My impression is that all the founders were what we now call ‘realists’ in foreign affairs. Their version of realism was informed by classical liberalism, particularly regarding trade policy, but they were realists nonetheless.”

David,

Thanks for the comment and I think you have some good points. First, when I say wanted, I mean that in the sense that it was a desire, not that they were committed to it whatever the cost or unrealistic. Of course one of my points is that realism being interpreted as somewhat isolationist was necessary and wise given the circumstances of the time. The moral impulse to be involved on the side of those seeking what Jefferson considered to be liberty was certainly strong. I could provide documentation, but I don’t think it obviates my point. If you would like more than this response let me know. I’ll get something up later tonight.

I have little fundamental disagreement with you except to say that while Jefferson was realistic in the sense of seeing the alliance with France as being useful, his reasons did not stop there. He did feel that being on the side of liberty was important.

I certainly wouldn’t characterize Jefferson’s behavior as president as “Wilsonian” as that term has come to be used. It was quite canny and shrewd in many ways. I should also note that many supporters were disappointed in his pragmatism and use of federal authority, so his actual policy stands and actions in an official capacity were often divergent from his rhetoric when acting as a political candidate or behind the scenes manipulator (which he was masterful at being.)

I would also add that the term realist is quite malleable. I consider, and am arguing in this post, that this speech and the philosophy espoused was not based on the kind of libertarian isolationism that in common usage it has come to represent for many people. It was a realist document, but that in different circumstances Washington and, possibly more importantly, Hamilton might have viewed the best policy differently.

My impression is that all the founders were what we now call ‘realists’ in foreign affairs. Their version of realism was informed by classical liberalism, particularly regarding trade policy, but they were realists nonetheless.

The Federalist/Republican division on foreign affairs predated the French Revolution. I think it rested mainly on a difference opinion about Britain rather than France, at least for Jefferson.

Both sides agreed that we now call ‘normalizing relations’ with Britain would be in the interests of both countries. The Federalists thought the British saw that also, but Jefferson was convinced that the British ruling classes still resented American independence and were jealous of any American success. He thought the British would act against American interests even in despite of their own.

For both sides, the attitude toward France followed as a matter of realpolitik from the attitude toward Britain. The Republicans wanted to hold fast to the French alliance as a counterweight to Britain, while the Federalists wanted to cool off the French alliance as an essential part of normalizing relations with Britain.

Jefferson’ enthusiasm for the French revolution didn’nt last all that long. Like many others he became disillusioned with its antidemocratic turn. But his support for alliance with France predated the revolution and outlasted his sympathy for it, because it was based on realpolitik and suspicion of Britain, not ideological sympathy.

While Jefferson was president, most of the Spanish American colonies declared independence. Jefferson put off recognizing them so as not to upset his negotiations with the Spanish over buying the Floridas. He put national interest ahead of any Wilsonian crusading.

It is great to see you here. I appreciate the sentiments. I rarely see you comment except to counter an argument;) I hope I see that in the future, but it is always nice to see common ground acknowledged as well, especially on my first day up.

I’ll say that I agree with your sentiments on the line we walk. I struggle with that whenever it comes to foreign policy. I see no easy way to see where the line is, or if sometimes the outside worlds suffering eliminates all such concerns about our own welfare.

I would suggest that in those cases the deciding line might be that we can’t positively impact the world as much as we might want to, and therefore some idealized outcome is not what we should use to evaluate a policies appropriateness. We should probably imagine that the best outcome will be limited in scope and calculate the costs and benefits accordingly. If better things come we can be thankful.

I also think that if our leaders policies were judged with such modesty they and we would be better off. Their decisions, and ours, would be better absent the unreal expectations we place on them and any policies likely outcome.

Well stated. In fact, I thought your whole last paragraph was worded beautifully. When we find ourselves in a pickle, is when actions implemented by our government to bring liberty to our fellow men outside our nation’s boundaries begin to infringe upon the economic and personal liberties of our fellow men inside our nation’s boundaries. It’s a tough line to walk upon and that is why most traditional libertarians that I know look at those actions with extreme caution.

Many will no doubt argue that concern for our fellow men does not start at our nations boundaries, and also does not stop at our fellow men’s pocketbooks.

Cheers.
And I look forward to many posts from A Second Hand Conjecture.