The other side of the Vietnam story, implications for Iraq and the strange metamorphosis of Jim Webb

It is a common trope for people to deride the campaign in Iraq as another Vietnam. This seems a bit ridiculous to me, but in some senses it does fit.

One way it does comes from the constant complaints about the “right wing” blaming the media and war protesters and opponents for our difficulty in Iraq. I don’t buy that they are the reason for the campaign’s struggles, but they play a major part. We can complain that it is unfair to blame those who protest, a media that emphasizes the negative, or worse. We have freedom of speech don’t we?

Yes we do, but that doesn’t mean it doesn’t in fact harm our effort. Life is full of tough contradictions and tensions, this is one of them.
We often are told this is an ideological war and an information war. A war where how we are seen makes a compelling difference. I can’t argue against that, in fact I agree wholeheartedly. yet the same people who make this argument tell us that the debates in congress, the unwillingness to support our troops mission wholeheartedly has no bearing on the ultimate outcome of the conflict. That it does not affect our troops morale, the willingness of Iraqis to stand firm with us, and risk the price that they will pay if we decide to leave. That makes no sense to me. Maybe we should leave, but let us not lie to ourselves about what it means to them. We have heard from the troops repeatedly and Nancy Pelosi even heard it from the Iraqi government before lying to them. Who can blame Maliki for hedging his bets with the militias given we might leave them to their tender mercies if we leave? What might give him the idea we might? The Iraqi soldiers who will likely be slaughtered if we leave certainly are worried, what does that do to their morale?

As for the insurgents and other forces, well, let us hear their own words. Abu-Umar Al-Baghdadi, “Amir” of the “Islamic State Of Iraq”:

The demon [the U.S.] has begun to collapse and to search for an escape. … Today, we are dictating our orders upon you. So, you should accept those gladly and submissively before you regret it. We order you to withdraw your forces immediately, provided that the withdrawal is conducted via personnel carriers and passenger airplanes that would transport your soldiers with their own personal weapons only. You should not withdraw any of your heavy weapons and gear. You should also hand over all the military bases to the mujahidin of the Islamic State and complete your withdrawal in a period that does not exceed one month. (“AmirOf Islamic State Of Iraq Offers US ‘Safe Withdrawal,’” Open Source Center, 12/22/06)

Not only are they encouraged, they are peddling fantasies to intimidate the people of Iraq. It is working in varying degrees and so our mission is harder and more people die.

From Al Qaeda Leader Ayman al-Zawahiri On Our Iraqi And Afghan Allies: These traitors [who entered Kabul and Baghdad on the backs of American tanks] in Iraq and Afghanistan must face their inevitable fate, and face up to the inescapable facts. America–which was transformed from the Great Satan into the closest Ally–is about to depart and abandon them, just as it abandoned their like in Vietnam. (“Text Of Al-Zawahiri Statement Saying Bush ‘Addicted To Drinking, Lying And Gambling,’” Open Source Center, 02/14/07)

Yes, there is Vietnam again. So yes, Vietnam is relevant. So I recommend to you this essay from the late nineties on Vietnam, and ask you to think about its lessons as they apply to Iraq:

It is difficult to explain to my children that in my teens and early twenties the most frequently heard voices of my peers were trying to destroy the foundations of American society, so that it might be rebuilt according to their own narcissistic notions. In retrospect it’s hard even for some of us who went through those times to understand how highly educated people—most of them spawned from the comforts of the upper-middle class—could have seriously advanced the destructive ideas that were in the air during the late ’60s and early ’70s. Even Congress was influenced by the virus.

For the sake of clarity I think I should state that while to some extent true, this is an exaggeration. Obviously not a person who in general I would likely find much sympathy with. Many worthwhile things came out of that time period. I would assume the modern progressive movement would be appalled, but I don’t think that affects his analysis of Vietnam’s denouement.

This so-called Watergate Congress rode into town with an overriding mission that had become the rallying point of the American Left: to end all American assistance in any form to the besieged government of South Vietnam. Make no mistake—this was not the cry of a few years earlier to stop young Americans from dying. It had been two years since the last American soldiers left Vietnam, and fully four years since the last serious American casualty calls there.

For reasons that escape historical justification, even after America’s military withdrawal the Left continued to try to bring down the incipient South Vietnamese democracy. Future White House aide Harold Ickes and others at “Project Pursestrings”—assisted at one point by an ambitious young Bill Clinton—worked to cut off all congressional funding intended to help the South Vietnamese defend themselves. The Indochina Peace Coalition, run by David Dellinger and headlined by Jane Fonda and Tom Hayden, coordinated closely with Hanoi throughout 1973 and 1974, and barnstormed across America’s campuses, rallying students to the supposed evils of the South Vietnamese government. Congressional allies repeatedly added amendments to spending bills to end U.S. support of Vietnamese anti-Communists, precluding even air strikes to help South Vietnamese soldiers under attack by North Vietnamese units that were assisted by Soviet-bloc forces.

Then in early 1975 the Watergate Congress dealt non-Communist Indochina the final blow. The new Congress icily resisted President Gerald Ford’s January request for additional military aid to South Vietnam and Cambodia. This appropriation would have provided the beleaguered Cambodian and South Vietnamese militaries with ammunition, spare parts, and tactical weapons needed to continue their own defense. Despite the fact that the 1973 Paris Peace Accords called specifically for “unlimited military replacement aid” for South Vietnam, by March the House Democratic Caucus voted overwhelmingly, 189-49, against any additional military assistance to Vietnam or Cambodia.

I think this is an important point. The decision to cut off funds for Vietnam, when the war in South Vietnam had been for all practical purposes won, was based on hostility toward that government, not because we were suffering casualties. Nor was it mere hostility, it was also based on a denial of the character of our enemies, an actual appreciation for them. As we see next, many of these men and women are still serving and unapologetic for their behavior. Should we be surprised at it now? Notice the name, “Project Pursestrings.” We relive the past.

The rhetoric of the antiwar Left during these debates was filled with condemnation of America’s war-torn allies, and promises of a better life for them under the Communism that was sure to follow. Then-Congressman Christopher Dodd typified the hopeless naiveté of his peers when he intoned that “calling the Lon Nol regime an ally is to debase the word…. The greatest gift our country can give to the Cambodian people is peace, not guns. And the best way to accomplish that goal is by ending military aid now.”

That sure sounds familiar. It sounds a lot like Murtha and that very same Christopher Dodd now. Has Dodd apologized for that statement? Probably not. The billion or more victims of that move for peace would hardly feel placated in any event.

Tom Downey, having become a foreign policy expert in the two months since being freed from his mother’s apron strings, pooh-poohed the coming Cambodian holocaust that would kill more than one-third of the country’s population, saying, “The administration has warned that if we leave there will be a bloodbath. But to warn of a new bloodbath is no justification for extending the current bloodbath.”

Once again, that sounds familiar.

On the battlefields of Vietnam the elimination of all U.S. logistical support was stunning and unanticipated news. South Vietnamese commanders had been assured of material support as the American military withdrew—the same sort of aid the U.S. routinely provided allies from South Korea to West Germany—and of renewed U.S. air strikes if the North attacked the South in violation of the 1973 Paris Peace Accords. Now they were staring at a terrifyingly uncertain future, even as the Soviets continued to assist the Communist North.

As the shocked and demoralized South Vietnamese military sought to readjust its forces to cope with serious shortages, the newly refurbished North Vietnamese immediately launched a major offensive. Catching many units out of position, the North rolled down the countryside over a 55-day period. In the ensuing years I have interviewed South Vietnamese survivors of these battles, many of whom spent ten years and more in Communist concentration camps after the war. The litany is continuous: “I had no ammunition.” “I was down to three artillery rounds per tube per day.” “I had nothing to give my soldiers.” “I had to turn off my radio because I could no longer bear to hear their calls for help.”

For those of us who have followed the lives and struggles of the people of Iraq, the flowering of Kurdistan, the dogged hopefulness of the Iraqi bloggers, the brave men who risk death we hear about from Bill Ardolino and Michael Yon, would it not be the same?

For those who had evaded the war and come of age believing our country was somehow evil, even as they romanticized the intentions of the Communists, these few weeks brought denials of their own responsibility in the debacle, armchair criticisms of the South Vietnamese military, or open celebrations. At the Georgetown University Law Center where I was a student, the North’s blatant discarding of the promises of peace and elections contained in the 1973 Paris Accords, followed by the rumbling of North Vietnamese tanks through the streets of Saigon, was treated by many as a cause for actual rejoicing.

Denial is rampant in 1997, but the truth is this end result was the very goal of the antiwar movement’s continuing efforts in the years after American withdrawal. George McGovern, more forthcoming than most, bluntly stated as much to this writer during a break in taping a 1995 edition of cnn’s “Crossfire.” After I had argued that the war was clearly winnable even toward the end if we had changed our strategy, the 1972 presidential candidate who had offered to go to Hanoi on his knees commented, “What you don’t understand is that I didn’t want us to win that war.” Mr. McGovern was not alone. He was part of a small but extremely influential minority who eventually had their way.

I’ll give McGovern credit for honesty. Many deny that was their intention to this day, but their actions went way beyond just wanting us out. So it is true today. Many openly root for our defeat, but there are many others who would never claim that is true, who would deny with anger that they want us to fail. Yet, every failing is a chance to show how wrong we are, every piece of evidence is magnified to show we did this under false pretenses, they cheer and enrich Michael Moore, every hopeful sign is treated with disdain. There is no balance, it speaks of a desire for us, or more specifically this administration, to be humiliated, the consequences be damned. Others are at least conflicted.

There is perhaps no greater testimony to the celebratory atmosphere that surrounded the Communist victory in Vietnam than the 1975 Academy Awards, which took place on April 8, just three weeks before the South’s final surrender. The award for Best Feature Documentary went to the film Hearts and Minds, a vicious piece of propaganda that assailed American cultural values as well as our effort to assist South Vietnam’s struggle for democracy. The producers, Peter Davis and Bert Schneider [who plays a role in David Horowitz’s story—see page 31], jointly accepted the Oscar. Schneider was frank in his support of the Communists. As he stepped to the mike he commented that “It is ironic that we are here at a time just before Vietnam is about to be liberated.” Then came one of the most stunning—if intentionally forgotten—moments in Hollywood history. As a struggling country many Americans had paid blood and tears to try to preserve was disappearing beneath a tank onslaught, Schneider pulled out a telegram from our enemy, the Vietnamese Communist delegation in Paris, and read aloud its congratulations to his film. Without hesitating, Hollywood’s most powerful people rewarded Schneider’s reading of the telegram with a standing ovation.

[...]

Not a peep was heard then, or since, from Hollywood regarding the people who disappeared behind Vietnam’s bamboo curtain. No one has ever mentioned the concentration camps into which a million South Vietnamese soldiers were sent; 56,000 to die, 250,000 to stay for more than six years, and some for as long as 18. No one criticized the forced relocations, the corruption, or the continuing police state. More to the point, with the exception of the well-intentioned but artistically weak Hamburger Hill, one searches in vain for a single major film since that time that has portrayed American soldiers in Vietnam with dignity and in a true context.

[...]

Vietnam veterans, though persistently maligned in film, news reports, and classrooms as unwilling, unsuccessful soldiers, have been well thought of by average Americans. In the most comprehensive study ever done on Vietnam vets (Harris Survey, 1980, commissioned by the Veterans Administration), 73 percent of the general public and 89 percent of Vietnam veterans agreed with the statement that “The trouble in Vietnam was that our troops were asked to fight in a war which our political leaders in Washington would not let them win.” Seventy percent of those who fought in Vietnam disagreed with the statement “It is shameful what my country did to the Vietnamese people.” Fully 91 percent of those who served in Vietnam combat stated that they were glad they had served their country, and 74 percent said they had enjoyed their time in the military. Moreover, 71 percent of those who expressed an opinion indicated that they would go to Vietnam again, even knowing the end result and the ridicule that would be heaped on them when they returned.

This same survey contained what was called a “feelings thermometer,” measuring the public’s attitudes toward various groups on a scale of 1 to 10. Veterans who served in Vietnam rated a 9.8 on this scale. Doctors scored a 7.9, TV reporters a 6.1, politicians a 5.2, antiwar demonstrators a 5.0, and draft evaders who went to Canada came in at 3.3.

Here is another myth that is even less true in today’s military, but keeps getting play:

Contrary to persistent mythology, two-thirds of those who served during Vietnam were volunteers rather than draftees, and 77 percent of those who died were volunteers. Of those who died, 86 percent were Caucasian, 12.5 percent were African-American, and 1.2 percent were from other races. The common claim that it was minorities and the poor who were left to do the dirty work of military service in Vietnam is false. The main imbalance in the war was simply that the privileged avoided their obligations, and have persisted since that time in demeaning the experience in order to protect themselves from the judgment of history.

I don’t know whether we should have ever been in Vietnam, but our behavior in cutting off the funds to allow them to defend themselves was disgraceful. As I pointed out before, it didn’t redound to the benefit politically of the left:

The real problem is longer term. The people may be turning on Bush, but down the road as Iraq probably gets worse and other problems spring up in the Middle East and terror attacks possibly pick up are the people going to elect the people who quit? Even if they are glad we quit, is it those people they want in charge in the future? Murtha? Kerry? Hagel?

That may seem like an obvious yes, but I doubt it. Think back to Vietnam. As unpopular as that war was, McGovern lost. The people may have wanted the war over, but they liked the quitter even less.

More importantly, it was only five years after the fall of Saigon that saw the triumph of Reagan, the anti-McGovern. The tragedy in Vietnam didn’t sour the people of America against a strong and aggressive posture against our enemies, it goaded them to find someone who promised to move us past those disasters and reassert our role in the world, someone who was not afraid to rattle his saber.

That doesn’t necessarily mean a Republican, but it almost certainly doesn’t mean those who quit or defunded the effort, so we see them playing to the anti-war faction with political theater undermining the war, such as the upcoming resolution, while refusing to put themselves in the position of actually forcing us to quit without the administrations acquiescence and making what happens afterward their legacy.

Much of this is so familiar. The denial of what is likely to happen when we leave. The claim that it is we who are the reason for the violence, not a bloodthirsty set of ideologies. If a child is killed by a car bomb, it is we who are at fault. The moral preening about how the coming slaughter is because of those who want us to stay, not due to those who demand we leave. This is not about support for the invasion, that is done. It is about the next step. If those who supported the invasion are at fault for what has happened, the cost of leaving has to be borne by those who insist it happens. That is life, hard choices all around.

Like in the essay above I care about what happens to the Iraqi’s. I shiver when I think about what will happen to Mohammed of Iraq the Model and his family. I see the most vibrant and encouraging place in the Middle East, Kurdistan, and go cold at the thought of their dismemberment as we abandon them once again. I am not an isolationist or one who thinks our immediate interests or desires trump all other factors.

Of course I should thank the author for reminding us of that dark decision. I don’t agree with his blanket condemnation of the sixties, but it reminds me of why we need to give the Iraqi government the space to haltingly find its feet and give it the resources it needs to resist the forces which will assault it once we do leave. It will not be a perfect government by any means, nor was the S. Vietnamese, Cambodian or S. Korean government. I am glad though that we gave the Korean government the support it needed to eventually become a fairly decent one, and ashamed we did not do the same in Cambodia and Vietnam. The hundreds of millions, even billions, who eventually perished deserved better. The Kerry’s, Dodd’s and Murtha’s of the world should listen to the lessons of this essay, but it would probably make them blanch and turn red with anger to see themselves in such a light.

Who is this author? Why, it is Jim Webb, who even now plots with Murtha, Dodd and Kerry to hamstring the “surge” without even giving it a chance to show progress. I don’t know how he can say all these things and do that, or connive with people he so evidently despises.The Webb of 1997 would have insisted that the government, as long as it stood, still deserved the chance to survive. The Webb of 2007 is willing to doom it. Who is being fooled in this case I don’t know. Does he repudiate his past statements? He claims not to have. Do his many supporters in the Hollywood left he so eloquently condemns know what he probably still believes? Do the Kos kids who helped him win know the depth of his contempt for the victorious fight against funding Vietnam that they hold so dear? How much he despises the values they endorse? Webb has shown himself to be awfully deceptive. I doubt either party will want him eventually. Still, read the whole essay, it is worth it. He knows his history and he knows how to write.

[tags] Jim Webb, Christopher Dodd, project Pursestrings, Vietnam, Iraq [/tags]

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