I’d say something about petty name calling, but I think Lance, you’ve lost that high ground to the pile of socks.

Having Instaputz ready to jump on it, too, would be nice.

I am sure he will Mona, and it will display all the fair minded analytical skills of you and his sock puppet master I am sure.

On the other side is Hizballah and Hamas – where in both cases it can be argued that their taking of power through democratic means has so far further democractized their respective internal systems.

Yet bloody terrorists they remain. Hizballah cells in the US behave almost as organized crime.

Since it is unlikely that Hizballah or Hamas would have got far without resorting to some level of democracy, it appears that they are using democracy simply to achieve their ends. Perhaps their use of democracy makes them become more inherently democratic, but it appears that we are too early on this vector to determine where it is pointing, except to say that they are violent terrorists.

I will say I agree to a large extent, and I also think that Iran’s rather odd structure lends some support to what Ledeen is arguing for as well.

By the way, I didn’t respond to your remarks on Ledeen’s sources. I think what you say is true, but only to the extent that any attempt to utilize sources in or out of such a state is going to be an iffy deal. Even reliable sources will often be wrong or interpret events incorrectly. We have all seen the movie Roshomon.

I have never read anyone who has been any more accurate than he in reporting or predicting events in Iran. They all routinely get things wrong or interpret the evidence they get in ways that turn out to be misleading. That is the nature of such things.

Magna Carta, 1215.
Bill of Rights establishing authority of Parliment over the crown, 1689.

Where in that 475 year period are the Islamists, assuming equal liberty? And how quickly can they go the rest of the way?

It’s hard to see because it’s not clear-cut. There are for and against examples. But in a literally universally authoritarian region, for and against examples – a mixed record – is progress.

What is the mixed record? On one side, the Taliban, which won power in a way, and Sudan, which took power in a coup.

On the other side is Hizballah and Hamas – where in both cases it can be argued that their taking of power through democratic means has so far further democractized their respective internal systems.

Iran is squarely in the middle, but there is a strong case to be made that, while not yet a democracy, Iran has more genuine political competition and popular input into the policy process than under the Shah.

Hizballah-Lebanon, Hamas-Palestine, and Iran are all more internally politically decentralized – allow more political participation – than Syria, Hussein’s Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.

That’s the very brief case.

I personally believe that the Islamic movement will be the mechanism by which democracy enters the Arab world.

More or less.

This is not in all cases because the Islamic cause and democracy are inherently alinged, but because after decades of living under authoritarian regimes, the two goals are conflated.

Please elaborate, glasnost. I\’m interested in how you think such an event would transpire, especially because I regard the radical Islamic movement as being at cross-purposes with the movement for democracy. Do you mean that the tension between the two will usher the endgame? I truly am curious.

The states where Islamic regimes currently exercise power are more decentralized and less top-down totalitarian than the ones where they do not.

Again, how do you mean. My perception is completely opposite, but I am willing to change my mind.

I personally believe that the Islamic movement will be the mechanism by which democracy enters the Arab world.

More or less.

This is not in all cases because the Islamic cause and democracy are inherently alinged, but because after decades of living under authoritarian regimes, the two goals are conflated.

There are examples against this, but there are also examples in favor of it.

The states where Islamic regimes currently exercise power are more decentralized and less top-down totalitarian than the ones where they do not.

However, it also doesn’t change my opinion that if you give a madman a knife, and he stabs you with it, it’s your own fault. If the rest of the world won’t comply, then they can deal with the madman.

Like Lance, I see precious few options available. None of them are very appealing, reasonable, or likely to result in peace. None of them make a lot of sense. Until we come up with a plan that does make sense, I’m afraid we will have to take the knife away from the madman – knowing he will make us bleed to do it.

As a practical matter I see little chance of that kind of sanctions regime being implemented without a military blockade anyway. Russia, China and many other countries, if not most, won’t cooperate.

I see no good options. I don’t have a lot of faith that democratic revolution is likely, but I see no other option that makes any sense at all. If we pressure the regime both internally and by making their proxy’s suffer on the battlefield when they venture out to attack us or our allies maybe then we will be able to negotiate from a position of more strength.

Ledeen does describe in the policy paper I linked to some targeted sanctions that might work. I would like some commentary on those.

But they don’t, because they are contained. In their own way, they are also beautiful. I believe the parallels to the Middle East are unavoidable – containment has to be our tactic, because deterrence is predicated upon an unwillingness to die. I don’t see that they have that.

Our sword, our jail, and our medicine in the middle east all come down to the same tool – petrodollars. I don’t see how we can win a war if we are funding both sides of the conflict. Maybe it’s time to consider pulling a Cuba on them. Don’t just restrict trade, but cut it off; let them bite the hand of a different feeder for awhile.

Israel-Hizballah war? The most aggressive and military options on the table. And “hot pursuit” of “terrorist training camps” in Iran and Syria? Is this really a situation that exists, terrorists attacking, I imagine, US troops, then fleeing across the border, and then *not* being pursued? I don’t believe it. When someone advocated aggressive military action right now, on condition of a situation that isn’t happening, then what are they really advocating?

They were not the most aggressive options on the table. However, it would be fair to say that striking Hezbollah bases in Syria and Iran is aggressive. It is also a policy I wouldn’t have agreed with, but I was opposed to the Israeli operation period. However, I don’t think striking back at Hezbollah bases in the midst of a shooting war qualifies as wildly militaristic, worthy of terms like indiscriminate bloodlust or desiring (note the word, actually wanting, not merely risking getting) oceans of blood. Whether the best way to deal with Hezbollah at that time was to limit the fighting or bomb specific training camps is something people of good will can disagree on, I guess unless one is a Hezbollah supporter.

As for your hot pursuit question, yes, that is occurring. Zarqawi fled to Syria several times. Once again, if soldiers or terrorists are coming and going across a border to attack, escape, regroup and train I don’t think it is excessively militaristic to suggest doing something about that. It is certainly debatable, but that is true of most people and arguments.

More importantly glasnost, those are small potatoes compared to what he spends most of his time advocating, which is what I was really interested. One of Ledeen’s theses is that by constantly refusing to take action against the regime we make the likelihood of actual large scale military conflict more likely down the road. Not necessarily with us, but with allies or other Middle East states. Disagree with that analysis if you want, but it explains his willingness to put pressure on the regime in the hopes that democratic reform will take hold.

As for his columns, he is combative and uses combative language. That may be a valid criticism, but it doesn’t change his primary focus. Go look at his policy papers at AEI. They are much like this interview. I am not saying don’t disagree with him, but what are we doing about Iran other than fighting about whether neo-cons want to level the place. Not much. We don’t have many good options there, why not start arguing for the Ledeen approach, even if you are not sure he believes in it?

Or is this part of Mike’s thesis that Iran runs Al-Quieda, and that we should just bomb Iran as general detterance?

I may have missed that he believes Iran runs al Qaeda, though he certainly believes they have cooperated a lot and at times have been a bit under their thumb (especially after the Afghanistan invasion) but I concentrated on his discussions on Iran and Iraq while researching this, so I could have missed something.

What I am sure of is that he has never advocated any large scale bombing of Iran, and he discusses the why of that in the interview and the linked documents. His goal is not deterrence first to disrupt the terrorists, thus striking just at their camps. The analogy would be Clinton bombing al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan.

Secondly he feels this would embolden the regimes opponents.

Unfortunately, I haven’t read just this interview. I’ve also read Mike Ledeen’s NRO columns.. several of them.

I think he makes a lot of, cough, unsourced allegations and seemingly very aggressive policy recommendations couched in general terms.

Mona’s quote at the end of his 2002 column, “Let’s roll again” – what does that stand for? Military action, couched in symbols.
What were his arguments in the Israel-Hizballah war? The most aggressive and military options on the table. And “hot pursuit” of “terrorist training camps” in Iran and Syria? Is this really a situation that exists, terrorists attacking, I imagine, US troops, then fleeing across the border, and then *not* being pursued? I don’t believe it. When someone advocated aggressive military action right now, on condition of a situation that isn’t happening, then what are they really advocating?

Or is this part of Mike’s thesis that Iran runs Al-Quieda, and that we should just bomb Iran
as general detterance?

So, Lance, I appreciate your motive, your general aims, and Mike says things that might be stirring and encouraging to someone trying to promote liberty.

But frankly, reading his own words, I find him to be – I’m being polite here – very inconsistent. More directly, I think it goes beyond carelessness with language. I think he writes columns that don’t in any way sound like how he presents himself here. I think he’s trying to play all the sides of the field at once. And I think he is regularly prone to exaggeration in his pursuit of his policy goals.