Update: McQ has a good roundup and similar thoughts to mine.
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The place to go is the Small Wars Journal to start. The NIE is a fair assessment and the full 10 page document can be found here, which doesn’t mean it is the best way to look at every issue. Nevertheless the Small Wars Journal gives a good representation of its findings, while many blogs and media reports distort its findings. Most media reports in particular seem to have headlines that stress the negative aspects or give a more negative impression than the report warrants:
Report Cites Grave Concerns on Iraq’s Government – Mark Mazzetti and David Cloud, New York Times
Report: Iraqi Leaders ‘Unable to Govern’ – Eric Weiner, National Public Radio
Iraq Intelligence Estimate: No Surprise, it’s Bad – Sharon Weinberger, Danger Room
NIE: Iraq ‘Unable to Govern’ Itself Effectively – Peter Baker, Washington Post
Those actually analyzing it can expose its perceived failings, and the Small Wars Journal Has a good roundup of those as well as media reports. The key takeaway for me is that it sees the situation as difficult, but that progress is being made in almost all areas of interest, thus the trajectory is upward. It describes possible paths of successful progress, but shows they will take time. It describes a situation made more difficult by the possibility of a drawdown. This is having a negative affect in a number of ways on the internal politics as well as encouraging outside forces to prepare for that eventuality. The report is not sanguine about any change in mission as has been suggested by many:
We assess that changing the mission of Coalition forces from a primarily counterinsurgency and stabilization role to a primary combat support role for Iraqi forces and counterterrorist operations to prevent AQI from establishing a safehaven would erode security gains achieved thus far. The impact of a change in mission on Iraq’s political and security environment and throughout the region probably would vary in intensity and suddenness of onset in relation to the rate and scale of a Coalition redeployment. Developments within the Iraqi communities themselves will be decisive in determining political and security trajectories.
Recent security improvements in Iraq, including success against AQI, have depended significantly on the close synchronization of conventional counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. A change of mission that interrupts that synchronization would place security improvements at risk.
They describe the risks inherent in the local political progress being seen, as well as its benefits:
The IC assesses that the emergence of “bottom-up” security initiatives, principally among Sunni Arabs and focused on combating AQI, represent the best prospect for improved security over the next six to 12 months, but we judge these initiatives will only translate into widespread political accommodation and enduring stability if the Iraqi Government accepts and supports them. A multi-stage process involving the Iraqi Government providing support and legitimacy for such initiatives could foster over the longer term political reconciliation between the participating Sunni Arabs and the national government. We also assess that under some conditions “bottom-up initiatives” could pose risks to the Iraqi Government.
That seems about right to me.
Others blogging: Gateway pundit, Captain Ed, Flopping Aces, Outside The Beltway
