Cross-posted at The Conjecturer.
The Pentagon
- I’ve reread Lt. Col. Yingling’s essay on the failures of the generalship several times at this point. This morning, while I was pondering the flag announcements, which are the lists of people being submitted to have stars attached to their rank (i.e. generals and admirals), it hit me: we have more flag officers now than we did during World War II. That kind of top-heavy bureaucracy has to have a negative effect on overall effectiveness, no matter the supposed caliber of these administrators-come-leaders.
- Meanwhile, notice the White House scaling back talk of progress in Iraq? But I thought Anbar was coming along nicely? Buried in that story, too, is the realization (that should have been obvious) that troops will have to stay a lot longer than anyone has been willing to say.
- Inside the Air Force has a silly story about the Air Force trying to use a “show of force†strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan, as if flying combat aircraft within range of RPGs and other short range anti-aircraft weaponry will disincentivize the fighters. This is especially foolish in Afghanistan, which has demonstrated for several decades that aircraft don’t scare the mujahideen.
- They also report that Air Force Chief of Staff Michael Moseley says the key to dealing with China’s ASAT weapons is… “situational awareness.†Was situational awareness not a distinguishing feature of the Air Force’s Network-Centric and “Transformational†philosophy over the past decade?
- Oh, and remember how I’ve been railing against the F-22 as a pathetic waste of time and money (see here and here)? Well, it seems the plane is little more than a deeply unfunny joke. And don’t think we could ever recoup some of the $20 billion we wasted on it, either, as it is simply not for sale even to our closest allies. Waste, waste, waste, fighting a war that hasn’t been on the horizon for sixteen years.
Around the World
- Oooh, NATO launched an offensive against the Taliban! What, after only six months? Maybe the Brits can do better than the American raid that whoops killed six civilians, including a woman and a teenager. These things, along with the brainless poppy eradication campaign, don’t help us distinguish ourselves from the Taliban, which are still easy to kill, if not easy to uproot.
- AFRICOM is going to secure Africa, except probably Somalia and Darfur. Those would be hard to fix.
- 500,000 march on Istanbul, demanding a secular society, as fears rise of a yet another Army intervention in Turkey’s political process.
- Continued protests over a Soviet memorial, in Estonia.
- A look at the North Korean Air Force, courtesy Google Earth.
- Kyrgyzstan will not able to vote for the daughter of its deposed President. Scandalous!
- Oh, and reform is stillborn in Turkmenistan, much to no one’s surprise (but much to my disappointment). I lay part of the blame on George W. Bush, who has resolutely ignored our long-term strategic interests in the Caspian basin.
- Yet another U.S. oil bribe conviction over Kazakhstan. Baker-Hughes paid $4 million in bribes to develop the massive Karachaganak natural gas field in the North Caspian. It is still small potatoes compared to the reported $78 million James Giffen paid out to Kazakh officials on behalf of several oil companies in the early 2000’s. The moral outrage here shouldn’t really stem from the bribery, which is, to be honest, SOP in much of the developing world. It is really how our courts, which handle these convictions, expect American companies to operate overseas when they can’t grease the gears. It’s not a moral judgment (bribery and corruption are clearly bad things, and if they can be eliminated, Paul Wolfowitz, they should), but a business one—American companies will not be able to compete if they can’t play on the same playing field.
Back at Home
- We are either in a war, or we are not in a war. In a war, failures have consequences. Our own military’s refusal to take its leaders to task for inexcusable failure (Abu Ghraib, among many others) tells me they don’t really think we’re in a war. Same with Congress, which not only refuses to declare war anymore (as should be necessary before sending our troops into battle), but refuses to behave as if it is a war. In other words, I guess, despite all the rhetoric, we’re not really in a war, then? Put another way, our entire leadership, not just the generals I carp about above, are at fault for the current mess.
- And the “War Czarâ€â€¦ talk about leadership failure. If NSA Steve Hadley can’t handle the wars his President started, then perhaps, rather than appointing yet another layer of bureaucracy to sit between him and the President (perhaps as a buffer or scapegoat?) he could try recommending we redeploy to better support the wars. Understaffing is the theme of war fighting with the Bush administration—assuming our fancy network-centric forces, which were designed post-Cold War to fight an advanced enemy that doesn’t exist anywhere on the globe, can jump into messy guerilla urban combat in a culture they never studied with 1/5 the number of troops their own generals say we need. From the top down, it is a fundamental failure of leadership.
- A major blow for abstinence (lol!): Randall Tobias, head of Bush’s foreign aid programs and a staunch and vocal proponent of abstinence-only AIDS education abroad, has been caught cavorting with a bunch of whores. Kind of like Dick Morris, or anyone else who takes extremist views on sex as a cover for his own sexual mismanagement. Funny how they seem to be dropping like flies lately.
Not me! I have always felt they would likely be there a while. Of course Rummy didn’t agree, and his views counted more than mine.
But is that good news or bad news? I already voted for it as a welcome relief!.
I do think you and glasnost should duke it out over whether it means we need to stay longer if we want the progress to continue or if it means we can leave Anbar now because it will get better if we do. I’ll jump in and play Devils advocate just for fun. No fair copping out and saying it doesn’t matter and we should leave anyway.
Hah! For all I know, he needed the sex. That doesn’t make it okay, since the cornerstone of the man’s political career was a puritanical attitude toward sex. Let’s just hope he at least had the foresight to wear a rubber.
All good points, however the Pentagon has known since WW2 (and certainly since Vietnam) that our tooth to tail ratio (except for the Marine Corps) was atrocious as was the fact that we have far too many Chiefs and not enough Indians (again, except for the Marine Corps). The Air Force is the worst offender here, but the Navy and Army certainly contribute. An Air Force base or Army Post commanded by a Major General, for example, would probably be commanded by a Colonel or Lt. Colonel if it were a Marine facility. Also, Yingling was beaten to the punch by about 85 years regarding failures of generalship.
Correction, Fuller’s essay dates from the late 20′s/early 30′s, giving him only a 75 year head start on Yingling.
I might also mention the trenchant critiques of Liddell Hart (One of my favorites. My mother gave me a membership in the military history book club when I was 8. His history of the Second World War was my first selection, and the first true work of historical scholarship to read.) Of course his own career was a good example of being ignored because he didn’t fit in with the mainstream. His work on armored and mechanized warfare was for the most part ignored by his countrymen. Unfortunately it was studied quite closely by Guderian and other German theorists. The British were out generaled by one of their owns theories.
Just because he was saying nothing new doesn’t mean it doesn’t need saying. Moreso, that an active duty officer is saying this, and that it will almost certainly impact his career, I think speaks to his bravery.
Seriously, people will actually listen to what an el-tee says about the military. When a 25-year old homosexual goes off about it, no one cares. Yingling has a chance of maybe waking someone up.
Are you referring to Yingling? He was an “el-tee” a few decades ago. He is currently a Lieutenant Colonel.
I don’t disagree, however my question is if the brass have not learned these lessons after 75+years, 5 wars (incl. the current one) and several changes of administration, what makes Colonel Yingling or anyone else think that they will now? I admire his bravery, but it seems like he is on a suicide mission. Perhaps he was already aware of that and was simply intent on falling on his sword to prove a point. I don’t know. I wish the best for him, though as he seems to be a talented, forward thinking officer.
One of Fuller’s best students and a man that our own General Patton loved to disagree with.
I didn’t think Omar was denigrating Yingling by mentioning Fuller.
I think the real point (which I see Omar has just made, if more pessimistically) is one I have been making for a while in our discussions of the military. It has always been thus. I think Omar may be being too pessimistic, in that usually during a war this changes. In fact I think it is as the conflict pushes new ideas to the fore.
The essay caught my attention (and McQ’s.) I am glad he is doing it, and I think it is brave (though I disagree with some of it) but I have a theory I haven’t heard explicitly stated, though that doesn’t mean it hasn’t. I don’t think Yingling is starting something, I think he is setting the stage. I have heard now for several years rumblings from the officer corp, and I don’t mean the “general’s who have gotten so much attention. Prominent amongst these guys, even if behind the scenes, have been Petraeus, McMaster and others who have been working to get the army to make room for their ideas and promote those who embody them.
The article was probably written well before Petraeus’ ascension, but even if it wasn’t, I think it it is part of that ongoing effort. Remember, he is part of the Petraeus, McMaster cadre of officers. My guess is they knew of and reviewed it ahead of time. I don’t mean it is a conspiratorial coup, but like minded officers are getting power and laying the groundwork for how things should change, both intellectually and in terms of how the military is run. That is my impression.
Lance – I can only hope so.
Well, let us throw in some caveats. If the changes these guys would like to see made occur, it will be incremental.
There is also a downside. The ascension of officers raised on the tactics and strategies of WWII who forced out during the conflict many of the holdovers and deadwood of pre-war years, became part of the problem in later years. Things evolved, many of them did not. As much as I am a fan of the kinds of things Petraeus and his guys are doing, if they achieve prominence institutionally, as opposed to just in theater, I see no reason to suspect they will not become the new orthodoxy. They won’t see it that way, that is just human nature and institutional behavior at work.
Pollyannaish attitudes lead to disappointment and eventually bitterness, which can cloud judgment as well. Expect little and hope to be pleasantly surprised is my motto.
Omar,
True, but that is high praise. Patton was pretty contemptuous of most others, the people he took the time to actually disagree with (which was pretty much everybody) were a select group. The contemporary thinkers Patton actually studied with the intent of copying and expanding on were a pretty distinguished group in my estimation; Hart, Guderian and Rommel being the most important in my mind, though probably not his.