Galula, Anbar and Counterinsurgency from the eyes of a Marine

Andrew Sullivan received an e-mail from a Marine in Anbar which gives more depth to the NY Times report from Anbar. I am posting the whole thing. Notice for those who tried to follow our little spat about COIN in this posts comments, the Marine makes the point that COIN techniques have been successful in the past when used, most famously in Vietnam and Algeria. The basics having been laid out by David Galula. So let us first look at Galula and then at the report from our marine, which is very well written and thoughtful.

Here is a piece written by Galula on why he was successful, why his success was not achieved earlier and the laws of counter insurgency warfare:

The first law. The objective is the population. The population is at the same time the real terrain of the war. Destruction of the rebel forces and occupation of the geographic terrain led us nowhere as long as we did not control and get the support of the population.

The second law. The support from the population is not spontaneous and in any case must be organized. It can be obtained only through the efforts of the minority among the population that favors the counterinsurgent.

The third law. This minority will emerge, and will be followed by the majority, only if the counterinsurgent is seen as the ultimate victor. If his leadership is irresolute and incompetent, he will never find a significant number of supporters.

The fourth law. Seldom is the material superiority of the counterinsurgent so great that he can literally saturate the entire territory. The means required to destroy or expel the main guerrilla forces, to control the population, and to win its support are such that, in most cases, the counterinsurgent will be obliged to concentrate his efforts area by area.
Destruction of the rebel forces and occupation of the geographic terrain led us nowhere as long as we did not control and get the support of the population.

As the war lasts, the war itself becomes the central issue, and the ideological advantage of the insurgent decreases considerably. The population’s attitude is dictated not by the intrinsic merits of the contending causes, but by the answer to these two simple questions: Which side is going to win? Which side threatens the most, and which offers the most protection?

What I achieved in the Djebel Aissa Mimoun was not due to magic and could have been applied much earlier throughout Algeria. I am not writing all this to show what a genius I was, but to point out how difficult it is to convince people, especially the military, to change traditional ways and adapt themselves to new conditions.

I also suggest this piece for an overview of how some see it as applying to Iraq:

Indeed, the 1957 battle for Algiers marked a crucial turning point in the fight against the FLN. By 1959, Galula’ principles had been extended across Algeria. Some 600 “specialized administrative sections” were set up, each headed by army officers to oversee civil as well as military affairs. The new structure finally allowed the French army to use effectively its superior numbers (including 150,000 loyal native troops, more than a third of the total) and conventional military hardware. Helping to put the guerrillas on the defensive were such tactics as the division of troops into “static” and “mobile” units to deal with terrorist outbreaks; the use of helicopters for counterinsurgency operations; and construction of a 200-mile, eight-foot-high electric fence (the so-called Morice Line), which shut down the FLN’s sources of support from neighboring Tunisia. By January 1960, the war that many had considered lost three years earlier was virtually won.

[...]

Thus, the key to success lay in bringing to the surface the portion of the populace that hated the guerrillas, and then turning that minority into a majority by a combination of political, social, and cultural initiatives. But of course that crucial portion, Galula wrote, “will not and cannot emerge as long as the threat [of insurgent retaliation] has not been lifted.” This was where military strategy came into play. Galula’s approach boiled down to three stages, each with its own lesson for Iraq today.

The first was concentration of force. Whereas terrorists were able to do much with little (witness, in today’s Iraq, the improvised explosive device or the lone suicide bomber), government forces could do but little with their much. Even after having expanded in number to 450,000 men “nearly one soldier for every 23 Algerians”French forces could not confront the elusive FLN everywhere. So Galula divided his own district into zones: “white,” where government control was complete or nearly complete; “pink,” where insurgents competed with the government for control; and “red,” where the insurgents were in complete control. A successful counterinsurgency involved turning pink zones into white zones, then red into pink, through a block-by-block, neighborhood-by-neighborhood struggle to force the terrorists into the shadows.

The second of Galula’s lessons was the need for a visible and continuous military presence, in order to build civil institutions of support and trust. In counterinsurgencies, the classic Clausewitzian dictum “that war is the continuation of politics by other means”turned in on itself. Through constant policing and patrolling, by running down insurgents and punishing them on, if possible, “the very spot” where they committed a terrorist attack or outrage, and above all by visibly supporting and rewarding allies, the military occupation would itself became a political weapon: outward and conspicuous proof that supporting the government translated into increased security, peace of mind, prosperity, and eventually social and political advance.

Toward this end, Galula’s third lesson was that the counterinsurgency must project a sense of inevitable victory. The local populace had to see the military and civilian authority as the ultimate winner. For that, native troops were essential. In counterinsurgency terms, they were more than just auxiliaries in the fight; they were also signposts of the future, of a secure post-insurgency order around which the local populace could rally.

[...]

As recently as two years ago, Galula’s book was virtually unknown in Pentagon circles. Today it has become the bible of American counterinsurgency thinkers like General Petraeus, whose field manual (known as FM 3-24) it largely informs. Its masterful approach to breaking, isolating, and then uprooting a terrorist insurgency is the core of our revised near-term strategy for Iraq, a strategy based, in Petraeus’s words, on the principle that “you’re not going to kill your way out of an insurgency.”

[...]

Critics have already charged that our recent successes in suppressing the militias in this area signify only a temporary respite. But Petraeus, like his predecessor Galula, understands that in counterinsurgency warfare, temporary respites are all there is. The goal is to make those respites last longer and longer, until eventually they become permanent. As he has said, “The idea is to end each day with fewer enemies than when it started.” Anything more ambitious leads to overreaching, disenchantment, and ultimately failure.

[...]

Will it work? That is not the crucial question. It has been done before, and it can be done again; at least, it can be done on the ground. The crucial question is whether the political will exists to see it through to the end. Here, too, the French experience in Algeria is instructive in a wholly negative way.

In under two years, as I have noted, the fight against the FLN insurgents in Algeria was all but won. But the war itself was lost. By late 1959, even as the army was scoring victory after victory, French President Charles de Gaulle had concluded that he had no choice but to offer Algeria “self-determination.” Within two years, the French had pulled out and the FLN’s leader, Ben Bela, was Algeria’s president.

Galuala’s book Pacification in Algeria can be purchased here or downloaded free in PDF format here (326 pages)

Here is the e-mail from our Marine who counsels patience. I am posting it in its entirety. There are no quick fixes:

I enjoyed your latest post on Al Anbar. As a US Marine having just returned from a 7 month deployment to Iraq that began in mid September 2006, I feel qualified to give my two cents worth of input after having worked in the Hadithah Triad area of Western Al Anbar.

The latest tribal coalition’s (Sawar Al Anbar, which Sheik Sattar heads) revolt against Al Qaeda Iraq’s (AQI) tactics and methods formally began in August/September of last year when a group called Thawar Al Anbar (TAA) formed with the stated goal of removing AQI from Sunni areas in the west. The group operated (and still operates) in a covert fashion, ironically utilizing the same type of informant networks and kidnapping/interrogation methods used by AQI to work against its enemies. The group was so successful in its indigenous campaign against AQI in the last three/four months of 2006 – particularly in Ramadi and other smaller towns to the north and west of the provincial capital – that AQI attempted to negotiate with TAA in December. TAA even enjoyed a working, proxy relationship with local Iraqi Police and Army units here and there as well.

What we saw happen as a consequence of TAA’s considerable success in killing and otherwise driving out AQI cells in portions of Al Anbar was the group’s supporters and other admirers in the tribal smorgasbord develop a political alliance in order to participate in the political process and and provide top cover for TAA. As you probably know, the government of Iraq and Coalition Forces are formally opposed to tribal militias of any sect, including those like TAA that have forsworn any actions against US forces while focusing efforts exclusively on ridding Al Anbar of AQI. TAA provides the political cover and legitimacy for what is really the most successful counter-insurgency bid in Iraq to date, the indigenous intelligence gathering against and targeting of AQI by TAA. This development is what we have hoped would happen in the last four years.

But speaking of counter-insurgency, much of the success in Al Anbar in the last 5-6 months has to do with the US Marine Corps’ back-to-basics counter-insurgency effort. In the Hadithah Triad for instance, 2nd Battalion 3rd Marines focused our efforts on limiting the insurgents’ freedom of movement which has long given the insurgent his center of gravity – freedom of action. We bermed the towns of Hadithah, Haqlaniyah, Bani Dahir, and Barwanah and stopped vehicle traffic. These simple actions, which the US military is well equipped to carry out with existing assets and skill sets, crippled the insurgency in our portion of the Western Euphrates river valley, forcing many Sunni insurgents and AQI affiliated groups to the periphery of our battlespace or else to other cities. Predictably, attacks plummeted in our area of operations as the insurgent, unable to move about freely and anonymously in his vehicles of choice – the ubiquitous four door sedan and/or Kia bongo pickup truck – could no longer transport men and material. These foundational COIN precepts have also been employed in other Anbari cities with varying degrees of success; we were able to do it all and reaped the most success. That is not to toot our horn but only to point out that where our Corps is able to focus enough assets and attention, this basic counter-insurgency plan of action can be carried out with relative ease. Without the basic conditions of security and stability enshrined in an area, you can not began to hope for locals to take the reins and began running their locality, much less an entire country.

The berm was a psychological victory over the insurgents and demonstration to the local Anbaris the USMC was committed to stabilizing “their” area. As the security situation improved and atmospherics improved, locals began to cooperate more and more with Marines and the fledgling Iraqi Police force. Just as important, the local police force grew in numbers and in rapport with the people. These Iraqi Police are far from professionals in many respects, but as they have teamed with Marines to stabilize the area and bring a sense of normalcy to the area, insurgents have fled, been killed or captured or otherwise laid down their arms. More than that, with a non-permissive environment in the Hadithah Triad, AQI chiefs watching from on high will not pour resources and fighters into an area where the chances of success are few and far between.

All of this is classic counter-insurgency, basic stuff learned from the British in Malay, the French in Algeria and Indochina, and the US military in Viet Nam; it should have been done a long time before my battalion’s arrival. Having had Marines conduct the essential “COIN” footwork in order to stabilize the area, local police and politicians are finally able to make headway in growing the local political system and tweaking the local economy while repairing both the social fabric and physical infrastructure that AQI had all but destroyed in many respects.

Frenchman David Galula’s 1964 book on counterinsurgency has it all right there in print for all to see. Up until now, we have, in my opinion, attempted to prosecute this war without first conducting the basic COIN work essential for meaningful local and provincial political progress to be attained. Thankfully, Gen Petraus seems to understand the fundamentals of COIN. It seems that General Petraus is finally able to push the US Army out of its massive firm bases and imposing and impersonal armored vehicles and on to the streets to conduct regular and frequent foot patrols to deny the enemy freedom of movement and build rapport with Iraqis. This approach has been working – somewhat under the media’s radar – for Marines and even a few Army units operating under Marine commands in Al Anbar, for the past 16-18 months; we are now seeing some real signs of progress.

The US Military’s role in Iraq, from my experience, should be as enforcers of counter-insurgency basics and nothing more. Restrict locals’ and insurgents’ freedom of movement, isolate the insurgent from the populace, restrict the insurgents’ access to material and munitions and, where we can, encourage and protect the development of local leaders in order to bring about the stability and security that enables local Iraqis, State Department types (to a lesser extent) and NGO experts to come in and operate to rebuild and repair and improve. From my experience, the military’s part of that equation is being accomplished in western Al Anbar.

I say it is at least three years before we can have fewer than 80,000 troops in Iraq. Unfortunately I don’t think that will happen, and the belief we may leave will make it even less likely we’ll be able to do it quicker. The people fighting with us now are in my prayers.

Tags: history, Iraq, War, David Galula, Anbar, Baghdad, COIN, Counterinsurgency