For example: They claim because there has been a decrease in number of units capable of operating independently that Iraqi forces have not improved. That could be a sign of something, and I would be interested in hearing Petraeus or someone else address that. However, in and of itself that is pretty meaningless over a short period of time. It could even be a sign of progress (For example, the unit is no less effective, but due to continuing efforts at removing sectarian influence the leadership has been changed.) More “on the ground” and subjective assessments from within and without the military have come to very different conclusions. While all the problems mentioned exist and are serious, the unmistakable conclusion is that from an operational standpoint there has been large amounts of progress.

Nor is independence the only metric, though that is the only metric the congress allowed the GAO to assess. They could be far more effective, yet not be independent, that will depend on base construction, logistics, etc. By law they are required only to assess, up or down, no middle ground allowed, whether the benchmark has been met. It doesn’t even pretend to make a more complete assessment. So, from everything I have seen the idea that the report characterizes the Iraqi Army as not having improved not only is not true, but the report doesn’t even address that as a matter of law.

I could go through each benchmark in that fashion, but I think the point is that the “data” in such an exercise is not the best way to measure things, as Kilcullen recently pointed out. That is not to imply happy talk, just recognize the report for what it is.

Finally, this statement I find disturbing:

The person who provided the draft report to The Post said it was being conveyed from a government official who feared that its pessimistic conclusions would be watered down in the final version — as some officials have said happened with security judgments in this month’s National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq.

To put it another way, the person wanted these preliminary judgments, with no feedback from other agencies, to stand regardless of any other data put out that might be in support of a less pessimistic assessment. One should be able to ask, what if the conclusions reached (once again, understanding by law that much progress could exist and still in the report be judged, not met. No middle ground is allowed) are wrong? What if, as in a completed assessment, the report needs review to ensure an accurate judgment? Typically that is assumed to be true. They are an independent agency, other agencies cannot force them to agree the other data changes things, so why would this person fear the result? Unlike the NIE, which arguably could be manipulated by the administration, the GAO is obviously not toeing the line. So the real fear should not be the DOD or other agencies will force something down their throats (and just because the GAO disagrees doesn’t make them right anyway) but that people who fear the GAO will find compelling evidence to alter their preliminary conclusions are busy poisoning the well.

We should await the actual report, and understand the reports limitations.

IE when they say they’re so happy things are getting better, they are lying, since there is no basis for it.

If that reasoning holds then they are lying, not the administration. I don’t believe that is the implication, but you set up the syllogism, not me. That progress is occurring in many ways is now almost universally held by observers of diverse ideological views. The implications of that progress is debatable, one could argue they are just temporary gains, or one could acknowledge it and still feel we should withdraw or a range of actions. To deny that it has occurred requires one to ignore just about every credible observer, including many who still argue for as rapid a withdrawal as possible. So, according to you, they must be lying if I am going to go with something other than just assertion from afar.

The draft provides a stark assessment of the tactical effects of the current U.S.-led counteroffensive to secure Baghdad. “While the Baghdad security plan was intended to reduce sectarian violence, U.S. agencies differ on whether such violence has been reduced,” it states. While there have been fewer attacks against U.S. forces, it notes, the number of attacks against Iraqi civilians remains unchanged. It also finds that “the capabilities of Iraqi security forces have not improved.”

“Overall,” the report concludes, “key legislation has not been passed, violence remains high, and it is unclear whether the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion in reconstruction funds,” as promised. While it makes no policy recommendations, the draft suggests that future administration assessments “would be more useful” if they backed up their judgments with more details and “provided data on broader measures of violence from all relevant U.S. agencies.”

The GAO is basically saying what the rest of the administration is saying is not supported by data. It is baseless assertion, in other words. IE when they say they’re so happy things are getting better, they are lying, since there is no basis for it.

The GAO just called the White House and DoD a a cabal of liars.

No, they have a more pessimistic assessment. Some of which, assuming it is being characterized accurately, I’ll just say are wrong, or look at the issue in a rather screwy manner. Nor do I think those benchmarks are the only things we should be looking at.

On a more positive note, the Post is calling the large casualty estimates a bunch of hooey as well judging by the estimates they continue to use posted at the bottom of the article in question. It must be true. It is in the Post.