial support for the continuing development of Iraqi security forces. It also stresses the need to continue the counterinsurgency strategy that we have been employing, but with Iraqis gradually shouldering more of the load. And it highlights the importance of regional and diplomatic — regional and global diplomatic approaches.
Finally, in recognition of the fact that this war is not only being fought on the ground in Iraq, but also in cyberspace, it also notes the need to contest the enemy’s growing use of that important medium to spread extremism.
The recommendations I provided were informed by operational and strategic considerations. The operational considerations include recognition that military aspects of the surge have achieved progress and generated momentum. Iraqi security forces have continued to grow and have slowly been shouldering more of the security burdens in Iraq.
A mission focused on either population security or transition alone will not be adequate to achieve our objectives. Success against Al Qaida Iraq and Iranian supported militia extremists requires conventional forces as well as special operations forces. And the security in local political situations will enable us to draw down the surge forces.
My recommendations also took into account a number of strategic considerations. Political progress will take place only if sufficient security exists. Long-term U.S. ground force viability will benefit from a force reductions as the surge runs its course.
Regional, global and cyberspace initiatives are critical to success. And Iraqi leaders understandably want to assume greater sovereignty in their country, although, as they recently announced, they do desire a continued presence of coalition forces in Iraq in 2008 under a new U.N. Security Council resolution, and following that, they want to negotiate a long-term security agreement with the United States and other nations.
Based on these considerations and having worked the battlefield geometry with Lieutenant General Ray Odierno, the Multi-National Corps- Iraq commander, to ensure that we retain and build on the gains for which our troopers have fought, I have recommended a drawdown of the surge forces from Iraq.
In fact, later this month, the Marine Expeditionary Unit deployed as part of the surge will depart Iraq.
Beyond that, if my recommendations are approved, that unit’s departure will be followed by the withdrawal of a brigade combat team without replacement in mid-December and the further redeployment without replacement of four other brigade combat teams and the two surge Marine battalions in the first seven months of 2008, until we reach the pre-surge levels of 15 brigade combat teams by mid-July 2008.
I would also like to discuss the period beyond next summer. Force reductions will continue beyond the pre-surge levels of brigade combat teams that we will reach by mid-July 2008.
However, in my professional judgment, it would be premature to make recommendations on the pace of such reductions at this time. In fact, our experience in Iraq has repeatedly shown that projecting too far into the future is not just difficult, it can be misleading and even hazardous.
The events of the past six months underscore that point. When I testified in January, for example, no one would have dared to forecast that Anbar province would have been transformed the way it has in the past six months. Nor would anyone have predicted that volunteers in one-time Al Qaida strongholds like Ghazaliyah in western Baghdad or in Adhamiya in eastern Baghdad would seek to join the fight against Al Qaida.
Nor would we have anticipated that a Shia-led government would accept significant numbers of Sunni Arab volunteers into the ranks of the local police force in Abu Ghraib.
Beyond that, on a less encouraging note, none of us earlier this year it appreciated the extent of Iranian involvement in Iraq, something about which we and Iraq’s leaders all now have greater concern.
In view of this, I do not believe it is reasonable to have an adequate appreciation for the pace of further reductions and mission adjustments beyond the summer of 2008 until about mid-March of next year. We will, no later than that time, consider factors similar to those on which I base the current recommendations, having by then, of course, a better feel for the security situation, the improvements in the capabilities of our Iraqi counterparts, and the enemy situation. I will then, as I did in developing the recommendations I have explained here today, also take into consideration the demands on our nation’s ground forces, although I believe that that consideration should once again inform, not drive, the recommendations I make.
This chart captures the recommendations I have described, showing the recommended reduction of brigade combat teams as the surge runs its course and illustrating the concept of our units adjusting their missions and transitioning responsibilities to Iraqis, as the situation and Iraqi capabilities permit.
It also reflects the no-later-than date for recommendations on force adjustments beyond next summer and provides a possible approach we have considered for the future force structure and mission set in Iraq.
One may argue that the best way to speed the process in Iraq is to change the MNF-I mission from one that emphasizes population security, counterterrorism and transition to one that is strictly focused on transition and counterterrorism.
Making that change now would, in our view, be premature. We have learned before that there is a real danger in handing over tasks to the Iraqi security forces before their capacity and local conditions warrant.
In fact, the drafters of the recently released national intelligence estimate on Iraq recognized this danger when they wrote, and I quote, We assess that changing the mission of coalition forces from a primarily counterinsurgency and stabilization role to a primary combat support role for Iraqi forces and counterterrorist operations to prevent Al Qaida Iraq from establishing safe haven would erode security gains achieved thus far.
In describing the recommendations I have made, I should note again that, like Ambassador Crocker, I believe Iraq’s problems will require a long-term effort. There are no easy answers or quick solutions. And although we both believe this effort can succeed, it will take time.
Our assessments underscore, in fact, the importance of recognizing that a premature drawdown of our forces would likely have devastating consequences.
That assessment is supported by the findings of the 16 August Defense Intelligence Agency report on the implications of a rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq.
Summarizing it in an unclassified fashion, it concludes that a rapid withdrawal would result in the further release of the strong centrifugal forces in Iraq and produce a number of dangerous results, including: a high risk of disintegration of the Iraqi security forces, rapid deterioration of local security initiatives, Al Qaida Iraq regaining lost ground and freedom of maneuver, a marked increase in violence and further ethno-sectarian displacement and refugee flows, alliances of convenience by Iraqi groups with internal and external forces to gain advantages over their rivals, and exacerbation of already challenging regional dynamics especially with respect to Iran. Lieutenant General Odierno and I share this assessment and believe that the best way to secure our national interests and to avoid an unfavorable outcome in Iraq is to continue to focus our operations on securing the Iraqi people, while targeting terrorist groups and militia extremists, and, as quickly as conditions are met, transitioning security tasks to Iraqi elements.
Before closing, I want to thank you and your colleagues for your support of our men and women in uniform in Iraq. The soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and Coast Guardsmen with whom I’m honored to serve are the best equipped and very likely the most professional force in our nation’s history.
Impressively, despite all that has been asked of them in recent years, they continue to raise their right hands and volunteer to stay in uniform. With three weeks to go in this fiscal year, in fact, the Army elements in Iraq of Multi-National Corps-Iraq, for example, have achieved well over 130 percent of the reenlistment goals in the initial term and careerist categories and nearly 115 percent in the mid-career category.
All of us appreciate what you have done to ensure that these great troopers have had what they’ve needed to accomplish their mission, just as we appreciate what you have done to take care of their families as they, too, have made significant sacrifices in recent years.
The advances you have underwritten in weapon systems and individual equipment and munitions and command, control and communication systems, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, and vehicles and counter-IED systems and programs, and in manned and unmanned aircraft have proved invaluable in Iraq.
The capabilities that you have funded most recently, especially the vehicles that will provide greater protection against improvised explosive devices, are also of enormous importance.
Additionally, your funding of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program has given our leaders a critical tool with which to prosecute the counterinsurgency campaign. Finally, we appreciate, as well, your funding of our new detention programs and rule of law initiatives in Iraq.
In closing, it remains an enormous privilege to soldier again in Iraq with America’s new greatest generation. Our country’s men and women in uniform have done a magnificent job in the most complex and challenging environment imaginable. All Americans should be very proud of their sons and daughters serving in Iraq today.
Thank you very much.
(PROTESTOR SHOUTS OFF-MIKE)
REP. SKELTON: The person will be removed.
Let me make this announcement. Those who have been…
(PROTESTOR SHOUTS OFF-MIKE)
REP. SKELTON: … please remove them.
(PROTESTOR SHOUTS OFF-MIKE)
REP. SKELTON: Those who have been…
(PROTESTOR SHOUTS OFF-MIKE)
Please remove them.
(PROTESTOR SHOUTS OFF-MIKE)
REP. SKELTON: Let me make the announcement that those of you have (OFF-MIKE) and improper conduct, who have, who are, and who will throughout the remaining of this hearing will be prosecuted under Section 10(503)16 of the District of Columbia and we will prosecute them under the law.
This is intolerable. We will not allow it. And I hope everyone that’s considering it understands because they will be prosecuted.
Ambassador Crocker?
(PROTESTOR SHOUTS OFF-MIKE)
REP. SKELTON: Order will be restored.
[tags] Petraeus, libel, defamation, Iraq war, “Petraeus Report”, “Bush Report”, Congress, “General Betray Us”, MoveOn.org, Daily Kos, the New York Times [/tags]
[HT: Dan Riehl]
So I’m with you on the MoveOn tards (ooh, surprise, they’re acting like dicks!) but how is what Feinstein said slimy? She’s right in saying Petraeus is not a neutral observer, if anything else because Bush has placed his entire Iraq strategy on the man’s shoulders. That creates incentives to spin or push or choose to interpret a certain way that are difficult to ignore.
How is pointing that out slimy in the least? I normally dislike that woman, but that strikes me as prudent—certainly more so than accepting everything the administration has to say at face value, given recent history.
Because if he’s not a neutral observer, then why in the hell did she and the other Democrats demand by force of law that he deliver testimony directly to Congress about his observations. If she can’t trust what he has to say, then why demand that he he say it? That’s called setting someone up to fail.
The entire Iraq strategy will always be on the shoulders of whomever is in the lead in the field. Does that make anything such person has to say suspect? The man has deidcated his life to serving his country with honor. Isn’t it at least possible, just maybe, that man has enough integrity and ethical fortitude (not to mention good old-fashioned honor) to simply state the truth? Given his credentials thus far, and the high esteem with which he is held by his peers, shouldn’t he be given at least the benefit of the doubt?
Not according to DiFi, Reid, Schumer and friends. To them Petraeus is just a political hack. The question you have to ask yourself is, when did they suddenly discover this? What changed between when they ratified his nomination (81-0), to when they drafted and passed the law demanding his testimony before them, to now?
Oh, and BTW, did you catch the first thing that Petraeus had to say today?:
But he’s probably just lying cause he’s knees go all wobbly when faced with that daunting political pressure. I’ll bet he can’t wait to get back to Iraq where he merely has to face those wimpy terrorists.
Oh, pish posh – war is always political, so there will always be a political element to it. Unless you suddenly stopped believing in Clausewitz, which I rather doubt, given your other writing.
That being said, I dont’ blame the Democrats for wanting a paper trail, so to speak, of under-oath testimony… especially given the Administration’s, and the Military’s propensity to fess up to their own mistakes, misdeeds, and crimes (like the “shock” of not imprisoning any of the men convicted of murdering civilians at Haditha). If, say, Wesley Clark were in Congress discussing the relative success or Kosovo — where, let it be said, there are still 40,000 troops and renewed calls for war from Serbia — would you be so stand offish about the very personal way these generals ingratiate themselves to the political leadership?
And you can vote for someone, think he’s the best one on the table for the job, while still having misgivings or being skeptical… or is a vote an unchangeable contract now? Skepticism is not at all the same as defaming, and I do think the MoveOn.org crazies are just that – crazies. Saying Petraeus has a vested interest in proving his theory of warfare right should not be outrageous… that is, if you’re not assigning blatantly political motives to how the war should be fought (i.e. without those filthy liberals).
What, am I writing in Greek? Where did I claim that war is not political in part? My problem is that the Dems in Congress demanded that Petraeus deliver testimony regarding his opinion, and then they openly and brazenly discount anything he has to say BEFORE he even says it. Maybe Petraeus does have a vested interest in showing that his strategy works, but as a career military man he also has a vested interest in getting it right.
The difference between politicians and men of integrity is that politicians only care about making it through the next election. Men of integrity care about doing their job to the best of their ability, something that cannot be accomplished by following a losing strategy. I’ve neither read nor seen anything that causes me to doubt Petraeus’ integrity, while I have encountered enough to give him the benefit of the doubt.
You didn’t respond to anything I said other than to accuse everyone who dares wonder about the incentives influence Petraeus of lacking integrity.
Classy.
Joshua,
I’ll tell you my issue with Feinstein’s comment. As Michael said, he has to testify. Of course he isn’t independent. Who can be independent of themselves? It is his opinion. However, to state something more than that obvious reason for them to listen and evaluate his testimony, which they are obligated to do, is to in fact poison the well, and I think we all know that. She could have said she would listen to his testimony and make up her mind based on his and other evidence. She isn’t saying he is somehow worth special mention as deserving scrutiny. You can claim all you want they are saying benign things along the lines of performing their duties to critically examine his testimony, but she and you know her audience is not seeing it that way. The remark is intended to show that his testimony is suspect in some way more than others. Given the remarks he has made since the surge began he deserves nothing but the opportunity for people to disagree without any special mention.
I can. They legislatively required it come from the administration, not him. Other reports (such as the ridiculous GAO and the well done Jones Commission report) were supposed to be from independents, The Brookings has given us two interesting recent ones as well. He wasn’t commissioned to do one, but to give oral testimony. If they wanted his paper trail (though it does exist) they could have authorized him to do more than give oral testimony. So complaining about it is bad form.
That is a rather interesting interpretation of Clausewitz. Generally he wasn’t addressing the war against ones own military, but I guess we will not argue with you that that is what many Democrats are waging;^P
Of course, Clausewitz wasn’t arguing that such politics were good either. He was talking reality, not justifying it.
Okay, so you still haven’t explained why the GAO report (which does match nicely with the NIE and many parts of the Jones Commission) is “ridiculous,” aside from “it doesn’t match my biases.”
So you demand benefit of the doubt, while the Democrats proclaim skepticism. I fail to see democracy coming apart at the seams, unless we are to humbly worship at the man’s feet. Give me a break. If it was Bush’s job to deliver a report on the surge, and he spends three months saying, “I don’t know, ask Petraeus in September,” how is it in any way unfair to wonder what the thought process was in drafting that report? From your writing, that makes it seem like a despicable dodge of responsibility on Bush’s part, and deeply unfair toward Gen. Petraeus. Which still would not change whether or not his testimony is reliable.
And if you want to talk about Dems’ war on the military, then you should also address the military’s aggressive PR campaign (often called “information warfare”) here in the states. Unless 20 days of publicity tours in August is just par for the course during a period of historically high levels of violence.
And Lance, I am talking reality, too. I’m not happy with the state of affairs, but I try not to squeeze my eyes shut while shouting “support the military!” Both sides have very strong incentives to twist the truth, and you’ll only admit the one you’re not on does.
Huh? Did you not ask:
I’ve answered that several times over. Your response is apparently that the Dems are just being “skeptical.” I’m not sure what definition of the word you’re relying on, but in my dictionary calling someone a partisan hack who has no independent thoughts goes well beyond skepticism, especially when that person has yet to speak.
I haven’t made the accusation you’re accusing me of, but instead refered to all politicians as lacking in integrity. It’s a common theme of mine. You should really be reading me.
Yeah, well when I’m ready to raise my level of debate to baseless accusations, mischaracterizations and goal-post moving I’ll be sure to attend the Josua Foust Charm School.
Yes I have. It has nothing to do with my biases. The questions it asks, the form, by law, that they were forced to answer them in, all undermined the usefulness of the report. I have given specific examples of how it obscures more than informs, unlike the Jones, Pollack and O’ Hanlon and Cordesmann reports. That is mostly not the fault of the authors, but Congress. On the casualty issues it tells us nothing. They punt, give vague reasons they cannot say anything specific and then claim there is disagreement. Unfortunately for that part I haven’t seen a single report which contradicts Petraeus’ assessment in any meaningful way. Point one out to me that shows something really different than what he is saying. The links you have provided do not, or I am missing it, so please point to one where the data is provided or for me to say,”oh, I see what you mean.” Unless you are calling Petraeus a liar (and please back that up before you do) he claimed today that his numbers were reviewed by other intelligence agencies and they are the best available. Now, they may be wrong on that, but are the other numbers very different anyway? No.
It does, in ways that nobody is disputing. In the ways it doesn’t it is useless. Both the NIE and the Jones Commission I have not disputed in any way. That doesn’t make them right, but neither I nor Petraeus has argued that either assessment is wrongheaded. All of their concerns are reasonable. So stop acting as if I am arguing things I am not. You are the one claiming that documents that show it is a bad situation in many ways support your argument. Nobody is denying that. The question is has there been progress? Both agree, though the NIE is pretty dated. Should we withdraw? Both agree we shouldn’t. Is there a basis for believing that progress can continue? Both feel there is. Even the darkest of the thorough reports, Cordesmann’s, feels the answer is yes to all those questions, though he emphasis’s the difficulties somewhat more than they do. Petraeus is firmly in there with all of them. He might be more or less optimistic on various points, but none of their concerns has he in any way suggested are unreasonable, nor have I.
So can the happy talk accusations about myself or Petraeus. The progress they have achieved was discounted by many ahead of time, and they have been able to pull it off. People such as Cordesmann who would and did say that the turnaround in places such as Anbar couldn’t happen, who pooh poohed any real hope for the surge have had the stones to go back and say it has made a difference and has even justified “strategic patience.” Given the attitude of many it took guts. The Coalition may not sustain it, but that should make people claiming they know with certainty what is and is not possible a little more humble.
Who says it is. We say it is wrong. I feel the same way about the minimum wage, but our democracy soldiers on.
What is wrong with that? He says get it from him. Petraeus was there, they can ask him. They wanted his testimony, they wanted the written report from Bush. Petraeus provided the data, the sources are available to congress. Complaining he isn’t doing what Congress decided the administration do is ridiculous. It isn’t as if Bush’s opinion isn’t known, but he says make your judgment based on the commander. This is their chance. He gave them a written presentation ahead of time. I know, I had it sent to me. I got the slides to. This is just BS. Nothing is hidden and he is using the same data they have handed to everyone, including the independent assessments, and they haven’t come up with anything different, except the GAO which didn’t come up with anything for reasons that frankly mystify me.
There is no dodging. They wanted to hear from, Bush says why don’t you ask him, and now for everybody doing exactly what they were asked to do you claim some kind of concern is warranted. BS.
No, you read stuff and pull just what you want out and act as if the rest is probably tainted, except what sounds bad. Me, I read it all and haven’t discounted any of it, except for reports that don’t even attempt to answer the key questions, such as the GAO. They couldn’t even get straight forward stuff on ISF progress right, though that is once again Congresses fault for putting forward inadequate benchmarks in the legislation, not the authors. The Jones commission gets it mostly right, though Cordesmann points out some potential weaknesses in his review of the report, some of which should be taken seriously.
My eyes are open, but like all the authors above, despite recognizing many problems, we all think we should continue forward. Who knows what the GAO thinks? The report provides no basis for determining what to do. You deny progress. If you catch me denying that there were bombings in Nineveh then you have a complaint. As far as I can tell you have none on that score. At least I am not pretending that violence hasn’t decreased, nor did I deny that it was increasing last summer and fall, and if it does this fall you won’t hear me alluding to mythical reports that dispute it on factual grounds when in fact the reports are just interpreting its implications differently. I might interpret the data differently, but I won’t claim that I have some super secret numbers.
Oh, and I won’t argue for “seasonal adjustments.” Horse hockey.
So can the straw men. When you find something that Petraeus and I haven’t acknowledged is serious that is, than let me know. So far you haven’t brought anything up other than the assertion that we must be engaging in happy talk because we disagree about what to do going forward. Frankly I am tired of it.
Oh, and while we are at it, I let you go on this because I had only read it once at the time and I assumed I had missed something, but the Jones report does not call for the disbanding of the Interior Ministry (I knew that but thought maybe he had suggested it might be necessary in his testimony) or the police. They do call for a lot of work there including disbanding the National Police, or really re-tasking it and shrinking it. That certainly makes sense to me. I also got the impression that they would have felt that way even if it wasn’t so riddled with problems and on perfectly reasonable grounds. The Interior Ministry doesn’t need such a large and mission inappropriate force. So sanguine or not, disbanding the Police and Interior Ministry wasn’t even a recommendation.
Speaking of goalpost moving? Again, Michael, classy.
Lance, you are really fond of accusing everyone who disagrees with you of having narratives and selective reading skills and nefarious motives, while ignoring your own. The fundamental point of the GAO report—that the Iraqi government has met 3, partially met 4, and not met 11 of 18 benchmarks while violence remains high and key legislation remains unpassed, it not in dispute. In fact those other three independent reports all vary around that same theme. (And if you really read the report then you’d know those benchmarks come from “commitments articulated by the Iraqi government beginning in June 2006 and affirmed in subsequent statements by Prime Minister Maliki in September 2006 and January 2007,” and not from fuzzy legislation out of Congress—these are goals the Iraqi government itself set up, not anyone else).
Unlike the MNFI-I reports about violence, the GAO report is honest that it is difficult to measure sectarian violence, because it is difficult to discern the exact motives behind many killings… yet MNF-I feels okay decreeing sectarian violence down overall while violence really isn’t. To wit:
I don’t know what or where you’re seeing those casualty figures definitively discounted, unless suddenly public sources are suddenly less reliable than MNF-I sources. Petraeus only talks about the last month or so of change, and several isolated weeks of improvement scattered between high-casualty attacks. That’s not a trend you can meaningfully extrapolate from. And if the NIE report is so outdated, why is Petraeus using it in his testimony?
Getting back to the real subject at hand: no one disputes that in some areas, the military situation is better. That’s not in doubt, and Petraeus says as much. What is in dispute is whether, in the absence of any political progress (or, as what has happened, a stepping back from stalemate), any of it matters. The patchwork strategy is considered a long shot with really bad odds even by the people who invented it and want it to succeed, and the NIE report agrees that while it poses the best hope for a sustainable solution to Iraqi security without the cooperation of the central government it has a miniscule chance of succeeding.
And, umm, Cordesman is vehemently against the current bottom-up, patchwork strategy, calling it the exact opposite of what President Bush says he wants, the fragmentation of Iraq (now lovingly advocated by the likes of Krauthammer). Worth noting if you’re going to use him to bolster your case.
Also when looking at overall violence levels, look at the metrics Petraeus is using:
Those eight weeks were not contiguous, thanks to the Yazidi bombing (which you have yet to address, though Petraeus almost brings himself to mention it) and others, and only in the last two weeks has violence dropped below its high point back to the status quo, which many already considered politically unsustainable.
Uneven progress and two weeks of a trend do not a meaningful case make. In fact, even over the course of the surge, two weeks does not mean anything, unless then the week where that massive bombing took place also means something. Clearly, both are outliers in the absence of more data.
Again, being skeptical of how he is choosing to spin those numbers is not “defaming” him, it is called being properly skeptical.
Now to the politics of this brouhaha. You can’t have it both ways. You cannot explain that Bush is right to punt all questions of the new strategy to the field commander, who conducts his own PR tours and aggressive courting of members of Congress, and then complain that the Democrats are needlessly politicizing the war.
Last bit about the Interior Ministry thing: I don’t recall saying the Jones report recommended its disbanding, merely that it is so beset by sectarian divisions and corruption it is functionally useless. We both agree they suggested canning the police force and starting over, which is hardly worth celebrating after four years of input.
So again (and again and again and again) I really don’t know what your problem is, other than a feverish desire to push a war we’re still not winning forward (because if we’re all about Petraeus, then it’s worth noting that he feels a proper COIN campaign is 80% political and 20% military, so all this military progress in the midst of political regression is beyond meaningless).
war has some noble motive. I am just pointing out a lot of people do not. That recent poll backs me up that reading in your reasons for wanting a withdrawal hardly means your rationale has much to do with the thought process of the people I am talking about. You claim they are a tiny minority, I claim they are a hell of a lot more common than you think. it seems I am right.
BS. I have been quite open about my motives. You just don’t find them compelling. I do. End of story. So you are busy searching for some hidden reason such as I am ignoring all the problems, challenges and risks. I am not. I have written far more on those risks than the things you keep accusing me of being fond of, though in your defense (sort of) I think you are collapsing my arguments in with others. Not that I think they are wrong, but it is silly to act as if they are a particular focus of mine. It is especially irritating when you defend the reporting of the Times, which in Iraq has been excellent in my opinion. That includes when it has been negative, as it quite properly was many times, especially in 2006. Their editorial page is another matter, I can only assume the editors don;t read the reporters anyway, or when they do it seems they harm the reporting. Another topic though, and one I have never written about before.
It isn’t. Not by me at least. Except on violence where they are disputed and the dispute centers around we have no idea how they came to their conclusion.
True, but they are useful, it isn’t. I have explained why, and it has been widely pointed out elsewhere.
Not really true, but who cares. Congress passed the legislation, the benchmarks are unrevealing. I didn’t need the report to tell me which benchmarks haven’t been met, and frankly some of them will not and cannot be met until the war is over. It would be like pointing out in Dec. 1944 because Berlin hadn’t fallen that no progress had been achieved. It is a stupid way to look at it. Once again, this was pointed out in numerous places, not just by me. They had to be pushed to allow the term partially met to be applied to a few benchmarks. They made no serious attempt to assess progress, just whether the benchmarks had been met or not. It was only because of pressure from agencies who said it was a stupid way to look at it that they allowed the option of partially met to exist on the few benchmarks applied. Which is part of the process the leaker was trying to poison.
Whatever, if you learned anything useful from the GAO report, good for you. I learned a lot from the other reports about what what has progressed a great deal, less so, and what has regressed. There was also interesting analysis of the significance of various things and developments outside the benchmarks which are of great significance. The GAO report studiously avoided doing that highly necessary task, though once again, that is mostly because of the way the Congress set up the report. I don’t think the Iraqi’s thought we would only look at those benchmarks if other data (positive or negative) emerged of great import. As I said, stupid. I can see 3M deciding the fate of a business unit because it had set certain targets which were not met, but in the meantime they had invented post it notes not part of the original plan and far exceeded revenue goals. That would be stupid. I am looking for real analysis, which all the other reports provided, not some blinkered piece of bureaucratic mush.
This quote is a perfect example:
Who has argued otherwise? Notice, no discussion of progress, the term is eliminated. You are correct, the problem hasn’t been eliminated. is this some big revelation to anyone?
Once again, the term eliminated. Surprise, surprise. Nor is it likely to, I have yet to see a military where it has been. See our congress. Of course this is a much bigger issue in Iraq, and it is being used for more nefarious purposes. Still, significant (and that is their word, not mine) progress has been made as each of the other reports demonstrates.
Once again, ensured, not made progress, etc. An impossible standard, or even applied loosely one which no one has claimed has been met or is likely to be fully met anytime soon. Here though the progress has been muted as the Jones report makes clear, but there has been progress nevertheless.
As the Jones report makes clear this is technically true, but false in its impression. A great deal of progress has been made in this regard. Full independence is a good ways off. They could have technically met this standard and had a worse military. Bureaucratic measurements that distort rather than help are no use to us.
How are you going to do that? We haven’t accomplished that here. Have we made progress on this issue? Has it gotten worse? If it has done either, why? It could be a bad sign.
Reasonable question which nonetheless obscures what is going on. As the data clearly shows violent deaths are down. The military claims that is because of a reduction of sectarian violence, but criminal and intra sect violence has not been as positively affected. Okay, I think the military’s claim makes sense, but either way the total figures still fit. What we don’t hear is whether they are saying the methodology the miltary is using has changed? has it? If not, and if I am wrong in thinking it hasn’t, than the military is probably right. While their numbers are not going to be perfectly accurate for the reasons cited, they are likely not less accurate, and to the extent they do track sectarian violence the trend line should be approx. correct. If they have some reason for doubting that, they might have told us or kept their mouth shut.
yeah, but all down from what I can see.
I thought the defense numbers were bad? They seem to have cherry picked the one figure which doesn’t look as good, though it has gone down. By the way, those are not casualty figures, but attacks. has this misconception been behind your claim on the number of dead?
Actually he has talked about more than that, but yeah, he talks about the change since the operation began. You know, Mid June? He also talks of the change in Anbar.
Maybe not, that hasn’t stopped you. The changes noted have been based not just on statistical measures (and shouldn’t be) but direct observation. All observers have noted it isn’t just the body count, but the actual conditions on the ground which have changed, the relations between coalition forces, Iraqi forces, the population and those we are fighting. That is real analysis, but of course we must worry about the dead and other statistical measures as well. They are usually lagging indicators, but sometimes things work differently. Petraeus and I want to see if this trend holds over a reasonable time frame. The hope is that day to day violence in areas cleared will decrease markedly and stabilize as they seem to have in Anbar. In the meantime Petraeus, and I, expect some of those gains will be offset by violence moving elsewhere and larger, spectacular attacks. We’ll have to see, but the downswing in the number of casualties has been dramatic overall.
I think it was, and is, quite useful, but it does not contain analysis of stuff past June. You put the word “so” in there and distort what I said. It is outdated, I don’t think its conclusions Petraeus referenced based on what was known at the time would change at this point. Do you?
No, that isn’t the dispute. We are not arguing that. it is an important argument, but we are not having it. Frankly, I won’t have it now. I hope it matters, you claim it doesn’t. I salute your certainty.
Actually I mentioned it in a post, Petreaus has discussed it as well, and it is an example of two factors I mentioned above which will make the data not as nice as he or I would like. Move the violence, increase the scale of them.
It is worth noting, I already had, though your characterization is overblown.
Of course it is political, but has Petraeus, and with far greater justification, questioned their honesty? Apples and Oranges.
If you believe those last two words then you do not understand his doctrine. He doesn’t think that is true.
No, they did not suggest canning the police. Just the National Police. It would be like us deciding to can the ATF and Secret Service and starting over. Not good, but most of the Police in this country are not included in that assessment. Hardly a disaster, and the whole concept of what the National Police should be is questioned. It has nothing to do with what I or you say, we are talking about the Jones Report. So your agreement isn’t necessary. The report says what it says.
That statement is what I am talking about. Neither was recommended by the commission.
Actually the Jones commission was more positive on the Police as a whole and the possibility of building them into a reasonably effective force than I had expected. The Ministry being the biggest obstacle to that.
That is it Joshua, I just want to push a war. I get off on it. I’ll tell you what. Looking back at your work, I was a whole lot less pushy on this war than you. I am still struggling with what is best to do going forward just like then. Like then you seem to have a great deal of certainty about the best course of action. Whatever, I am feverish with war lust so why bother.
I shouldn’t even be addressing you aftrr you burned me the last time I stuck up for you here at QandO,
Mike, not sure what you were talking about here, but it got my attention. How do you “burn” someone in a blog argument, exactly?
I’m giving you a freebie on the rest of the post, personal attacks and all. What’s your beef?
As for the larger debate, here, I can’t help but agree with Foust – the logical conclusion of Mike’s parameters would be that the mere act of publicly concluding that Petraeus’ testimony is wrong, or the act of discussing his motives for being wrong, is called a ‘dishonorable’ act. Screw that. He’s a general, not an emperor. As for waiting until his testimony was over – did he say anything that wasn’t 100% predicted beforehand?
Perhaps if Petraeus hadn’t discussed his views beforehand on right-wing media outlets, there wouldn’t be such a sense of certainty about his future testimony. He was the first one to break this imaginary code of scrupulousness, with his PR blitz to the US public.
In the modern media cycle, if you’re perceived as about to give testimony making a controversial argument about a controversial subject, you can bet on being pre-empted. Nobody gets a free pass, and there’s no reason why anyone should get a free pass. Petraeus’ testimony is part of a PR war. Dianne Feinstein and MoveOn are also participants. And nobody plays Marquis of Queensbury rules in the PR War that I’ve witnessed recently. So, the media blackout on pre-testimony Petraeus bashing is kind of like, “hold still and let the other guy hit you! No fair!” – an imaginary rule to make life easier on the other guy.
Because if he’s not a neutral observer, then why in the hell did she and the other Democrats demand by force of law that he deliver testimony directly to Congress about his observations. If she can’t trust what he has to say, then why demand that he he say it?
Come on, who are we kidding? Your argument is that if someone lies to Congress’, it’s Congress’ fault for having him testify in the first place? It’s not Congress’ job to screen its givers of testimony for accuracy beforehand, only to demand it.
See here.
Of course he said what was expected. He has been talking about it, commissions, correspondents and academics have discussed it based on his conversations and reports from him. Those paying attention knew what he thought. Nobody is saying you can’t disagree with him, but that is not what is going on and you know it.
Well he discussed them with non right wing outfits as well, including critics working on various assessments. Greenwald didn’t raise a peep to apologize for his screed about Hewitt when Petraeus appeared with Alan Colmes, a show the little liar works on himself.
Thank you, you don’t agree with Joshua. They, and you, are calling him a liar. Glad to clear that up.
As for the other stuff, he has every right to make his case. You may not like it, but it is his opinion. Call it PR or whatever. However, your implication of his behavior as being some kind of attack is BS. he has been nothing but tolerant and considerate in addressing the views of others. Deferential even. He has not attacked any of his detractors, If Feinstein or Boxer or any other politician wants to disagree, they can withhold the personal attacks and defend him against them as well. If they do feel he is a liar they should declare it and shouldn’t have a liar testify. We didn’t need his testimony unless they thought it valuable. It was for many who don’t follow things closely and know his views. But it wasn’t necesarry if it is a pack of lies.
Lance, my comment was a general question. It doesn’t refer to Petraeus. I think Petraeus is inaccurate and I suspect some of his statistics at being massaged. I don’t have any proof that any of that crosses the line into “lie”, so I didn’t say it. Most of what I think Petraeus is “inaccurate” about are somewhat subjective matters.
My point was Foust’s: Feinstein’s quote was not an ‘attack’, or if it was, it was an appropriate one. Moveon’s choice of terms may have been inflammatory, but Feinstein’s quote was a polite enough way of saying, “We don’t believe you”. Unless you think that Petraeus is owed belief merely by his position as general, it had better be okay to not believe Petraeus.
As for you, Mike, something is very wrong with this picture.
I tell you what, I’m not here to be friends if that implies once you say something nice about me, I then therefore have to agree with you and back you up. I’ll back you up in terms of, “I think Mike is an okay guy” if the situation requires it. I’ll still call BS on you whenever I think you are, in fact, BSing. I was polite enough in that post, and I was making a valid point – you were linking to people suggesting people cancel subscriptions to TNR merely on the basis of their suspicions.
If you don’t want to stick up for me because I “burn” you, then by all means, stop sticking up for me. I’m going to call it as I see it, period. I mean, my purpose here is, basically, to argue with you and disprove things you say that I don’t agree with. I try not to be a jerk about it, but that’s why I show up here. I don’t agree with you philosophically on very much. I’m not a supporter of your agenda.
Thank you, you don’t agree with Joshua. They, and you, are calling him a liar. Glad to clear that up.
I think Petraeus is inaccurate. A lot of the inaccuracy is in things that are subjective. Other elements are contained in his statistics, and that innaccuracy may not rise to the level of “lies”. You can manipulate statistics in a lot of ways without making anything up.
I haven’t called Petraeus a liar, and neither has Feinstein. You’re trying to delegitimize any questioning of Petraeus’ testimony or his motives. Both are fair game. Stop putting words in my mouth.
As for Mike:
I’m going to call BS on you when I think you’re wrong. Whether or not you stick up for me in QandO is irrelevant to that. I’ll back you up to the effect up “Mike is an ok guy”, but I won’t back up your innaccuracies or offensive statements. My mission here is, basically, to disagree with you and question you. I make no bones about it. I’m not a supporter of most of your agenda.
If you want to stop sticking up for me, the floor is yours. I’m sorry, it’s nice when it happens but it doesn’t really matter. No special treatment.
PS: I don’t really comment on blogs at all when I agree with them. My comments on left-leaning sites are also usually limited to disagreement and criticism. I am what I am. Deal. Or get rid of me. Or ignore me, I suppose. That’s your decision.