It is all rules of thumb, impressions, wild assed guesses. I am skeptical of your certainty, not arguing for replacing it with my own, which doesn’t exist.

You seem pretty damned certain that both Pogue’s and my skepticism is unfounded. I’ve never figured out why, if you’re all about skepticism and accepting imperfect information. What do you know that we don’t, that gives you such optimism about Iraq?

Reduce the threat, increase their capability and we may get there. That is the space Petraeus is trying to create.

Not true at all. At the start, the surge was sold as creating breathing room for the Iraqi government to pass a series of benchmark laws. Instead the Iraqi government has, for all intents and purposes, collapsed. Now, the IA’s marginal improvement may have been a component of the plan, but that is not at all how it was sold, and to claim it was is to, yes, shift the goal posts to turn a failure into a victory (which is not necessarily immoral, but be honest about it… that was my complain the subsequent comment).

The long quote of the reasons the surge were futile plays into this: most relate to securing areas long enough to be able to give the central government time to establish capacity. Not only have we not really done that (the car bombings continue, even in supposedly “cleared” areas, to say nothing of the new campaign against the Shiites), but the Iraqi government itself—whose cooperation and participation were necessary for the surge to end by Gates’ intended April 2008 cutoff—has collapsed.

And it’s worth noting much more explicitly that your reasons for supporting the surge are not the same as the public justifications for it. Just thought I’d throw that out there.

We all need a touch more humility about the future

That is exactly what I am arguing. I supported the Iraq War with the best intentions and sunniest of outcomes… and have seen each of the reasons I thought the invasion moral systematically destroyed by reality—right down to the stomach-churning revelation that, from a statistical point of view we probably didn’t make things any worse than under Saddam—probably. The lesson I drew from this, that I guess I never made explicitly, is that we simply do not know or understand Iraq well enough to pretend to be able to improve it by force or will. We got it wrong before, and there is no reason we don’t get it wrong again, for reasons relating back to the many incompetents I have railed about above. This leads me to conclude the surge is a fool’s errand, the last ditch effort to grab an almost victory from the jaws of defeat, with no greater degree of understanding about the battle, the enemy, or the preferred end state than in 2005. So I wonder why we bother.

I can adjust my sights up or down depending on events. If it is down, you can say you won the debate and I won’t care or think it proves very much, so you are warned that I will be frustrating should things take a bad turn. It will prove nothing. I see this as an effort, not a foregone conclusion.

Ahh, the lesson is in the journey, not its destination. How convenient. I should note, too, that “adjusting my sights up or down” can also be called “shifting the goal posts to avoid conceding defeat.”

Personally I think the ability to shift goal posts in war and foreign affairs is often a virtue.

Right, so you do think shifting goal posts, which I like to call “having no idea what we’re doing” is a good thing. This is where we differ. But I’m not that rigid in being appalled at the idea: did we, say, do this in WWII? Or did we have a concrete goal in mind – the surrender of Germany and Japan – and work tirelessly toward it? See, the problem with wishing for “something better” is that you never know when the job is done. The way you portray it, so long as there is the slimmest chance we might make one district of Iraq better, we should stay in the country. You are, in practical terms (I know not directly, and not explicitly) arguing for the permanent occupation of Iraq—for permanent and unending warfare so long as those exist who oppose us. I find that position deeply troubling.

One problem with foreign policy is we have very few cases to draw any firm conclusions from, yet we claim to have found some easy truths every time we have a war, and we do it in the midst of every war.

Not really. We’ve been stuck in Clausewitz ‘s framework for well over a century, and it served us well in state-to-state battle. Clausewitz doesn’t apply very well, however, to insurgency—and especially not to 4GW. Think of the Powell Doctrine – just hit them with overwhelming force and they’ll crumble and surrender. The challenge comes when overwhelming force is actually counterproductive (think of air strikes in Afghanistan, which have killed more people in 2007 than the Taliban), and when there is no one to surrender. We’ve killed most of the leaders of the insurgency, and still it bombs on. How you end that without a radical shift in doctrine (I’m writing a longer essay on this at the moment) is something no one knows. We have a 3GW army for a 4GW war.

As I said before: we have hammers, and only think there are nails about.

No, much of war is “something better.”

Again, no it’s not. Besides Iraq right now, when was war not fighting to achieve concrete objectives? The surrender of Germany and Japan, the defeat of Kim il-Sung or Ho Chi Minh, the overthrow of whatever dictator happened to befriend the Reds… Warfare was always about something concrete, not the incremental quest for marginal improvement. What you’re describing is war without end, because things can always be a bit better—it is a continuum with no logical start or stop. I cannot abide by that. And I cannot support sending people to die, however enthusiastically, for undefined marginal improvement.

I can posit we are at war because of certain desired end states, but they are hardly exhaustive. That is true in all wars. I know of no war where a particular end state not being achievable (and in Iraq many may still be) meant the war should be abandoned for that reason and that reason alone.

That’s not what I’m saying. I’m not saying some concrete end state in unachievable (I can be a sucker for lost causes if they are noble), I am wondering what that end state actually is. You seem fine with us killing and dying for “something better,” but don’t really get around to saying what that is, or when it might be reached.

Joshua, I think that is just wrong. Nobody knows. We look all around us and people are consistently doing the wrong things.

Then all criticism is invalid. I demand you stop calling the Democrats out on their idiocy, because people are always wrong and we just never know when it might somehow work out.

I would say the military has been more flexible and has learned a great deal, the administration about average.

If you knew the military as well as you say you do, you’d know this to be false. The military is the most conservative institution in this country, and while the brass isn’t uniquely inflexible from an historical perspective, they are of an above average rigidity precisely when we most need flexibility. Think about why it’s taken us nearly six years to figure out we had the wrong tactics and strategy in Afghanistan… or why it took four years to shift course in Iraq. Had we behaved with this much sloth during WWII, Japan would have occupied California. And the enemies in Iraq are innovating tactics at an increasing rate; we simply cannot keep up with our current structure.

Maliki is such a problem then his fall might lead to chaos or something better. You really know what will come of that?

I’m curious as to how you think the government’s collapse is a good thing, or how anything other than a tyrant can emerge. For a long time now, I’ve seen that as the eventual end state, after a long and brutal civil war. You see something better? Let’s see it, along with why you think it likely or even worth pondering.

“Think” is the operative word, not “know.”

Oh you’re right, Lance. You can’t “know” you’re sitting at your computer, typing those words. You might be in the Matrix, and a machine is only tricking you into thinking you do those things. Hell, I don’t even know you exist — you might be a fractured Self, right out of a Palahniuk novel, tempting me into fights so I can achieve a new plane of awareness.

Please.

game theory tells me to take the bet that it will get better even if I thought you were the most qualified person in the world to analyze such things. Withdraw and it definitely gets worse, stay and it probably will get worse, but maybe you are wrong.

How you weigh “probably” matters a great deal. You’re also not internalizing all of the cost. Please inform the families of the dead that their mutilated progeny were thrown into body bags on a certain probablistic outcome, because I sure can’t do that.

Criticism can be leveled but not out of some belief the people in power are idiots.

Except when they demonstrate rote idiocy. When generals rise up in protest against the conduct of a war, it’s safe to say that a reasonable argument can be made for the idiocy of the men in charge.

The CIA? Please. I won’t get into how much they have been wrong on, including Iraq, but the CIA is a source of analysis, no more reliable than the Weekly Standard or many news services on the kind of things we are discussing.

Lance, again I have to question how much you actually know about the CIA, its operations (you do know they have an operations division, right? which the Weekly Standard does not?), or even what they say. When the CIA says we shouldn’t invade because we will likely kick start a civil war we cannot control, and the CIA is written off as “undermining the president during war” (I am, embarrassingly, guilty of this), you don’t get to talk about “how much they’ve been wrong on including Iraq.” The CIA has very serious problems, but you pretend like they are worthless.

Iraq is part of a series of poor decisions, and just plain bad luck, ill fortune and social trends we have no control of (not that my decisions would have been better) and so is the rise of al Qaeda.

So we make a bad decision (glad you acknowledge that bit at last), everything that can go wrong goes wrong, and broad social forces we cannot influence turn against us, and your decision is… to stick it out? I don’t get it.

Right now, we have people who through painful trial and error have learned some things. They are implementing policies which have a chance of some success.

But I thought war was all chance and we can’t know what will work and what can’t and lessons learned is just after the fact carping and thinking we can draw useful guidelines from past failures is a bad idea because it might get better? You’re contradicting what you said above. Painful trial and error have taught us we cannot control Iraq. If these new policies have such a chance of success, why couldn’t Bush find someone to be his War Czar and bring it all home?

If you are right, it is because in a swirl of discordant facts you stabbed into a murky body and struck lucky ground.

And ditto you. So stop being so damned defensive. If Iraq magically works out, it won’t be because you had secret knowledge or unique insight into why it could work out. If my pessimism stands on no facts (something I vehemently disagree with, for if the men in charge are allowed to learn from failure, then I don’t see why I cannot either), then neither does your optimism. If chance and serendipity are why things out good or bad, we really shouldn’t ever train or school people in military doctrine… because they would have no control over it. I know you disagree with that. Yet… you argue it (when it suits you).

So, you are fully confident that sending in a large standing army was the right move? How do you know we placed that much faith in them anyway. I haven’t seen that in evidence outside of nice nice diplomatic speak. We decided (for good or ill) that a large occupying force wasn’t wise, for reasons similar to some people’s view of Iraq, and they were what we had at hand.

Yes. We didn’t have a large standing army going into Afghanistan because Donald Rumsfeld does not believe in large standing armies. Pure and simple. His generals disagreed with him, but felt they were obligated to follow their orders. The belief was that SOF could train the Northern Alliance to serve as proxies—incidentally, after decades of neglect—and that would solve our manpower situation. That has been proven beyond foolish.

So, while I may even agree that a larger force would be nice, the idea that it is “right” in some kind of way that should lead me to view those who made the decisions in Afghanistan with the contempt you drip is unfounded and dangerous.

Not so. The initial manpower decision was a triumph of belief over reality, and we are worse off now than we were then because of it. But you seem loathe to criticize anyone in charge.

The idea that Iraq will definitely have a chaotic civil war (as opposed to the bloody slow burn we are faced with now) and that we cannot make a significant difference speaks to a certainty about variables that we cannot know.

Lance, you seem to be elevating belief above wisdom. When the people who are paid to know everything about Iraq say we will unleash uncontrollable chaos, and we unleash uncontrollable chaos, how can you possibly say that was said without reason, knowledge, or experience?

I also do not bristle at criticizing those in charge, this discussion includes many for example. Just the idea that there is some unique or unexpected nature to your complaints, or that you know with certainty all of the claims you make are definitely true, as opposed to a belief. Some pretty bright men, including Petraeus disagree, with far more specific knowledge. They may be wrong, or fail despite being right, but it is not because you have a basis for such certainty. I still suggest you read Against the Gods.

I never claimed to be unique or unexpected… in fact, I appeal to authority far more than you do. For good or ill, I suppose. I also don’t know for certain that what I say will happen actually will. But I think it will – on this, I have been consistent (and if you bristle at me saying you said things you didn’t, I feel obliged to do the same when you do). Petraeus is not a factor here — as a flag officer governed by Title 10, on deployment under the authority of the President of the United States, he is legally forbidden from dissenting from the administration’s line. So he might think he’s on a fool’s errand, and is hoping to come home as soon as he can—he could never say it without facing jail time.

And unless you want me to start quoting all the books I’m using to bolster my beliefs, don’t go quoting a book Nassim Taleb would be ashamed of I’ve read that, and it’s not that great. Besides, doesn’t Bernstein argue that future risks can be understood? That would cut against your whole “we can never know” idea… especially when you consider that risks can be reasonable weighed. Regardless, it’s more a history of the development of theories than an actual look at what risk is and what it entails… and considering its potential implications for grander fields of risk, I thought it pretty limp.

That is the problem with the Munich argument that galls you so much.

Not really. People supported Neville because the horrors of WWI skewed their value sets to pathologically fear another war. Hitler was open and unashamed of his intention to conquer—right down to his relentless, and not hidden, military buildup. Saddam Hussein featured none of these things in 2003.

What are its lessons about how different men are perceived based on who crashes a plane into a building, how a lucky shot gets Bin laden, or doesn’t.

I have no idea what you’re driving at here. Are you saying invading an uninvolved country is an inappropriate response to a distributed terrorist network? Because I would agree with you.

How 120 sergeant’s could take down the Taliban when prior to that it would have been considered nuts amid worries about going into Afghanistan with a large force.

ARGH. No, 120 sergeants did NOT “take down” the Taliban. 120 SOF of many ranks advised a newly resupplied Northern Alliance army to partially take down the Taliban in a few parts of the northern part of the country, and many thousand American troops have been doing cleanup ever since. Christ Lance, you know this.

What I am saying is you don’t know with anything approaching certainty what you claim you know with certainty.

You know, it’s funny — you’ve spent a lot of time complaining that I’m arguing against something you never said. I can’t for the life of me see here where I used the word certainty. It is in fact from uncertainty that I argue for withdrawal—the fact that we cannot control the situation indicates we should leave before we contribute to the disaster Iraq has become. The certainty I guess only comes in my belief that we are not omnipotent… which I thought you agreed with anyway.

I have not claimed it is all chance or we can’t know anything. Don’t confuse my argument against your claims with my own claims.

Well, you need to distinguish between when you’re speaking generally and when you’re dealing with a specific claim. Because you spent a lot of time bitching that no one can know anything with certainty and that lessons learned is folly, yet the people in charge should use lessons learned, but it’s all governed by chance, and complaining they got it wrong is inappropriate because there is so much chance no one can claim credit for anything anyway. I’m lost in there somewhere, and I’ll rely on you to fish me out with something coherent.

Christ, I think I’m done with this. I’ll read whatever you say back, but at this point I don’t even know what you believe anymore, aside from your strong and unshakeable belief that we have a right to occupy Iraq. I won’t respond anymore, this is tedious beyond imagining.

You’re big on theory and abstract, but not as much what is actually going on.

Well, if you consistently question my theory I go to the theory and find examples less colored by the present arguments prejudices. WWII is one that is colored by other prejudices, prejudices that are very illuminating in illustrating my point about how we distort reality to fit into comfortable patterns so we can claim we have rationally examined the past. That is the problem with the Munich argument that galls you so much. Funny, but those who hate it miss the real point of why it is wrong. Neville made a very rational choice and it was still wrong. Churchill made the correct choice, yet it was very flawed (he himself did not justify it at the time on the basis for which we see it as so correct now. He certainly didn’t see Hitler as a global hegemon who would murder six million jews and millions of others) and is most likely viewed so favorably only because Hitler was given the chance to prove him right and then some. Remove that chance at an early stage and Hitler has all the oomph of Saddam today, a tin pot dictator. Churchill would be seen by many as the warmonger many felt he was then.

You sputter about my theory and appreciation for chance, but you avoid all my examples. I would love to hear you deal with this one and think about its implications about how we view the world, both prospectively and retrospectively. What are its lessons about how different men are perceived based on who crashes a plane into a building, how a lucky shot gets Bin laden, or doesn’t. How 120 sergeant’s could take down the Taliban when prior to that it would have been considered nuts amid worries about going into Afghanistan with a large force. Then later that is why we are struggling, not a big enough force. Not saying any view is right, but contingency is all around us.

More generally you confuse my argument about your certainty in general with my view on Iraq specifically. What I am saying is you don’t know with anything approaching certainty what you claim you know with certainty. I have not claimed it is all chance or we can’t know anything. Don’t confuse my argument against your claims with my own claims.

Since you continue to caricature my point let us walk back through this. You and Pogue made certain claims. I refuted them, and you have not addressed that. Instead you shifted the goalposts by making various claims that are only true if one can achieve certainty, both prospectively and retrospectively. I have spent a great deal of time pointing out the difficulty with that way of looking at the world and have provided concrete examples of why that is true, and how examples of what you are claiming has never existed.

You have responded by ignoring the initial disagreement and acting as if questioning your certainty about the past and future implies everything is chance and no actions can be judged. No, I have spent a lot of time on those aspects because you seem intent on ignoring them, not because that is all there is. I ask humility before human imperfection including your own, and you act as if that means anything goes. You can say that is logical, but it is not.

say we shouldn’t care and take reckless risks.

Uh, where do I say reckless risks are warranted? Nowhere.

(the bull in the china shop comment relates to your section on muddling and mistakes

I never said that we aspire to muddling, I am saying that is reality. You plan, do the best you can, and realize the plan is going to be wrong (the old military cliche about plans not surviving contact with the enemy is often treated as an excuse, in fact it is hard learned reality.)That is by the way what the neo-cons did, they thought their plan was going to work, no need for any planning about how we were going to run the place, because cakewalk and ready cooperation would be the order, and never factored in whether any government would be left, or whether those they hoped would ascend would behave in ways that would allow that government to function. Within weeks that was all falling apart. No police, no army, no functioning civil service.I don’t have any problem with their plan, I have a problem with what they were going to do if events didn’t cooperate. Well, I don’t think events will cooperate with your plan or view of the future either. I don’t know in what way, but I doubt you really know what will happen as clearly as you think.

Also, as an observer, realize that planners will neglect things that in retrospect will be felt to be quite important. People who confuse an attempt to reduce that error rate to having done it right are dangerous, arrogant even. That you would confuse humility with arrogance is an issue you need to address. Those who believe their planning will be the right planning rather than at best an improvement are the ones who cause the real damage in this world, including during wartime. They are committing the same sins as those who have proven so fallible in the present conflict. As I said before, substituting your own hubris for Cheney’s is not necessarily an improvement.

One thing I like about Petraeus is he has a doctrine, a well thought out set of principles, which he knows do not work mechanistically, that have to adapt through trial and error. He accepts error and uses it to his advantage. It runs throughout his work, and his speech. He knows it is at best a rough approximation of what he will eventually do. He leaves as little to chance as he can, but readily acknowledges its huge role, and how he may have to change, though of course, as problems creep up those who have invested themselves in failure do not, and have not, shown appreciation for that process. So he makes few predictions, rather he sets his sights on attainable goals that once roughly met can allow for other goals to be attained. He doesn’t have some plan that when it has to be changed means we have a crisis. Yes, he shifts his goal posts. That is appropriate and wise. He and I may have ultimate goals we would like to obtain, but other goals are worthy as well.

Is Iraq worth the risk?

What risk? Do you mean that more of our soldiers are killed? If so, then what risk is it that we are facing? Mass casualties? Frankly casualty figures are astoundingly low. Treasure? Some, but relative to what? You act as if our staying risks some catastrophic event, yet you have not argued anywhere that I know of of such an event presenting itself. In fact, our staying according to you just puts off the inevitable catastrophic event, and not for us, but Iraq and possibly the Middle East. Now, those events are not known to us, but reasonable judgment would say that leaving behind a more stable Iraq is less likely to result in slaughter and a wider conflagration. Less likely, probability, that is all I claim. I see it as substantially less likely, but you disagree. None of it has to do with any inevitability, which is what you claim. Note, most leaders in the Middle East and a substantial number of informed scholars and observers, many who did not support the invasion, agree with that statement. So I am not out on a limb despite your assertions of it all being some rosy scenario. I see no roses, I see likely disaster for Iraq, and a significant possibility of a spillover if we leave.

On the other hand I see a situation that is difficult, but not without hope. Much can be accomplished, and right now much is. Will it last? I have no idea how anybody can say with any certainty whether it will get better. It may be marginal, it may be substantial, it might take on a life of its own and surprise us all. I don’t know, but it can get better whether it does or not.

In response I get claims from you that are based on nothing that I haven’t listed as to why that cannot happen. Too late being a good example. Why? What evidence do you have of a comprehensive nature which shows that things like this cannot turn around past some pint in time or quantity of gore? From History? Some hidden information about the specifics of Iraqi’s that make them incapable of reconciliation? Exactly what scientific method has arrived at such a thing? Or, is it just a feeling, a belief that too much blood has been spilled and they will not stop at this point. That, and other explanations I have heard are nice beliefs, but are still only beliefs, feelings, etc. That is fine, but when that is what you are basing your decision on a bit of humility before your beliefs and their fallibility is in order. I believe it is possible to turn around, and wide historical experience shows me it is possible, even if I cannot prove it means it will this time. If I had such proof I would state it. If you presented such proof for your belief I would withdraw. Since we can do neither, I couch all my statements about outcomes and goals in that light. To do otherwise would be dishonest.

So my decision rests on what the risks versus the rewards of withdrawing are. We have a progressing military situation. At the local level we have a progressing political situation. At the national level it is highly uncertain, but I cannot say whether the possible collapse of Maliki is a good or a bad thing. If the national political situation improves somewhat and present progress on the other fronts improve then we may have something. It will take quite a while to have much confidence either way.

On the other side I have those who believe that nothing we do will change the endgame, though those beliefs are convictions born more from disappointment at past progress than any firm rationale about the future. Both sides agree that us leaving will be disaster, at least for Iraqis. The disagreement is on staying. The people in theater overwhelmingly believe the first group is correct, a humble belief that it could go either way. So what to do? I say stay and see if we can maintain the progress considering nobody is claiming with any conviction that us staying makes our situation much worse. We just suffer the cost of occupation, while us leaving would likely be disastrous for Iraqi’s, and quite possibly the Middle East. Throw in that whether we leave now, or later in frustration, we have a substantial probability of having to become involved in the Middle East in numerous unpleasant ways should Iraq’s troubles spread.

It seems to me, and from reading your own comments and posts Josh, that the big downside risks to both Iraq, the Middle East and possibly to us lie in leaving. The upside to leaving begins and ends with stopping our low casualties and tax dollars going to the war. Everything else is downside, especially for Iraqi’s. The upside to staying is uncertain, but it does exist. We could stabilize Iraq, leave a potential ally (leaving almost certainly assures us that no matter who survives, they will not be our allies) and maybe even leave a democracy of sorts. Hope against hope it may be a really nice democracy, but I find that unlikely in the short term. If we fail we are where the withdrawal folks had us anyway. The choice? Possible success, sure disaster. Hmmmm…… I call it for possible success unless you can provide what you really believe is a likely positive outcome should we leave. Or, you could show that if not certain, the chances of failure to make things better are somewhere around 90%. I can’t imagine how you would do that, but please do so. If it is out there I am willing to listen.

Therefore the decision is not one of reason, but merely how one values what happens to Iraqis really. If one values them at all the decision becomes almost automatic given the rough sketch above of risks and returns. If one values them not a whit it becomes more problematic as even under those circumstances one must weigh the strategic concerns about what an unstable Iraq leaves behind.

Your position to me relies on two sets of conditions. First, a certainty that the outcome cannot be changed. Logic, history, epistemology tells me such certainty cannot be achieved, not even close. So one would require a great deal of evidence, such as IA units taking on each other in mass battles, etc., true civil war, whereupon, while not certain, the evidence would weigh heavily that the situation was spinning completely out of control. Personally last summer I feared such a scenario wasn’t too far off and we were going to have to leave. That wouldn’t necessarily mean withdrawal in my mind, but it would be a very compelling reason to. Second, failing certainty of outcome one must not be including the Iraqi’s in your calculation and have a good grasp of the long run strategic consequences should we leave and feel that since they are benign enough that it is not worth any effort to achieve them, because as stated, Iraqi’s don’t matter. If neither of those pretty tough conditions are met, such as there are signs of progress, if uneven and we do value what happens to Iraqi’s, then under the set of choices outlined in the preceding paragraphs I am left with the decision to stay.

You claim set one of conditions applies, you know that the outcome is predetermined. I say that because you claim to care about Iraqi’s in addition to having said many times that the outcome is now predetermined. Therefore I concentrate upon your claim of certainty. I also sense you feel you have a high confidence grasp of the strategic consequences, though that is irrelevant to your case because the outcome is predetermined so we face those whatever decision we make.

I will note that I question whether you do have such a high confidence grasp of what a full scale conflagration in Iraq may lead to. I also should point out that failure because we saw things collapse is in our long term interest as opposed to abandoning the project. One will be perceived as very different by our adversaries than the other. We can deal with actual failure, and our enemies know that they cannot count on their own capabilities and a local population always proving so difficult for us. They will believe that they can count on us to abandon anything long and difficult should we just quit, surrender in their eyes (even though the people surrendered will be Iraqis.) I do not count that as a huge factor, and other strategic questions may be far more important, but I rarely hear it pointed out that failure is often okay in a long struggle, but a perceived lack of will can be devastating.

I honestly don’t get it. You argue for chance yet say we shouldn’t care and take reckless risks. That’s fine, there are lots of people who think that. I happen to see it as dangerously arrogant (the bull in the china shop comment relates to your section on muddling and mistakes). Seriously – what are you arguing? Is Iraq worth the risk? You say yes. Fine – why? What are we sacrificing our men and women for? Is your ultimate goal marginal improvement? If so, why is that worth 3500 lives? If not, what else is at stake? Why are my alternate futures less valid and more pie-in-the-sky than yours?

You’re big on theory and abstract, but not as much what is actually going on. I think we would both benefit by making this more tangible, instead of running off to WWII whenever we need to explain what is happening.

So you’d reduce us to the bull in the world’s China shop

Huh? First of all my point is about everybody, not just us. As for the china shop deal, not sure where that comes from.

If you reduce defeat and victory to mere chance with no planning or (in)competence involved, and therefor no blame or praise for either, then what is the point of staying?

I am not doing that. Take WWII again. I can make an endless number of points about supposed incompetence, questionable decisions and many other things, yet I think we did a marvelous job. If D-Day had had bad weather (as was feared, gutsy or foolish? Depends on if you get away with it) I suggest the way most people would look at Eisenhower, the war, and why we chose to conduct it the way we did. We tend to justify things by outcomes in probabilistic situations rather than process. WWII’s process was not perfect, but it was pretty darn good despite the huge number of errors and mishaps. Those are inevitable in any large undertaking.

I promise you though, had the weather stayed bad the decision to risk such a huge force on a risky amphibious invasion despite the significant possibility of inclement weather would quite possibly have cost Eisenhower his job, and the war could have ended quite differently. Throw in the possibility that Hitler had moved his Panzer divisions closer to Normandy, had he chosen not to hold them in reserve because he fell for our ruse at Pas de Calais, etc. You also missed persistence as an important factor as well. Our determination and willingness to sacrifice had more to do with the outcome than the number of mistakes. They happen. Success is more about screwing up less than your opponent and the willingness to carry on. Look at our own Revolution for another example.

I am arguing against your claim “we know,” rather than we believe a number of things which are closer to reality than some other set. The idea that that if we had just done what any person with half a brain knows it would be better. Well, guess what, brilliant men fail that standard, especially after the fact, all the time. If you were our policy king you would too. Especially since those who claim it is the smart thing to do are usually not much closer to reality in fact.

Are you really saying you’re cool with rolling the dice and hoping only few hundred thousand fewer people die as a result? I really hope I seriously misread that.

First of all, pointing out the large role that the unknown and chance plays is not saying I just want to roll the dice whatever the odds. However, that you don’t like the fact the world is probablistic, that the number of factors at play are beyond the kind of certainty you claim is possible doesn’t make it not true.

I am not arguing for complete ignorance, I am arguing against your claim of certainty and obvious truth. So exaggerate the point all you want, but if you read the examples I gave on Iraq, such as in force size and disbanding the army, I do believe we have made avoidable mistakes, I just deny the choice was as obvious then as they look now. I also point out that because they look like bad decisions now doesn’t make them bad decisions, though I think they were. See Joshua, humility. It is easy to criticize those and many other decisions now that the race has been running for a while. However, we can’t even know that our critiques are truly valid. We are interpreting the best we can.

Look at history. Where is the deft foreign policy figure who got things right consistently, and even then are we sure their actions were actually the reason even when the decision turned out good? The ups and downs of all of their careers testifies they were faced with a task far beyond the certainty you and so many claim is possible. Most retired in disgrace after being lionized, or vice versa.

This is a tough situation, and the administration has not performed particularly well. The idea that others would have performed significantly better is faith, not reason, and even if their choices had been wiser it does not mean things would have turned out better, or that we would have recognized them as such. Neville Chamberlain is a good example of a man unfairly, if correctly, pilloried for his choices retroactively. If he had acted differently, as Churchill wished him to he would probably go down in history as a man who took Europe to war, and criticized roundly for having done so. As much as I admire Churchill, his prescience is admired to a large degree because neville set the stage for him to be the vindicated prophet. If he had marched off to war with Neville at Munich he would not be viewed so kindly.

I’d love to read your case that sending a few dozen SOF after bin Laden was a good idea. Because no one who knew Afghanistan in depth thought that was a good idea—at least no one scholarly

So why didn’t they? Keep acting like everybody else is an idiot and you will be firm in your beliefs and blind to your own flaws, see it from their point of view. In fact, what are the problems with your view? Can you state them? Would you please if you can?

Hell, I didn’t know the country very well at the time, and I was worried we had placed way too much faith in the Northern Alliance as a proxy. That’s not quite being a broken clock.

So, you are fully confident that sending in a large standing army was the right move? How do you know we placed that much faith in them anyway. I haven’t seen that in evidence outside of nice nice diplomatic speak. We decided (for good or ill) that a large occupying force wasn’t wise, for reasons similar to some people’s view of Iraq, and they were what we had at hand. How do you know the academics were right, because it isn’t stable yet? That proves we haven’t succeeded, it proves nothing about whether a large force of our own was the answer. Afghanistan’s fate may hinge on many other more critical factors, factors you and I have no knowledge of. So, while I may even agree that a larger force would be nice, the idea that it is “right” in some kind of way that should lead me to view those who made the decisions in Afghanistan with the contempt you drip is unfounded and dangerous.

Most tellingly as you stretch my point (discussed more than what we can with humility discern because that is the topic) whatever additional certainty we have attained after the fact that your analysis was a better one, that in no way argues for your certainty moving forward. The idea that Iraq will definitely have a chaotic civil war (as opposed to the bloody slow burn we are faced with now) and that we cannot make a significant difference speaks to a certainty about variables that we cannot know. Many said the progress we have seen was not possible, especially in Anbar. Do those mean it will succeed? No. It does mean we have learned a lot, some of which I would prefer we had known earlier as counterinsurgency doctrine was sorely neglected. We can weigh the risks differently and come to different conclusions, what I will not sit here and leave unchallenged is the idea that you know the future well enough to say some of the things you do with such certainty and state that any other reading is part of some delusional bias or wish fulfillment. Sorry, whether we fail or succeed in making Iraq’s future a brighter one than it appeared to be last summer will not change that that certainty and claim is false. You may not like the implications of that point, but that is a truth.

I also do not bristle at criticizing those in charge, this discussion includes many for example. Just the idea that there is some unique or unexpected nature to your complaints, or that you know with certainty all of the claims you make are definitely true, as opposed to a belief. Some pretty bright men, including Petraeus disagree, with far more specific knowledge. They may be wrong, or fail despite being right, but it is not because you have a basis for such certainty. I still suggest you read Against the Gods.

I’d love to read your case that sending a few dozen SOF after bin Laden was a good idea. Because no one who knew Afghanistan in depth thought that was a good idea—at least no one scholarly (interestingly, the much-maligned academia was right about that—kind of like Iraq). Hell, I didn’t know the country very well at the time, and I was worried we had placed way too much faith in the Northern Alliance as a proxy. That’s not quite being a broken clock.

So at this point I have to say, I’m not really sure what you’re arguing, Lance. You seem to want to fight wars on the random chance that something might improve somehow, and find great fault in blaming the men in charge when they make bad decisions and things go bad, then see disaster in trying to stem our losses after. Please tell me I got you wrong, because that is literally a suicidal view of war and foreign policy.

Our “end state” in Iraq has changed from several concrete and theoretically achievable things to, as you’ve put it, “something better.”

No, much of war is “something better.” I can posit we are at war because of certain desired end states, but they are hardly exhaustive. That is true in all wars. I know of no war where a particular end state not being achievable (and in Iraq many may still be) meant the war should be abandoned for that reason and that reason alone. Your example of Eastern Europe being a good example. We didn’t fight the war with the idea Eastern Europe would be in Stalins hands. Should we have decided that it should have been ended sooner because it was looking as if it would? At any point in time you work toward the best outcome from there, not what you started out trying to do. Korea is a great example of that as well. Sunk costs are sunk. What do we do now?

Is every marginal improvement therefore evidence of continued victories? Every marginal setback evidence of continued defeat?

No.

I must admit I resent that, as your biases are no more (or less!) valid than my own. But I think it is incumbent to be aware of these biases, and even attack them from time to time to see if they’re still relevant.

Except in the case mentioned it showed no bias, your response did. I stated a fact, a mathematical one. You read it as meaning something different. That is a bias. I don’t deny my biases, in fact I specifically mentioned above that I have them, just that this example doesn’t demonstrate them. I have given up on you just admitting that you did misrepresent my words and positions, if unintentionally, or that Pogue did. So I’ll take that as it is not true since you will not address it. I have concrete goals for the surge, and we listed them above. I hope we reach them. if we don’t, I’ll set my sights on others, including possibly as orderly a withdrawal as we can manage. If we do, then we can aim for the next ones, maybe some of those supposedly unattainable ones.

The entire political establishment knew better — they knew what was going on, what would work, what was sure to cause failure, and how not to lose… and they did exactly the wrong things.

Joshua, I think that is just wrong. Nobody knows. We look all around us and people are consistently doing the wrong things. We say, “they should have known better.” But they didn’t, not really, and frankly their critics didn’t either. Otherwise the world would be a lot simpler and better managed place. That it consistently eludes the grasp of pretty bright men should prove that. If Rumsfeld hadn’t been there it might have gone better, it might have gone worse. We have no idea really. Rumsfeld never bought into the administrations goals, and that has been a major problem, but there would have been different problems, I assure you.

You think you know what went wrong, when just like me you really only think you know. I think we should have had more troops from the beginning for example, yet I can argue (and have to illustrate this very point) that it might have been a big mistake. The same with disbanding the army etc. More importantly, when things inevitably went awry, though in my opinion likely better than they have, many of the same critics would be arguing about both strategies being a mistake, and certainly new ones would, and the bad situation would be used to try and shame opponents of those arguments as ignoring the obvious evidence of what a screwed up policy it was. I could practically just copy Pogues rant above about the evidence and it would fit any policy we chose to criticize, no matter that it might have been better than the alternative. Only actual success proves much, not failure, and even then it proves less than many think. The reasons for success and failure are often not what people are looking at at all, and only reveal themselves later, and often not at all (see both the Battle of Midway and the common belief in the primacy of the insurgency as the main problem in Vietnam for two examples.) No way to tease the data loose from contingency to test the hypothesis either. Just people arguing. Once again, it does not matter in Iraq at this point, it is what will work best now, not then.

because I have seen up close the role ego and rigidity and a refusal to listen to contradictory views plays in these things.

This is something new? I would say the military has been more flexible and has learned a great deal, the administration about average. If this frustrates you, well I already made that point.

Especially as the Iraqi government continues to splinter and disintegrate, I do not see a conceivable, likely future in which Iraq improves.

Why? You act as if that is obvious, but it isn’t to me. If Maliki is such a problem then his fall might lead to chaos or something better. You really know what will come of that?

I think it will get far worse no matter what we do.

“Think” is the operative word, not “know.” Therefore it is going to get bad regardless of what we do according to you, or it could be better if you are wrong. Frankly, game theory tells me to take the bet that it will get better even if I thought you were the most qualified person in the world to analyze such things. Withdraw and it definitely gets worse, stay and it probably will get worse, but maybe you are wrong. If I am in a bad situation I try to take the possible success over sure failure, no matter how convincing the person making the argument that I am “doomed either way so jump out the window” is. The flames pretty much have to be overcoming me before I jump to the sure death. I feel moreso when it is someone else who I am actually pushing out the window.

I may not see light at the end of tunnel, but history tells me such certainty about the course of events from here is impossible to have, as you oddly acknowledge above.

I think you really have no idea what I’m thinking by this. My frustration stems from the reasons the men in charge chose to reject the correct course of action — not from reasonable doubts, but from unreasonable ideology.

No, I get it exactly. it stems from what you say right there. One reason people are so angry sounding in politics is they believe there is a correct course of action which they have seen. Maybe it isn’t as bad a course, but in many things, including foreign policy, the discernible correct path doesn’t exist. That you think it does is why when the next administration gets in power and things go to hell (as many things did, including in the Middle East, under Clinton but few paid attention) you will be railing against them. I hope you don’t. I hope you just say, this stuff is beyond us. We are muddling through, we will screw up, fail, and hopefully try again. Criticism can be leveled but not out of some belief the people in power are idiots. Luckily, I have problems with all the candidates who have a shot, but none are idiots. (Harry Reid is, but he isn’t running. Pelosi isn’t, my problems with her lie elsewhere, though her policies will cause more problems than an idiot could manage.) Persistence makes a bigger difference than anything from what I can see. Hopefully our opponents screw up more, and given al Qaeda and its allies track record we have a pretty good chance at that. Despite your pessimism, I see lots of positive signs even in the Middle East. Nothing to change the basic issue yet, but they are there.

It was the same reason they’ve rejected the bill of rights and granted themselves the right to listen to our conversations and seize our property without judicial review, why the vice president has elevated himself out of the three branches, why the attorney general thought torture was perfectly fine and any notions of justice or process were mere barriers.

It is also why previous administrations have as well, on all counts including torture (see Clinton [being recent, not for being especially bad] Nixon, Johnson, Roosevelt, and worst of all Wilson for examples.) Hey, we are on the same page on this stuff for the most part, I just once again question why this is so shocking.

It was why the CIA’s warnings on Iraq were never heeded, we sent a force of 65 SOF (65!) to fight the army that launched the most successful attack on American soil in nearly two centuries,

The CIA? Please. I won’t get into how much they have been wrong on, including Iraq, but the CIA is a source of analysis, no more reliable than the Weekly Standard or many news services on the kind of things we are discussing. Information they have, and while disappointing to many, still a lot of it. Analysis however they seem to have few competitive advantages over a great many others.

As for the Afghanistan campaign, I can construct a very good argument using all the kinds of things we have been discussing on Iraq to ‘prove” that was one of the best things they ever did going in with 120 (65?) SOF and taking down the Taliban. It may not be working out like we would hope, and more troops might be the answer there, but the argument against it is pretty compelling as well.

We are right now in a period of idiocy, and while I rail against it and get truly angry over how much idiocy there is, it is through people voicing their discontent that the politicians in charge know change must be taken. It is by people like me (I hate this formulation, but bear with me) that change happens.

Actually I don’t see it as period of idiocy, or if so it is part of the preceding 8 years. Idiocy during those years left a much more difficult and dangerous challenge for these four years (which the previous administration would have handled differently and possibly more successfully, but not necessarily better, though i think they would have been worse on Afghanistan for a number of reasons.)

Iraq is part of a series of poor decisions, and just plain bad luck, ill fortune and social trends we have no control of (not that my decisions would have been better) and so is the rise of al Qaeda. I saw this coming (and no, it wasn’t prescience, I just bothered to look) for years. The exact way it happened I had no clue about, but that we would be embroiled in Iraq at some point, and with al Qaeda in the Middle East seemed baked into the cake to me. Maybe that explains why I am less frustrated. To me, things have not gone so badly. I feared much worse. Not that that excuses the many lapses of this administration, I just don’t get so worked up about them, nor do I see the previous or likely succeeding administration doing much better. That doesn’t mean things will not get better, I just don’t think it will be because of some vast increase in competence.

As for change being because of people like you, well I think it is because of people like me as well. I see my job as avoiding the making of just as serious mistakes based on the belief that lessons have been learned and change must happen, which really means, “they were wrong, so I must be right.” Usually the lessons learned are the wrong ones, believed to be far more relevant, well founded and well thought out than they really are, and have less bearing on the future than people think. The outraged critic is usually the worst enemy of truly constructive incremental reform, because they believe the problems are obvious and the solutions just as clear. If only people like them were given some power. Far simpler problems than the Middle East and Central Asia have proven immune to such hubris, as the once confident neo-cons are finding out, as school reform has proven time and again, and city planners the world over have been brought low as their solutions to the poor planning of their predecessors made things worse. They always sound so smart compared to the people who screwed up before, and of course it is hard to point out exactly why they are wrong, when the real issue is the idea that they know, rather than any specific problem with their analysis and solution. The problems will come out in the sausage making. See red faced neo-cons today who could rightly and easily sneer at those who preceded them, only to see their solution prove not so neat and well thought out as they wanted it to be.

Right now, we have people who through painful trial and error have learned some things. They are implementing policies which have a chance of some success. They are very different from what came before despite ignorant claims to the contrary. That knowledge, local and specific to this conflict, is showing progress, and deserves a chance to succeed in making the situation better even if it doesn’t fit the goals and objectives we started out with. Even if we fail miserably, that knowledge may save many lives in the future. You can say that you see it as futile, but that doesn’t mean it is, or it shows some rational calculation that only bias can be behind not seeing it. The bias if there is one, is the one that claims such certain knowledge of the future.

If you are right, it is because in a swirl of discordant facts you stabbed into a murky body and struck lucky ground. Personally it just isn’t worth it to you given the likely cost and high failure possibility. Nothing more nothing less. That is fine. It doesn’t stand on facts. The broad general facts we observe are not adequate to make such a judgment. That I will state with certainty. I see the same facts, and they don’t support what you say. They are evidence, but not conclusive. That makes it a best guess given the evidence, nothing more. You have presented no facts in all your writings which show anything but that it is a bad situation. None of them prove any outcome necessarily follows, nor any framework upon which to place those facts to show that Iraq cannot turn around. So I will go on eschewing the categorical claims, admit to the disturbing situation and judge that we should stay until the situation is beyond help. You can say it isn’t worth it given how badly it has gone and the likelihood of failure. Anything more is pretense, no matter how many times you say”look how bad it is.” I know it is bad, though less so than earlier, and acknowledging as well that it has been bad for decades.

I think the ability to shift goal posts in war and foreign affairs is often a virtue.

You and I fundamentally differ on this. Rather, I think we differ on when it is appropriate. Our “end state” in Iraq has changed from several concrete and theoretically achievable things to, as you’ve put it, “something better.” How is that defined? Is every marginal improvement therefore evidence of continued victories? Every marginal setback evidence of continued defeat? That doesn’t strike me as a reasoned (or at least, intellectually rigorous) argument.

Since we’re apparently fond of WWII comparisons, then let’s look at this. Was Eastern Europe better off under Stalin or Hitler? Were the concentration camps noticeably different from the gulags and forced mass-exiles? I honestly don’t know. But that is the gravity of the choice we’re contemplating in whether to press on or to withdraw.
I heard something interesting the other day: in war, the loser decides when to stop fighting. From the start, we were planning on fighting with a definite idea or at least how we would like to stop, if not when. Many of the insurgents, including (perhaps most importantly) the ones who felt they were defending their homes against a foreign invader who kicks down their doors and sends their men to be tortured, did not have the intention of not fighting until we were gone.

In other words, we have approached this war from the start with the mentality of losers. We are behaving like we have lost and are speaking like we have lost.

I have to say categorically that I did not mean to imply a pejorative when I mentioned your biases. We all approach the world with biases. Perhaps a more neutral word is assumptions. We assume different things about both the nature of the conflict, and the nature of its preferred end state. That’s all I was saying – often you seem to read your biases onto whatever aspect we’re bickering about at the time and then assume it’s common sense while I’m taking some crazy left field view just to be contrary. I must admit I resent that, as your biases are no more (or less!) valid than my own. But I think it is incumbent to be aware of these biases, and even attack them from time to time to see if they’re still relevant.

And many of your responses are indeed clever, which is why they’re so damned frustrating – like the Black Swan

One problem with foreign policy is we have very few cases to draw any firm conclusions from, yet we claim to have found some easy truths every time we have a war, and we do it in the midst of every war.

That is absolutely true. The thing is, we knew in the 1940′s how not to antagonize or otherwise make the Iraqis hate us with blood feuds. We printed and distributed a manual to all our soldiers that said as much. Yet in 2003, we were doing those exact things we knew 60 years ago, in a far friendlier environment, would have turned the locals against us.

That’s what I mean when I complain about this stuff. We know better, and the idiots in charge (I use that term specifically to refer to Rumsfeld) write off lessons learned as “well, stuff happens” and “you go to war with the army you have.” That’s foolish on so many levels in a normal, Western-centric context… it is outright criminal when dealing with a culture very few truly understand, in a war of our own choosing. The entire political establishment knew better — they knew what was going on, what would work, what was sure to cause failure, and how not to lose… and they did exactly the wrong things.

To me, that is simply inexcusable. I cannot explain it away as the result of chaos, or of the newness of modern warfare, or any number of things, because I have seen up close the role ego and rigidity and a refusal to listen to contradictory views plays in these things. Frankly, the men in charge who are like that — who are rigid, inflexible leaders who make concrete, unmovable positions based on information clearly labeled “incomplete” — deserve every ounce of scorn and resistance I can muster.

Which is why I cannot support their war. Now to your last bits:

do you really believe it will get better if we leave? At least over the next year or so? I think you suspect it will get much worse, though hope it will not. So at least in the context of this discussion that really seems out of place, as what is most likely to make things worse is our leaving.

Not quite. I think it will get far worse no matter what we do. Especially as the Iraqi government continues to splinter and disintegrate, I do not see a conceivable, likely future in which Iraq improves. The only question is whether we are there to participate in it or not. Do we keep putting civilians at risk, kicking down homes, helping the few streets where we can spare the troops, and acting as a lightning rod for all the militias in Iraq? Or do we pull out, wash our hands, and say we have exhausted our ability to control the situation? I see the latter happening no matter what, so I don’t understand the need to keep killing our troops in the interim.

Or, to take a more strategic view, do we dump this in Iran’s lap? It is worth seeing how much Iran is willing to talk to us now that there is a strong movement for withdrawal — they would rather have us handling a bunch of radical Sunni crazies. They don’t want to have a violent and chaotic neighbor state – they already have one of those, thank you very much Pervez.

I’m with you that this has been one of the most limited, successful wars we’ve ever fought (or that history has seen)… in strictly military terms. But, and this is a broader complain about how the political leadership in this country sees Islamism, this is not a military conflict, or even a primarily military conflict. We lost major amounts of (for lack of a better term — I’m open to suggestions) soft power when we invaded and blew it. That is a far bigger loss than most people, left or right, have been willing to acknowledge, as it dictates how much we can influence more people to either join or reject Islamism. We’ve lost so much ground on that front, I very seriously worry we won’t be able to recover for a generation, maybe more.

Placed in a slightly changed context, we have gotten the question wrong. We had a bunch of hammers, so we thought we had a bunch of nails.

I suggest you will live a frustrating life waiting for our foreign policy to improve dramatically, the list of stupid things the military spends money on to grow much shorter, for attempts to evade/hide responsibility by bureaucrats and officers to decrease much (that actually is an area where our military is much better than it has ever been and is much better than most government agencies, especially State) or a whole lot of other things. Think Andrew Sullivan (and not because of his sexual preference, but his constant sense of the failure of the humans around him, punctuated by bouts of overenthusiastic hope inevitably crushed by the imperfections of the solver and solution.)

Okay, the Andrew Sullivan reference is really pushing it

But seriously, I think you really have no idea what I’m thinking by this. My frustration stems from the reasons the men in charge chose to reject the correct course of action — not from reasonable doubts, but from unreasonable ideology. It was the same reason they’ve rejected the bill of rights and granted themselves the right to listen to our conversations and seize our property without judicial review, why the vice president has elevated himself out of the three branches, why the attorney general thought torture was perfectly fine and any notions of justice or process were mere barriers. It was why the CIA’s warnings on Iraq were never heeded, we sent a force of 65 SOF (65!) to fight the army that launched the most successful attack on American soil in nearly two centuries, and so many other things I’ve lost track of them.

That is where my frustration stemmed from. I expect the military to waste money — any unaccountable government agency will (and I actually think fraud and abuse is comparatively not that bad at the DoD, I just happen to know it better); just as I expect bureaucrats to act like bureaucrats and politicians to act like politicians. That’s why I don’t flip my sh*t out when Nancy Pelosi acts like Newt Gingrich.

But, with the exception of the last four years, our foreign policy had improved dramatically. It was a sine wave of sorts, with periods of genius and idiocy, but the genius was slightly more than the idiocy over the long term (I would argue) as we got a better handle on what the world was and how we could relate to it. We are right now in a period of idiocy, and while I rail against it and get truly angry over how much idiocy there is, it is through people voicing their discontent that the politicians in charge know change must be taken. It is by people like me (I hate this formulation, but bear with me) that change happens.

So I think because we’ve limited these discussions to Iraq, I don’t come across as sanguine as I really am about our grand strategy. But perhaps that is a discussion for a different day…

Contempt was not intended, sharp jabs given in response to sharp jabs received however was. Let us look at the first jab, straight from your keyboard:

Lance, you just elevated shifting goalposts to a virtue.

Unkind, as well as untrue. I never accused you of lying, but being wrong. Whatever you think of my argument or philosophical approach, I haven’t changed it, not that there is anything wrong with changing, but the contempt if there is any was expressed in the idea that I have and that it is contemptible. Personally I think the ability to shift goal posts in war and foreign affairs is often a virtue. It is not a virtue to attack someone and then to justify the attack shift it all over the place to find something to criticize and then act as if the original claim is justified. That kind of goal post shifting is often worthy of contempt. Either way, your charge was unfounded, though no claim was or is being made that it was done out of base motives or dishonest ones. If you got that impression, my apologies.

Second jab:

But that statement alone reveals a lot about the biases through which you’re filtering your support for the war.

It did no such thing, it was factually correct and no hairs were split (third jab.) It said exactly what I intended to say. You assigned meaning to it (I believe, and I did state my concern that my interpretation of what you were implying may not be accurate) that it did not carry. Once again, I accuse you of misreading me, not intentionally misrepresenting me. I may have a bias, but that statement did not reveal it. Also is this quote one that bothered you?

Look up the term relative, and then get back to me about biases affecting how I filter what I read.

I thought that was a pretty snappy come back to your, well, I can’t say it was anything but an insult, though maybe you didn’t mean it that way. Whatever, I thought of the reply as a wink at the jab. You know, you shoot a strong forehand across the net and I do my best McEnroe impression and send it back at an odd angle toward the right sideline. You throw an insult, I respond with a clever retort, that kind of thing. Uh, I thought it was pretty clever at least, and I give high priority to entertaining myself.

As for the rest, I tried to answer your question, and I detect no reason to see it as revealing any contempt or implication of dishonesty. It reveals how I think about problems in foreign policy, and a great many other things.

As for my jabs (in response to yours in each case) they were intended as spirited (Pogue sets that tone;^) and I ask, were they not true? I mean, whatever your motive, on re-reading, were my words actually guilty of the charges leveled and deserving of the contempt you showed them? You have not said, or discussed them, but moved onto other ground. If you believe what I think what you imply about the daily lives of Iraqi’s, then you probably shouldn’t discuss things with me, for only an idiot would believe such things, though I do believe we may have a distorted view even of that.

Moving on, exactly what is wrong with the reply below? It may be a bit spirited as I said, but wasn’t it exactly in substance what needed to be cleared up so that a real discussion can commence?

By the way, have you found those goalposts I shifted yet? Or, has Pogue found where I said, implied, or otherwise claimed something to justify the claim that I have made comments “about there actually being enough troops there already, that your fears are settled?” Any settled fears found?

They are not particularly inflammatory words. Their sting, if you felt it, was because despite claims that I have said different things before (and once again, I do not know why that is a fault, but the implication was it is) you and Pogue actually cannot come up with any. That is not my fault.

Or maybe the complaint is with this little bit:

So pair that with the Black Swan Josh and smoke it while you contemplate the idea that your truth is just taking probabilities after the fact and claiming it means truth has been discovered. A few hundred tests more and we might have results approaching statistical significance for a situation that will not reoccur. Very useful that.

Now granted I have an odd sense of humor, and only one in a thousand others would get the Black Swan reference besides you and I, but I thought that was cheeky and funny. I thought it might even drag a smile out of you.

I also stand by its ‘truth’ as well. One problem with foreign policy is we have very few cases to draw any firm conclusions from, yet we claim to have found some easy truths every time we have a war, and we do it in the midst of every war. It may be the best we have, but given the fact that in every war we end up criticizing the generals and policy makers for “fighting the last war” it might give us pause in assessing the generalizations about the past so eagerly being set in stone and setting them on the course to do it yet again. Especially given how over the years we are undoubtedly going to look on all this differently.

Cheer up Josh, you make many good points, just make sure you don’t make them by reading other peoples sins into me, which is what I think both you and Pogue have inadvertently done, because I have enough difficulty with the sins I actually have committed.

It is something I am guilty of from time to time as well, in fact I have done it to Pogue and with deep embarrassment. You don’t have to share my Popperian/Hayekian skepticism of easily discerned truth about Iraq, and I do not deny that we may not have enough troops, the political actors in Iraq may never get their act together well enough to do what they need to do, or that the IA may yet splinter into a bunch of sectarian factions run by warlords as in Afghanistan. I just don’t believe they are inevitable, and think you are wrong to claim they are. I don’t think it is dishonest. I also believe that if they do occur it will not make me wrong to say they are not inevitable. Probability is a b**ch.

I just happen to be deeply frustrated with how we push ahead with malformed plans and make it worse, while you continue to see light at the end of the tunnel.

There is light at the end of the tunnel, but I haven’t claimed to see it. In fact, I have been arguing, and for many years, that we were and are going to be at this for a long time. Personally, I think we may end up up back even if we leave. The light may be there, but it is likely quite a way off and we may never see it. Hopefully I am too pessimistic, but a bit more pessimism on the behalf of one time war supporters might have served them better in the past. (Yes, that was a needle, and possibly unfair ;^)

I do see improvement, and to deny it may in the end prove correct, but there is no real basis for denying it. Even the pessimistic reports from Iraq do not deny the improvement, just whether it will last or make any long term difference. That is legitimate. Denying it implies a bias, and a depressing one at that. So, while the policies may not make a lasting difference, the idea that we are now making things worse seems a bit strained to me. That they will get worse is certainly a possibility, in fact over the short term I expect they will.

Also, while whether it is worth it to you, or that it will make a lasting difference, is a reasonable debate and question, do you really believe it will get better if we leave? At least over the next year or so? I think you suspect it will get much worse, though hope it will not. So at least in the context of this discussion that really seems out of place, as what is most likely to make things worse is our leaving. As a more general statement I can assure you that everyone feels that way, including the neo-cons and George Bush. the question is how to fix that. My own take is you can’t. Improvements here and there, sure. Fix it, never. I say that with quite a bit of confidence because a few thousand years of history shows we cannot. Our country has done a better job than almost anybody, and as hard as it is for most people to believe, this war has been done better than most by most metrics. The failures however were pretty poorly placed.

Anyway, I suggest you will live a frustrating life waiting for our foreign policy to improve dramatically, the list of stupid things the military spends money on to grow much shorter, for attempts to evade/hide responsibility by bureaucrats and officers to decrease much (that actually is an area where our military is much better than it has ever been and is much better than most government agencies, especially State) or a whole lot of other things. Think Andrew Sullivan (and not because of his sexual preference, but his constant sense of the failure of the humans around him, punctuated by bouts of overenthusiastic hope inevitably crushed by the imperfections of the solver and solution.)

As for no goalposts, well maybe so. So let us admit I haven’t moved them then, the statement was inaccurate.

As for what are working toward, something better. Since you hate me bringing it up, I will drag out the WWII carcass again. In that war, had I been alive, I would have wanted to crush the axis quickly and somewhat painlessly. Then I would want to have done it the way we did it, with great pain and sacrifice, a sacrifice we are unlikely to make ever again, even if another Hitler were to appear. We were not willing to do it to defeat Communism despite a higher body count and announced ambitions (and in that case I am glad we didn’t.) If that wasn’t achievable (much closer to having happened than we acknowledge) I would have accepted all kinds of things short of that. If the weather had turned against Eisenhower and the Normandy landings been a disaster, I think my reaction wouldn’t have been, “see, the whole invasion, in fact not accepting Hitlers peace terms, was stupid. It was never going to work.”

Notice Josh that I am not saying they are the same, except in ways that are relevant.

In Iraq I Would love to have a peaceful, Democratic government run by the closest thing to Milton Friedman combined with Eisenhower they could find, it is however unlikely. All kinds of things short of that seem pretty damned desirable to me. While it isn’t exhaustive I think your little list is a good place to start with our efforts:

We need to create space for the military to get stronger, the political progress to occur and create local capacity.

That seems a nice short to medium term goal. I can adjust my sights up or down depending on events. If it is down, you can say you won the debate and I won’t care or think it proves very much, so you are warned that I will be frustrating should things take a bad turn. It will prove nothing. I see this as an effort, not a foregone conclusion. It isn’t about “pinning me down” so you can win the argument, it is about what is the best course of action considering all of my concerns about the fate of Iraq, most clearly the people who live there. If I knew the answer to such questions I would be god, not a blogger. I am of the belief we have a decent shot at providing a better outcome if we stay for now. No certainty, just a decent shot. How much better I am not sure, but it seems likely it is significant enough of a difference to make it worth it to me, if not you. So far it seems my friends in the military, including my brother who is soon to be in Anbar from what I can see, agree. Hopefully it will turn out Michael Yon, Roggio and others are right about the improvement in Anbar (however temporary) and not Glenn Greenwald and al Jazeera. I promise to ask him. I assure you he gives the bad side of things as well. Not a company line kind of guy, as Peter and Robby can attest. Nor a conservative. Though I know few long haired, pottery majors who are (one of the things he loves about Iraq, cool pottery, ancient and modern, everywhere.)

As for shifting goalposts, you’ve successfully avoided that trap by not having any.

So tell me, what is victory to you? What are we working toward? And how do we measure whether or not we’ve arrived? I have yet to get a clear picture of that.

If Baghdad and Northern Iraq are cleared (at least relatively so) then well over half of the population (when other already less violent areas are included) will be living in relative calm.

So, if we were to clear (relatively so) Baghdad and Northern Iraq along with other less violence soaked places that wouldn’t be half? Notice, nowhere did I say anything even resembling the idea that most Iraqi’s do live in relative calm anyway, though by definition that statement would be true as well, though unhelpful.

By the way, have you found those goalposts I shifted yet? Or, has Pogue found where I said, implied, or otherwise claimed something to justify the claim that I have made comments “about there actually being enough troops there already, that your fears are settled?” Any settled fears found?

As for the reporting, your disdain for Yon, when mainstream reporters are starting to echo him, in favor of al Jazeera is a bit odd. Luckily I like odd. That is, I might like odd if Yon or Roggio or any of the embedded reporters was reporting anything along the lines of Iraqi’s living a calm life, which is what I think you are implying despite that pesky relative word thingy sitting there in the middle of that sentence. Instead I am just saying “what?”

Yes, I realize reality is somewhere in between. But that statement alone reveals a lot about the biases through which you’re filtering your support for the war.

I just went back to my writings on the surge at the beginning. I see no goal post shifting, in fact from a couple of objections addressed some time ago:

Pushing the violence out

Obviously we would love for the people opposed to us to just give up, but Petraeus certainly never expected them to. In reality all wars are about pushing the conflict somewhere else until the conflict ends. You choose the tactical and strategic goals (in this case Baghdad) and seize them. The conflict doesn’t end, but if your objective is the right one (and who can deny that the most important objective is Baghdad) then it is a success and can be leveraged to more success. When we had conquered Normandy in WWII it pushed the fighting “somewhere else.” The fighting still had a long way to go. The fighting would increase over time as well. Yet, it was significant strategic accomplishment. Making Baghdad a significantly safer city is a key objective. It does not solve everything, but it is essential to success.

Only a temporary success

Of course. All successes are temporary. The next steps are the key. That means the success has to be maintained long enough for Baghdad’s citizens to buy into the government as the guarantor of order. That will take time. Can that be done? Obviously it can. When we have tried it we have been successful. Will we be successful? Who knows, but a key will be next objection.

The violence will return once we are gone

So the obvious answer is to leave? I roll my eyes every time I hear someone say that while doing everything in their power to get us to leave. If us being gone is the problem, if we are successful but we are also necessary to the successes continuation, that would certainly give currency to the idea that we should not in fact leave. Of course I hear this contradictory analysis all the time. Our being there is what is causing the violence or making it worse, while simultaneously dismissing the surge as a temporary success which will evaporate upon our leaving soon, which they of course are fighting so hard to make a reality as quickly as possible. You would think the contradiction would make their head explode, but it doesn’t. The shrapnel just spews from their mouths.

So what about after Baghdad is a success (assuming that comes to pass.) Are we not just playing “whack a mole.”

No, though the claim will seem valid if we fail. If so, we failed, not because it can’t be done. We fail at things that can be done all the time. First of all, much of the country already lives in relative calm. Some of that calm will be disrupted as the focus of violence shifts from Baghdad. The fact is though, that Baghdad is the psychological, economic and political linchpin in Iraq. If Baghdad and Northern Iraq are cleared (at least relatively so) then well over half of the population (when other already less violent areas are included) will be living in relative calm. That gives the Iraqi government time and space to continue building up their capabilities. The constant downplaying of the importance of Kurdistan as a success colors our perception in many important ways. That is a fifth of the country already rock solid.

The Government of Iraq? Isn’t it corrupt and riddled with people with blood on their hands as well?

Yes. Anybody who had the idea that Iraq would be run by people who were not at least as corrupt as the neighboring states was living in a fantasy world. The government forces have been infiltrated, and it is a pretty uneven bunch overall. However, they are better than two years ago, better than one year ago, better than six months ago, and better than a month ago. Significant purges of the prime offenders have occurred, but this will be an ongoing problem. Nevertheless, it is better, much better. Unless that progress reverses, and for a significant time, our hand gets better over time. The same can be said for the government as a whole. While it is quite dysfunctional, it is more functional than before (though many areas of competency are not that desirable, or a mixed blessing.) As a vehicle for stability however, it is not ready yet, but more prepared than before. There will be times they take on tasks and fail. They will not be ready, or still unwilling. Still, it is better, and a calm Baghdad removes a huge amount of pressure from the government to acquiesce to the more extreme elements. Failure and dealing with it will be a key to a successful outcome. Unfortunately, coping with failure is not a strength of ours during wartime. It is a strength of our opponents.

Uh, where is the inconsistency? Where is the shifting goal post? I talk of at least the first two and imply the third back when the “surge” was only just starting to have its forces put in place. I see no inevitable triumphalism, just a belief it has a chance and what I think the goals are. We may reach some, if only partially, we may not, though early returns are encouraging. In fact, given the task, it would be hard to expect better, and I include the political front. That may end up taking longer than any of the other goals.

Or listen to McQ, Dale and my discussion of the surge in our podcast. Exactly where is all this certainty and goal post shifting you and/or Pogue are accusing me of? I was very doubtful, though I thought it had a chance at the time. I have been saying the same thing all along! I do reserve the right to change what I am saying if the facts change, and you and Pogue can whine all you want. It may be a debating win, but it is completely irrelevant to the task at hand. To quote the great Keynes:

When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?

I also would point out the problem with Pogue’s reasoning above. Out of a range of outcomes we have had a less than pleasant one so far, thus he wishes to claim some insight into truth. By implication Joshua you have been looking for policies and approaches which reveal the true path we should have taken and the true path we can take in the future. I’ll quote Keynes again:

It has been pointed out already that no knowledge of probabilities, less in degree than certainty, helps us to know what conclusions are true, and that there is no direct relation between the truth of a proposition and its probability. Probability begins and ends with probability.

So far, the evidence is the “it has a chance” argument is proving true. That it will inevitably fail is just the kind of categorical claim that the we will inevitably succeed argument is, specious.

So pair that with the Black Swan Josh and smoke it while you contemplate the idea that your truth is just taking probabilities after the fact and claiming it means truth has been discovered. A few hundred tests more and we might have results approaching statistical significance for a situation that will not reoccur. Very useful that.

We all need a touch more humility about the future, the lack of it is a large reason we are where we are and why I didn’t raise a peep about Pogue’s use of the Kristol quote above. While I am no hater of Kristol, I assumed he had to be directing the quote at someone beside’s me, since in my recollection I have never quoted Bill Kristol on anything, and certainly not to justify any policy in Iraq. One reason is he is far more certain about a lot things, Iraq included, than I am. If people such as Kristol (or Mona) had been a good bit less confident in their read on the situation we would probably be in far better shape. Being just as blinded by your own yet to be “proven” prescience now isn’t any more of a virtue.

Seems to me, having read your previous comments about there actually being enough troops there already, that your fears are settled. But it’s good that you fear.

I suggest you find a few quotes, because I am arguing that it is not settled against people who are arguing it definitely is settled that there are not enough. I am not sure we have enough at all, but I do believe we may have enough, at least for the goal Petraeus has set.

You can’t tell me that you’re not trying to patronize me. I won’t believe you. I know you too well.

Guilty as charged, but given the sarcasm and disdain dripping from certain keyboards, I cheerfully submit, warranted.

You know, you can take that patronizing bullsh*t down to whatever hippie coffee shop you like to visit for your nonfat-grande-latte-enema so that you can gaze about berating to all of the sheep readers of the NYT as so you can feel superior.

Now, I have been pretty kind to the NYT over the years, if not for Paul Krugman, Hebert or its editorial column, the rest of the paper ain’t that bad. I quote it approvingly on a regular basis, even on Iraq.

Yet, I’m the one that must come up with some kind of “metric” and “controlled experiment” to determine what is needed for security in Iraq.

Laughable.

It is in fact laughable. You misunderstand. First, I asked a question about troop levels, not the project as a whole. Second, it is laughable because there are no such hard rules, metrics or controlled experiments in foreign policy. It is all rules of thumb, impressions, wild assed guesses. I am skeptical of your certainty, not arguing for replacing it with my own, which doesn’t exist. It never has, and I defy you to point to anywhere where you see me expressing certainty about Iraq or Foreign relations/policy anywhere. You may find a nugget or two, but it will be awash in a sea of qualifications and doubt. That may be a real criticism, but that is a whole different argument.

Joshua and Michael,

I think Michael is expressing the core of why Petraeus thinks he can be successful. Josh, you are not giving the IA enough credit. They have made a lot of progress, but are still a good ways away. Reduce the threat, increase their capability and we may get there. That is the space Petraeus is trying to create. It is possible, if tough and far from certain, maybe even unlikely. It is not impossible though.

Also, Petraeus didn’t consider his numbers a rule to naively apply to an entire country. Some areas can be low on the priority list, not a problem, etc. Also, conflicts differ, therefore more or less troops may be necessary, but you and Pogue can go ahead and lobby for increasing the size of the military if the number of troops is the main problem. Personally I would support that.

I reckon it’s more comparable to the conflict in Ulster.

Hmmm … that’s actually a pretty good comparison. I mean all the countries start with “Ir” so that’s, y’know, something.

In all fairness, the comparison is apt as far as the internecine conflict. So long as you consider the UK the analogue of Iran, that is (“FOOUUURRRRR GREEEEEN FIEELLLDDS!!!!).

But no fault to you, Michael. You have characteristics susceptible to faith. I do not. Perhaps that is a fault of mine, not of yours.

But you keep crossing your fingers.

To be honest, I’m well aware of the fact that my faith in a good outcome in Iraq outweighs the empirical evidence that such outcome is possible. But your right about that being who I am (albeit for the wrong reason). Among the many reasons that Andrew Jackson is my second favorite President, is this quote: “One man with courage makes a majority.”

Oooh, I have an idea! How about we go by what General Petraeus himself said! In the COIN manual he wrote, he suggested certain metrics which place the current 150k at about 25% the density he himself suggests a successful counterinsurgency needs.

I think that probably is the best metric, if you can have one, but keep in mind tha rules are made to be broken.

This usually gets written off as saying “well, locally, he has enough,” and that might possibly be the case. But you and I both know the Iraqis themselves are wholly incapable of providing their own security, which means if the rest of the country is to be secured we’d need a helluva lot more guys thrown in there.

I don’t think that is entirely true. At least, it’s overstated. The IA is better than you’re giving them credit for, although I would agree that they’re not quite ready for prime time in hottest areas. Nevertheless, our military’s own estimate of the time necessary to properly build an NCO core is about 5 years. The IA is progressing a little bit faster than that, from what I have read, but that still puts us out about 2 to 3 years from now (assuming that proper training only began couple of years ago). If so, I don’t think the counterinsurgency plan being implemented by Petraeus is as lacking as you might first think. And while you may dismiss the “locally, he has enough” argument, if the ultimate goal is to secure Baghdad to the point where the government can get some work done, that really isn’t wrong.

I’m always for cultures to become more secular. They seem to be more peaceful, don’t they? I’m mean, historically… right?
I am not sure I accept that at all, as a pretty darn secular guy. In fact, Somebody once labeled me the heathen of our little crew;^)

LOL.
Yeah, that was me. However, heathen does not necessarily translate to secular, does it? Unless, of course, you have some sort of scientific model to prove me wrong. Or is it just a “feeling” you have. Tell me, Lance, are you just pulling that out of your ass?
Or have you made some sort of analytical conclusion?

My guess is the latter.

So you’ll forgive me if I believe that the current number of troop deployments is by far inadequate
I share that fear,

Do you?
Seems to me, having read your previous comments about there actually being enough troops there already, that your fears are settled. But it’s good that you fear.

But before you say that, “Oh, I never said that.” Then why do you pose to me such questions with obvious patronize.

but for the sake of curiosity, since you posit it is based on reason and other such virtues, exactly what is that based on? What metrics are you using to so scientifically make such a pronouncement? Or is it just a “feeling.” Or, is it just the opinions of people who say it as well? Exactly what kind of controlled experiments have been done in this area which can establish exactly what is the right number of troops, or even if numbers of troops (ours I mean) is the most important variable? Is there a table in the back of some text I can read from so that I pass the next exam? Or is it all rules of thumb?

You can’t tell me that you’re not trying to patronize me. I won’t believe you. I know you too well.

But I would say, that your efforts are in vein. For your patronization only make yourself look foolish.
I mean, come on… as if the last four years weren’t some “controlled experiment” or the countless dead and wounded some kind of “metric”. How about your next “exam” consist of the lessons learned from the last four years? How about the “text book” you wish to learn from contain details of the tens of thousands – if not hundreds of thousands – of dead and wounded Iraqi civilians?

How about the “rule of thumb” being, “if you have hundreds of thousands dead and wounded, and you have tens of thousands more wishing you dead and gone, maybe you should have more security around to prevent such disaster.”

How’s that for your “Rule of Thumb”?

LOL… You’re going to patronize me??? HAHAHAHA!!!!

Like I’ve been sitting around with my rule-of thumb up my ass… listening to talking points from Harry Reid, The Daily Kos, Michael Moore… LOL.
Yeah… yeah.. like I haven’t been reading FOR YEARS NOW QandO and other sites like yours to get a real good grasp on the “metrics” of what is needed in Iraq. Like I haven’t been paying attention to the “controlled experiment” just about every day for the last four years.

You know, you can take that patronizing bullsh*t down to whatever hippie coffee shop you like to visit for your nonfat-grande-latte-enema so that you can gaze about berating to all of the sheep readers of the NYT as so you can feel superior.

‘Cause it doesn’t wash here, my friend.

The last four years of this “controlled experiment” has proven beyond a shadow of a doubt, that this disastrous plan that you and your ilk backed was ill conceived from the start and the trust you placed in the government officials that you would otherwise dismiss on any other normal “libertarian” argument to be incompetent, provided less troops than were necessary to provide security and stability for a new government.

Yet, I’m the one that must come up with some kind of “metric” and “controlled experiment” to determine what is needed for security in Iraq.

Laughable.

I’m always for cultures to become more secular. They seem to be more peaceful, don’t they? I’m mean, historically… right?

I am not sure I accept that at all, as a pretty darn secular guy. In fact, Somebody once labeled me the heathen of our little crew;^)

Of course maybe the I’m mean part wasn’t a typo, whereupon many might agree with you. The point isn’t whether they are more secular as believers, but more secular in how they view the desirable government. The sins of the officially secular don’t demonstrate to me that they are more reasonable or peaceful at all.

So you’ll forgive me if I believe that the current number of troop deployments is by far inadequate

I share that fear, though of course we could choose to do something about that, but for the sake of curiosity, since you posit it is based on reason and other such virtues, exactly what is that based on? What metrics are you using to so scientifically make such a pronouncement? Or is it just a “feeling.” Or, is it just the opinions of people who say it as well? Exactly what kind of controlled experiments have been done in this area which can establish exactly what is the right number of troops, or even if numbers of troops (ours I mean) is the most important variable? Is there a table in the back of some text I can read from so that I pass the next exam? Or is it all rules of thumb?

You may be right Pogue, but let us not pretend it is all about some mechanistic calculation based on reason and probability.

Again, it’s not earth-shattering, nor a reason to shout from the rooftops. But it is a good sign.

Man… Talk about putting out the fire.

DAMMIT!!!

Curses on you for being so damned reasonable. F*cker.

I was soooo in the mood.

But anyhoo…
Haven’t we heard this before?
Like in 2003 just as the war started.

“There’s been a certain amount of pop sociology in America … that the Shia can’t get along with the Sunni and the Shia in Iraq just want to establish some kind of Islamic fundamentalist regime. There’s almost no evidence of that at all. Iraq’s always been very secular.”

Yeah, three guesses as to who said that. No points if you already know.

But whatever, I’m all for it. I’m always for cultures to become more secular. They seem to be more peaceful, don’t they? I’m mean, historically… right?

A lot of you like to compare this conflict to the second world war, some like to compare it to Vietnam, I reckon it’s more comparable to the conflict in Ulster.
And the conflict in Ulster has diminished over the last few years, not because of any reconciliation between Catholics and Protestants, but because the troubled region has become more secular. And the primary reason the region has become more secular, has little to do with anything any outside forces have done, but more to do with internal and global market forces. In short, the region has stabilized due to economic prosperity for all who dwell.

And economic prosperity breeds secularism. Which is a good thing.
The prosperous have little reason to turn to their respective deities and to those who peddle products from deities. Namely hatred and fear, which as all of you should know, is the bread and butter for those who market the supernatural.

And for Iraq to become more secular, Iraq needs to become prosperous. And to become more prosperous, Iraq needs the security to provide uninterrupted free trade. And to provide that security, Iraq needs more security forces. And that is what is lacking.
So you’ll forgive me if I believe that the current number of troop deployments is by far inadequate to provide an environment for uninterrupted free trade, thereby not providing an environment for secularism to grow.

But at least there are those holding the faith, that hatred and fear will wither exponentially. Allowing for an environment for secularism, prosperity, and peace.
But then, there are those holding faith for the second coming of some deity. I guess that’s why they call it faith.

I lack such faith.
I rely more on reason, accountability, and probability. Which is probably why I lacked faith for this expedition from the start. Get back to me when reason, accountability, and probability point to more than just faith.

But no fault to you, Michael. You have characteristics susceptible to faith. I do not. Perhaps that is a fault of mine, not of yours.

But you keep crossing your fingers.

I, uncontrollably, will keep referring it to as the aptly named…

HT: Hot Air

Cheers.

To make my beliefs more clear, since I can’t decide what you are referring to, my real issue is usually with poorly worded questions, and what the typical interpretation of them shows. For example, in this case we might surmise as survey question responses have developed, with an appropriate amount of humility, that the polls reflect the situation on the ground.

When security is poor Iraqi’s flee to what they see as the forces most likely to represent them. The State was seen as not existing in any reliable form to protect them. Sectarian and ethnic identity gave them a sense of belonging to a group which might. However, when security improves the state seems more a potential source of stability. One also might surmise that the alternatives seem a lot less attractive given the chaos and violence they unleashed.

Another possible conclusion is that in fact Iraqis true desires are to see themselves that way. If the state is seen as offering even a reasonable option they would rather the government were Iraqi, not Shiite, Sunni, or ethnically oriented. That is really good news, but obviously, and for obvious reasons, potentially fragile. Much like support for the war here at home, the reasons for the answers are rarely adequately explored, and only their shifting patterns can give us some insight into why people give the answers they do. I often read surveys and find the choices I am given for answers always distort or could give the wrong impression about what I really mean. I often debate with myself how I would answer as the closest answer could give people ammunition that runs counter to my beliefs. For example, last Summer had I been asked to give my opinion on the invasion, good or bad idea, I would have really struggled with the answer. The reasons I might have said a bad idea in the media were radically different than the reasons I might have said so, and would have very different political implications. The same on the question of withdrawal. Most policy questions in polls make me feel the same way. I can’t see why it is any different with Iraqis.

But I thought earlier polls about disillusionment and growing opposition didn’t really mean anything? But they do now, because they’re good?

I’m sorry. I don’t recall ever thinking that, much less saying or writing it. More importantly, this poll doesn’t have anything to do with disillusionment or growing opposition. For all we know, every Iraqi surveyed is a depressed, disaffected America-hater.