On one hand the construction and other infrastructure projects we have been funding are still struggling:
In a troubling sign for the American-financed rebuilding program in Iraq, inspectors for a federal oversight agency have found that in a sampling of eight projects that the United States had declared successes, seven were no longer operating as designed because of plumbing and electrical failures, lack of proper maintenance, apparent looting and expensive equipment that lay idle.
[...]
Exactly who is to blame for the poor record on sustainment for the first sample of eight projects was not laid out in the report, but the American reconstruction program has been repeatedly criticized for not including in its rebuilding budget enough of the costs for spare parts, training, stronger construction and other elements that would enable projects continue to function once they have been built.
The new reports provide some support for that position: a sophisticated system for distributing oxygen throughout the Erbil hospital had been ignored by medical staff members, who told inspectors that they distrusted the new equipment and had gone back to using tried-and-true oxygen tanks — which were stored unsafely throughout the building.
The Iraqis themselves appear to share responsibility for the latest problems, which cropped up after the United States turned the projects over to the Iraqi government. Still, the new findings show that the enormous American investment in the reconstruction program is at risk, Mr. Bowen said.
On the other hand the turnaround in Anbar continues to impress an seems to have roots that bode well for sustained success with continued effort:
Many Sunni tribal leaders, once openly hostile to the American presence, have formed a united front with American and Iraqi government forces against Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. With the tribal leaders’ encouragement, thousands of local residents have joined the police force. About 10,000 police officers are now in Anbar, up from several thousand a year ago. During the same period, the police force here in Ramadi, the provincial capital, has grown from fewer than 200 to about 4,500, American military officials say.
At the same time, American and Iraqi forces have been conducting sweeps of insurgent strongholds, particularly in and around Ramadi, leaving behind a network of police stations and military garrisons, a strategy that is also being used in Baghdad, Iraq’s capital, as part of its new security plan.
Captain Ed wraps it up for me:
The question will be whether they stick with that in the face of an imminent American withdrawal. It has taken four years for Anbar to understand that Sunni domination in Iraq has ended and will not return, neither in the guise of Saddam Hussein nor in a military junta ruled by Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, the chief Ba’athist dead-ender. Now that they have finally pulled together with the US to oppose the increasingly lunatic al-Qaeda terrorists, we have lost the will to fight the insurgents ourselves — or at least Congress has.
Government buildings and hotels are being rebuilt in Ramadi. Even the New York Times reports that violence has swiftly fallen in the region. Last summer, Ramadi had 25 terrorist attacks a day, and now it has dropped to four — still too many, but with the expanded police force holding territory for the first time since the liberation, the momentum has clearly shifted. American troops have turned to civil-affairs work, trying to kick-start the rebuilding effort that will secure some semblance of peace among the Sunnis.
The growing security forces rely on the Americans to assist them in getting the terrorists that everyone wants driven out of Iraq. Without us, they would have to sue for terms with the AQI lunatics that would have them divided and fighting amongst themselves. If we leave now, we will destroy all of the work we have done to reach this point — when even the Times acknowledges that we have finally begun to set the stage for success in Anbar and elsewhere in Iraq.
Others blogging:
Canticle For Leibowitz
Blog-o-Fascists
Dan Riehl
Update: It is Monday Morning and I see others have picked up on the Times positive coverage in Anbar:
Instapundit
Tom Maguire, who says something I agree with:
The Democrats own defeat in Iraq, and are simply maneuvering politically with hopes of forcing Bush to declare it before John Hillary Obama takes over.
And the Republicans own what? Quagmire? Hope? Victory?
Both parties are making a twenty-year bet somewhat reminiscent of McGovern 1972, and at least one party is going to lose.
Huh? So apparently there’s some new ‘plan’ going on in Baghdad that is similar to what’s being done in Ramadi. That’s nice, but surely not important – because one has to wade through six commas to get to a sub-sub-sub-ordinate clause at the tail end of the mother of all mangled sentences to find out about it.
I suspect what we’re seeing here is the leading edge of the Democratic strategy to dodge being tarred as treasonous cowards come 2008. Should the surge ultimately work, the spin will be something along the lines of “We’ve said all along there was no military solution to the problem. The Iraqis worked together to solve their problems on their own. The so-called ‘surge’ had nothing to do with it, and probably prolonged the conflict. If we’d pulled out years ago as we Democrats wanted to, things would be even better. Vote Hillary in November!
In a bit of well deserved blogger triumphalism Mind In Qatar asks, “What took so long?”:
That quote almost looks like it could have come from the NYT story…..except for the fact that it was written in December of 2006. In fact, Roggio has been reporting on these developments since March of 2006.
I know, it is easy to bash the NYT for taking several months to put 2,500 words to paper. But the point here should be the triumph of the new media over the old. While we should give reporter Kirk Semple kudos for actually traveling to Anbar to get the story, several bloggers have been on the ground consistently over the last year, and producing major stories to rival the quality of the NYT.
Which reminds me. I don’t know how many times over the past year I have heard Michael Fumento’s, Bill Roggio’s and others reporting denigrated. The primary evidence was that their positive (as in noting progress, the stories they told were harrowing and disturbing quite often) coverage showed they were not to be trusted. It wasn’t that the critics knew they were wrong (they weren’t there) it was the reporting didn’t fit their narrative. I guess we can now see that skepticism wasn’t true. Both bloggers gave the good and the bad, along with their opinion. It has been too often that only the bad is told, and as long as the war was deemed unsuccessful, that was claimed to justify it. It never did. It may mean most people, most voters, are missing major developments.
Just to irk those who act as if this talk doesn’t matter, and that to point out the cost as well the perceived benefit of their opposition is illegitimate, I give you that right wing shill from the New York Times (via Rand Simberg) John Burns:
Moments later, Matt Lauer asked Burns: “By its very nature a surge is a temporary dynamic. What is the biggest factor in your opinion as to whether they can have success in the near term and the longer term?”
NYT BAGHDAD BUREAU CHIEF JOHN BURNS: Well, the number of troops, that’s finite. The amount of time they can stay, we think that’s probably finite, too. And the calculations of the insurgents, who, as one military officer said to me, will always trade territory for time. That’s to say, they will move out, they will wait. Because they know the political dynamic in the United States is moving in a direction that is probably going to be favorable to them.
And to rub salt in the wound I give them Engram at Back Talk’s discussion of how the behavior of war opponents, especially the Democratic Congress fits al Qaeda’s plan.
Abu Aardvark notes the provisional nature of the success in Iraq.
Bruno and the Professor say “we’ve seen this before.”
Orinn Judd notes that the LA Times has noticed as well.
Finally Andrew Sullivan:
The encouraging news from Anbar, where al Qaeda has out-stayed its welcome among the local tribes, does not undermine this fact. What Anbar shows is that relative peace and stability will come only when Iraqis themselves, for reasons of their own, defend their own country from al Qaeda’s poison.
My only response to that is, who doesn’t agree with that? More importantly the rest of his case is not improved (nor hurt) by noting that, despite what Andrew thinks.
[tags] Anbar, Iraq, New York Times, reconstruction, Ramadi, war [/tags]
Why should anybody be surprised? This is “Government work†the worst form of management dreamed of by man. Let the Government run things and they unvariably cost more and take longer to be competed that originally estimated. The situation in Iraq is indeed a tragedy, people need these project functions, but you could say the same about the “Big Dig†in Boston. It’s been going on since 1985 and its cost has ballooned from a projected 2.8 Billion dollars to more than 14-Billion and still climbing, and not a terrorist in sight.
True, but our government needs to get a better handle on things than they do in Iraq. I have no doubt the fraud, waste and other issues will be very large, but we still need to do better than we do. I am not happy about the Big Dig either.
If the Sunnis are fighting Al-Quieda in Mesopotamia for their own reasons, as the article and the experts (Lynch) makes clear, and the Sunni population is on their side, as some people alledge, then there’s no reason to believe that a lack of U.S. occupation in Anbar will wash that away: in fact, it will deprive Al-Queida of their last compelling narrative for support and multiply the social pressure for them to dry up and go to ground.
Meanwhile, if we continue to stay and show no signs of leaving, like other, prior fissures between Al-Queida in Iraq and the insurgency, this one will heal. Someone from inside the semi-cooperative former insurgents will blow up some U.S. troops, and someone inside command will suggest a “strong response”, and we’ll be back to square one.
What Mark Lynch is warning against is precisely the happy-face idea that the Baathists prioritizing Al-Quieda over the U.S., for now, somehow has made a long-term U.S. presence in Anbar politically acceptable or militarily unprovocative.
You’ve missed the point. These developments in Anbar are a godsend opportunity to exit with some degree of grace – in this area. Miss it, and the other shoe will drop.
Arguable, but I think incorrect. If correct however, then withdrawal from Anbar now makes sense and we should replicate it elsewhere. No withdrawal nationally or in Baghdad.
Of course, when we have had this kind of success previously it was after we left that the insurgents picked up strength, contra your thesis. Obviously at some point your point is valid. I say it isn’t time yet.
This is analogous to having an infection and taking antibiotics to cure it. As soon as you start feeling better you stop before completing the treatment. The infection may not reoccur but the bacteria have mutated to ward off the antibiotic. The next time, and there will be a next time, they come back stronger than ever, immune to the treatment that would have destroyed them if continued for the full course.
In spirit of James’ analogy…
Iraq: I’m not dead!
Bush: What?
Democrats: Nothing. Here’s your ninepence.
Iraq: I’m not dead!
Bush: ‘Ere, he says he’s not dead.
Democrats: Yes he is.
Iraq: I’m not!
Bush: He isn’t.
Democrats: Well, he will be soon, he’s very ill.
Iraq: I’m getting better!
Democrats: No you’re not, you’ll be stone dead in a moment.
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Okay Chris. I don’t care where you stand, that was funny. Can someone find that bit on youtube and edit it?
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When we have had this kind of success previously it was after we left that the insurgents picked up strength, contra your thesis.
Well, sectarian fighting picked up strength. But we didn’t really leave. We just changed from one kind of tactic to another kind of tactic. There’s never been a withdrawal from Anbar.
“The insurgents picked up strength” in the sense of an accelerating war between Shiite and Sunni gangs. I’m not sure anyone designated that Al-Quieda, specifically, picked up strength.
On the other hand, it’s possible that our withdrawal now could lead to, instead of an accelerated war between Al-Queida and the Baathists, instead an accelerated war between Sunnis and Shiites.
If correct however, then withdrawal from Anbar now makes sense and we should replicate it elsewhere. No withdrawal nationally or in Baghdad.
Or, I suppose, if we’re merely theorizing, we should finish the soft division of the country, hand over the Shiite side, and swamp the Sunni side, after cutting a deal with all the regional Sunni dictatorships – a deal we’ve effectively cut anyway, minus Syria.
The insurgency is at its worst in mixed areas, where the sectarianism gives everyone something to blame America for and where taking on your own extremists always takes second place.
Actually that is a good point, I was sloppy. It has been true that in Tal Afar and other places the insurgents gathered strength once we ceased following the tactics were successful, and I think it would be true in Anbar specifically, but I also worry about sectarian violence as well.
Oh, and I should mention something that will not change your mind, but the Sheiks themselves don’t believe we should leave. Also, Anbar was broadly considered lost by all but people such as myself. I don’t claim to have predicted the change, but I did predict that no matter how bad it looked, and at the time it was the absolute worst place to make such a prediction, that it was possible.
Three lessons regardless of what we do next.
1. If you haven’t been defeated you haven’t lost. Sounds trite, but histproy says that is true. Even in Anbar we were never close to being defeated.
2. If you are not there when the opportunity presents itself you can’t take advantage of it. Old theme with me I know, but it is one of the more consistent lessons in military history. Often you are keeping pressure and presence until an opportunity, usually impossible to predict, makes its appearance.
3. No matter what it looks like on the surface, often a lot is going on that if pressure is being kept up that will make the change seem to suddenly appear. In fact the key events may have been much earlier but it takes a while for what is haapening to become visible or recognized
All of this could reverse, but for now the tribes say we are needed no matter how much they also say they wish we were gone.
Here is an idea for US phased withdrawl that I haven’t heard kicked around yet:
Partner with majority Muslim nations to import their troops into Iraq as ours back down. Crazy. Yes. Radical. Absolutely. Scraping the bottom of the idea barrel. Possibly.
Think about it, though. Say we ask Jordan, Pakistan, Turkey and maybe Indonesia or Malaysia or heck, Egypt or the -istan (Uzebk, Tajik, etc.) nations to send fairly large contingents to Iraq to help pick up where we left off (thinking maybe 5-10,000 for Jordan, 10-15,000 for the others). They have some direct motivation (with the exception of Indonesia and Malaysia, Iraq is pretty much their backyard). If the US supplies logistic support and pays for the whole process, they certainly have no financial reasons to object. Their troops will most likely not face the same kinds of threats that ours do because these are Muslims operating in a Muslim country (granted all of the above nations are Sunni, but still). We remove the onus of being a “Crusader” army. US troops get to come home. Iraq is now being helped by its own neighbors (not neighbors who simply want it to become a new province [Syria, Iran and Saudi]). I’m just thinking out loud here, but do you really think that Iran or Saudi would risk war with these nations (or the public image hit they would take) by attacking their troops? Who cares if they kill Americans (seriously)? 1.2 billion people care if they kill Muslim troops. Plus we remove the supposed religious motivation of some of the insurgents and terrorists; they are no longer killing the Great Satan’s “Crusaders.” Finally, this will help the world community take ownership of Iraq and have a real commitment to its success as a democratic nation. One of the biggest complaints (rightly) prior to the war was that the US did not have adequate backing from the international community (yeah, Britain and a few other European nations sent mid-size contingents, but the other 30something nations that supported us sent like 6 guys). If we could somehow enact this new plan, we would have solid evidence of support from the international community. I daresay that this would also help any further UN resolutions dealing with Iran (more pro-US/Iraq votes).
I don’t know. I’m really just spitballing here, but hey no one else has come up with anything new in awhile (other than the “Surge” which is really nothing new and not a sustainable effort anyway). What do you guys think?